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This dissertation is about fi scal policy in Flemish municipalities in general 
and focuses on strategic policy in particular. As an introduction to local 
fi scal policy, we investigated the simultaneous role of partisan e ects, of 
fragmentation, of interaction dynamics, of electoral cycles and of fi scal illusion 
e ects on the Flemish local income tax rate and local property tax rate. 
Even though policymakers’ fi scal policy choices are assumed to bring 
about their re-election, policymakers may fail to achieve this aim. Aware 
of this failure, policymakers may change their policy from ‘opportunistic’ 
to ‘strategic’. Policymakers expecting to lose power may pursue their 
fi scal policymaking to restrain their successors’ scope of policymaking. 
Suchlike strategic behaviour, the focal point of this dissertation, is 
introduced and tested in Chapter 3. We use a vote function to estimate 
the governments’ vote expectations and provide evidence that especially 
leftist and fragmented governments expecting to be defeated change 
debt to reduce the scope for policymaking of the next government. 
Debt changes in election years thus can be explained by the government’s 
vote expectations. One way to change debt is –ceteris paribus– changing  tax 
rates. Indeed, in Chapter 4 we fi nd a signifi cant impact of the vote expectations 
on these changes. The lower the vote expectations, the stronger the local 
income tax rate cut. This is in line with expectations from strategic use of debt 
models. This e ect cannot be retrieved for local property tax rate changes.
Finally, in chapter 5, we investigated whether fragmented governments are more 
optimistic about tax revenues. Overestimating tax revenues allows governments 
to spend more than the actual revenues allow for. This expectation can be 
inspired by the strategic use of debt.  Overestimating tax revenues can be a 
strategic instrument for increasing debt when a government expects not to 
get into o  ce again after the upcoming elections. Also the ‘weak government 
hypothesis’ and the ‘war of attrition’ may explain higher optimism in coalition 
governments. We show that the level of political fragmentation indeed 
a ects the local government’s revenue forecasting behaviour. Nonetheless, 
we fi nd that coalitions with at least three parties are less optimistic.   
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General introduction 
 
This dissertation consists of four empirical essays on fiscal policy making in local 
governments. We focus on the tax rate and tax policy choices made by incumbent 
politicians, who we assume act as opportunistic agents hoping to stay in office after the 
next elections. As such we rely on standard public choice models, which, contrary to 
normative welfare theory, do not depict politicians as benevolent governors. Public Choice 
Theory views governmental decisions as the product of interest group politics which do 
not necessarily maximize the community’s prosperity. Starting from this assumption, it 
makes sense to explain tax-setting policies by reference to variables indicating aspects of 
the local political setting, the political background of those in power, the year in the 
election cycle and the strength of the party to which a politician belongs.  
 
Besides opportunistic behavior, Public Choice models recognize that politicians are not 
unfamiliar to strategic interaction (Kraan, 1996). “The concept of strategic interaction 
refers to the fact that […] decision-makers are usually cooperating in small groups, so that 
each individual vote has a noticeable effect on collective outcomes. Consequently, each 
actor is able to anticipate the reactions of other actors to their own choices” (Kraan, 1996; 
5). Persson & Svensson (1989) and Alesina & Tabellini (1990) apply such anticipating 
behavior to fiscal policy when introducing strategic debt models. Their models show that 
deficits and debts are instruments of strategic fiscal policy. Theories of strategic debt try to 
answer questions such as whether a government runs fiscal deficits when it knows that its 
successor’s choice of public spending will be influenced by the level of inherited public 
debt, or whether incumbent policy makers run higher budget deficits than they otherwise 
would if they are certain to be re-elected. The idea of the strategic use of debt is that 
governments expecting to lose the next elections consciously create deficits and increase 
government debt in order to reduce the possibilities of the next government.  
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Empirical research shows the relevance of Public Choice models for Flemish local fiscal 
policy making. Political variables such as partisanship and fragmentation characteristics 
exhibit a significant impact on the tax variables studied in most of the research (e.g. Geys, 
2007). Political budget cycles also appear to exist in the context of Flemish municipalities 
(e.g. Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006). There is also evidence of tax mimicking (e.g. Heyndels & 
Vuchelen, 1998), fiscal illusion effects (e.g. Heyndels & Smolders, 1994 & 1995) and 
flypaper effects (e.g. Bastiaens et al. 2001 and Heyndels & Van Driessche, 2002).  
 
This dissertation contributes to the field firstly by integrating previous models. Second, it 
applies models of the strategic use of debt. Do expectations of electoral defeat incite 
incumbents to change fiscal policy in a way that reduces their successors’ scope for policy 
making? The dissertation both tests the seminal strategic debt models on Flemish 
municipalities and also attempts to find evidence of strategic motivations in the formation 
of pre-electoral tax rate policy and the budgeting of tax revenues.  
 
The outline of this dissertation is the following. Chapter 1 familiarizes the reader with the 
Flemish local fiscal and political context, as well as with the results of previous empirical 
research on Flemish municipalities. 
  
The research question addressed in Chapter 2 is whether or not a government’s 
constitution, fiscal interaction dynamics, political budget cycles and fiscal illusion are of 
importance when setting the rates of the two most important Flemish local taxes. First, as 
in most of the empirical contributions, tax rate determinants are regrouped and these 
groups of variables are tested one by one on a panel data set. Second, we contribute to the 
literature by testing the simultaneous impact of these groups of variables.  
 
Given our special interest in strategic fiscal policy making, Chapter 3 overviews the 
literature on strategic deficit and debt and tests whether or not Flemish local governments’ 
debt policies are in line with the predictions of the seminal papers by Persson & Svensson 
(1989) and Alesina & Tabellini (1990).  
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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We continue building on the theory of strategic debt in chapters 4 and 5. In chapter 4 we 
focus on tax rate policy in the years immediately before elections. Traditionally, tax rate 
reductions at such times are attributed to the incumbents’ opportunistic motivations. 
Reducing tax rates, it is assumed, should increase the government’s popularity and increase 
its chances of re-election. However, such cuts could also be explained by strategic 
motivations. It may be the case that a government expects to be voted out of office 
regardless of the policy followed. In that case, it may also reduce tax rates from a strategic 
point of view. To be able to discriminate between opportunistic and strategic motivations 
for local tax rate cuts, we introduce the variable of a government’s electoral expectations 
when explaining pre-electoral tax rate changes. It is argued that the decision to change tax 
rates is influenced by the expected vote percentage for the governing party (or parties). 
 
In chapter 5 we apply strategic debt models to explain why the level of revenues collected 
by a government during the fiscal year may deviate from that projected in its budget. 
Chapter 5 analyses whether differences in government fragmentation are useful in 
explaining tax revenue forecast errors. We assume that fragmented governments are more 
optimistic about future revenues compared to one party governments, as they are on 
average less certain of staying in power (Ashworth et al., 2006). Next to the strategic use of 
debt models, the Weak Government Hypothesis (Roubini & Sachs, 1989a,b) and the War 
of Attrition idea (Alesina & Drazen, 1991) support the contention that fragmented 
governments could be more optimistic about future revenues. 
 
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 contain empirical analyses. The hypotheses are tested in different 
kinds of models found on an extensive dataset providing a wide range of information on 
Flemish local governments. Initially fiscal policy research was cross-section based, while 
recent papers almost all build on panel data estimations. In line with this evolution, 
empirical analyses are panel based. Chapter 2 contains a 3 Stages Least Squares analysis of 
the local tax rate determinants. In chapter 3 a 2 Stages Least Squares approach is 
introduced to estimate the local government’s electoral expectations. Chapter 3 continues 
with an Ordinary Least Squares analysis to test the strategic debt hypothesis. In chapter 4 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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we apply the Seemingly Unrelated Regression method to explain pre-electoral tax rate 
changes. In Chapter 5 we implement Generalized Method of Moments estimators to 
explain the differences in budgeted and realized tax receipts. 
 
Finally, some remarks on the establishment and valorisation of this dissertation. First, we 
mention that this dissertation results from the compilation of four empirical papers that 
have been written over the past four years. Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 at hand were developed 
each with their own focus and are presented before as self-contained papers at various 
academic conferences and workshops.1 In a sence, this dissertation “on papers” can be 
seen as a forced attempt to bring these papers together in one neat unit. The most logical 
presentation of the empirical analyses was in reverse order, with the strategic debt models 
as connection thread through chapters 3, 4 and 5. The reverse realisation might create 
inconsistency, still we tried to reduce it to an absolute minimum. Second, the paper that 
presents the analysis of Chapter 5 has recently been published in International Tax & 
Public Finance, a peer-reviewed journal on theoretical and empirical aspects of tax policy.2 
Chapter 3 is submitted for the B.E. Journal of Economic Policy & Analysis, a peer-reviewed 
journal that aims to publish submissions that employ microeconomics to analyze issues in 
business, consumer behavior, and public policy. We only recently received the confirmation 
that a revised version of this chapter will be most probably published in the next few 
months. Both journals are indexed in the Social Science Citation Index. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
1  For an overview of the presentations, see p. 215.   
2  Goeminne, S., Geys, B. & Smolders, C., 2008, Political fragmentation and projected tax revenues: evidence 
from Flemish municipalities, International Tax & Public Finance 15(3), 297-315. 
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Chapter 1 : Flemish municipalities 
 
Flemish municipalities are the subject of all empirical analyses in this work. This first chapter is 
intended to make the reader familiar with Flemish municipalities. To understand local governments’ 
tax policy, one should be informed about the political (section 1.1) and fiscal (section 1.2) context. As 
this dissertation is not the first empirical work on Flemish local fiscal policy, we give a brief overview of 
previous empirical tax and fiscal policy research in Flemish municipalities in section 1.3. Finally, in 
section 1.4 it is shown why the dataset of Flemish governments is popular in political economy research. 
 
1.1 Institutional and political context 
 
Through a series of state reforms over the past three decades, Belgium has become a 
federalised country in which municipalities constitute the lowest tier of government.3 The 
start of the state reform process goes back to 1970, when a revision of the Constitution 
resulted in the setting-up of the three cultural communities. Although the powers of these 
communities were initially limited, this revision laid the foundations for the establishment 
of three Regions with economic autonomy in 1980. As the state reforms continued, local 
government also became a matter for the regions. The Lambermont Accord made Flemish 
municipalities dependent on the Flemish Region. Of 589 Belgian municipalities, 308 are 
under the supervision of the Flemish government. Local governments have wide-ranging 
autonomy, as article 162 of the Belgian Constitution proclaims. This article basically states 
that municipal councils are authorised to pursue any policy that promotes the interests of 
their inhabitants and therefore have the legitimization to take any initiative that is not 
prohibited explicitly by central legislation (Vanneste, 2002). 
 
In the sections below we illustrate the institutional context of Flemish local governments 
and discuss some of their political characteristics. 
                                                 
 
3  Except for the municipality of Antwerp where districts are the lowest government level. 
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1.1.1 Institutional context 
 
Flemish local governments have a parliamentary system consisting of the local Council (the 
legislative body) and the College of Mayor and Alderman (the executive body). The local 
Council has 7 to 55 members, depending on the number of the municipality’s inhabitants. 
Seats in the Council are allocated using a system of proportional representation, in which 
each party is allocated a certain number of seats in proportion to the votes it obtains in the 
elections. The College has 2 to 10 members and is elected from the members of the 
Council. The composition of the College is determined by the party (or parties) holding a 
majority position in the Council. They appoint the aldermen and propose a mayor from 
among their councillors (the mayor is then officially appointed by the Flemish Minister of 
Home Affairs). Local power thus rests in the hands of the parties holding a majority 
position in the local council. We should also note that a multi-party College reflects the 
absence of a clear majority for any one party in the council (unlike in, for example, Norway, 
where the College reflects seats in the council (cf. Tovmo, 2007).4 This is important as it 
implies that –in most cases– all parties in the College are responsible for the decision-
making process (since they are needed to reach the majority position in the council 
necessary to pass legislation). The College is in charge of the everyday administration of the 
municipality.  
 
Elections are held every 6 years on the second Sunday of October.5 As a result of these, 
new governments are formed by the party or the parties that can command a majority in 
the Council. The new governments take office from January 1st following the elections. 
Incumbents can be re-elected without restrictions (i.e. there are no binding term limits). 
This is not unimportant for this dissertation, as research shows that incumbents who can 
run for re-election are more sensitive to strategic fiscal policy, which is in the end not 
                                                 
 
4  In some limited instances, a party with a clear majority nonetheless decides to form a coalition. This is usually 
driven by the consideration that the majority position is too tight −e.g. no absolute majority or just one seat 
above it. (Ackaert, 1996 and Buelens & Deschouwer, 2001).  
5  The most recent elections were in 2006.  
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surprising as the reason to act strategically is to get into office again.6 It should also be 
noted that the proportional representation system stimulates strategic fiscal policy as it 
leads to a diverse political landscape, both ideologically and in terms of fragmentation.  
 
1.1.2 Government fragmentation 
 
Proportional representation tends to generate more fragmented political landscapes. 
Generally, the number of parties competing in elections and participating in government is 
larger in proportional representation systems than under plurality rule (Duverger, 1954).7 
Table 1 shows that Flemish local governments exhibit a considerable degree of 
fragmentation. Therefore, the effect of government fragmentation on Flemish local fiscal 
policy will be tested in all empirical analyses of this dissertation. 
 
Table 1 Size of College of Mayor and Alderman in Flanders (N=308) 
 
 1989-1994 1995-2000 2001-2006 
1 party 
140 
45.5% 
120 
39.0% 
96 
31.2% 
2 parties 
136 
44.8% 
149 
48.4% 
162 
52.6% 
3 parties 
27 
8.8% 
31 
10.1% 
43 
14.0% 
+ 3 parties 
5 
1.6% 
8 
2.6% 
7 
2.3% 
Average number of parties 1.67 1.77 1.87 
 
Source : Ashworth et al. (2005, 400) 
  
                                                 
 
6  See Bordignon et al. (2003), who show that tax mimicking is present in Italian municipalities only when mayors 
have electoral concerns, while mayors facing a binding term limit do not appear to be affected by their 
neighbours’ policies. They conclude by stating that the auto-correlation in tax rates is likely to be driven by 
strategic considerations rather than by spatially auto-correlated shocks. See also Case (1993) and Besley & Case 
(1995a & 1995b) for an analysis of the impact of term limits on US state governors’ policies. 
7  According to Duverger (1954) political systems based on proportional representation tend to maintain 
multiparty systems, while simple majority systems result in a two-party system. The general idea is that the 
number of parties is positively correlated with the proportionality of the electoral system. 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 16 
From Table 1 it can be seen that, in each legislative period, more than 80% of the Flemish 
municipalities have had one or two parties in government. However, the incidence of single 
party governments decreases over the period examined while the opposite is true for two-
party coalitions. In addition, the number of coalitions with at least 3 parties shows that the 
level of political fragmentation has been increasing over the period 1989-2006. Indeed, 
their number have risen from 32 in the 1989-1994 periods to 50 after the municipal 
elections of 2000. Over the entire period, the average number of parties in the College has 
increased from 1.67 to 1.87.  
 
In Table 1 the degree of government fragmentation is presented in the most easiest way, 
that is the number of parties that are in the government. Still, this measure of government 
fragmentation is insensitive to the relative size of the parties that are in power. However, 
the role of size inequalities cannot be denied. Suppose a coalition government with three 
parties, each represented by three members in the College of Mayor and Alderman. Then 
think of also a government with three parties and nine members in the College, but here 
one party is represented by six members, a second party by two and the third party by only 
one member. It’s obvious that both governments are three party coalitions with nine 
members of the College, while the power of each party is different in the two presented 
compositions. Therefore we could take into account size inequalities to pay attention to the 
importance of the various parties in the decision process. In empirical specifications on 
Flemish local fiscal policy –see e.g. Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006)– the Effective Number 
Of Parties (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) is often employed. This fragmentation measure is 
based on the Herfindahl-Hirschmann concentration index. In fact, the effective number of 
parties index is its inverse and is calculated as following : 
 
Effective number of parties = 
 
with n = the number of parties in the government 
 pi = party i’s chare in the total number of seats 
 
∑
=
n
i i
p
1
2
1
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Lower concentrations result in higher values and represent increases of the fragmentation. 
By definition, the effective number of government parties cannot exceed the actual number 
of government parties. When all parties of the government have equal seats in the College, 
the effective number of parties equals the actual number of parties. Size inequalities result 
in values of effective number of parties that are lower than the effective number of parties.  
 
When in the next chapters of this dissertation the impact of fragmentation is tested, the 
variable NPAR refers to the simple count of government parties, while ENPAR represents 
the effective number of parties index as presented above. When introducing NPAR or 
ENPAR, only a linear impact of fragmentation on the dependent variable is tested. As 
research on local fiscal policy in Flemish municipalities before indicates that fragmentation 
can have a non-linear impact too −see Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006) and Geys (2007) and 
Goeminne et al. (2008)− we also combine NPAR or ENPAR with its squared terms. 
Another operationalisation to test for non-linearities is the introduction of dummy 
variables TWOPAR and LARGEPAR for governments consisting of, respectively two and 
at least three parties –with single party governments as the remaining category. 
 
1.1.3 Ideology 
 
It is not only the constitution of the government which influences, through its level of 
fragmentation, fiscal policy. This policy is also guided by the government’s ideological 
characteristics. The ideological diversification of Flemish local governments is studied by 
Deschouwer (1996) and Rihoux (2001), who position the main parties on a left-right scale. 
Local party representatives were asked to position their party on a left-right axis, with 0 
representing extreme left and 10 representing extreme right, which resulted in the 
ideological positions as shown in Table 2.  
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Table 2 Ideological positions of Flemish parties 
 
General name Previous name Current name 1989-1994 1995-2000 2001-2006 
Ecologists Agalev Groen! 2.9 2.6 2.6 
Socialists SP SP.a 2.8 2.7 2.8 
Nationalists VU - 5.1 4.7 5.0 
Local parties   5.0 5.0 4.5 
Christian Democrats CVP CD&V 5.1 5.3 5.3 
Liberals  PVV VLD 5.6 6.1 6.0 
Extreme right Vlaams Blok Vlaams Belang - 8.9 8.7 
 
Source : Deschouwer (1996) & Rihoux (2001) 
 
The first column of this table indicates that parties with a local name –indicated as “local 
parties”– are distinguished from parties that face the voter with a label formed nationally 
(Ecologists, Socialists, Nationalists, Christian Democrats, Liberals, Extreme right), 
including the connotations this might bring about in the electoral mind of voters. Parties 
with a local name, as e.g. the “list of the mayor”, have no references to parties operating at 
higher government levels and are often formed around local political personalities or issues. 
Local parties may attract voters and candidates of different ideologies, especially in the case 
of cartel lists – that are cooperations between two or more (local and/or national) lists.  
Steyvers et al. (2007) show that in the period 1976-2000 about three quarter of all municipalities 
had at least one local party in the municipal party system. Ackaert (2006) shows that for the 
same period local parties get the support of approximately one fifth of the voters. Parties with a 
national label are expected to mirror national ideological differences, political programmes 
and practices. Indeed, Deschouwer (1996) presents evidence of a nationalisation of local 
elections in terms of national party presence, but also reveals divergence among branches 
of the same party as it comes to structure, organisation, programme and electoral themes.  
 
Table 2 shows that Christian Democrats, Nationalists and local parties are at the centre. 
The Ecologists and the Socialists are at the left of the centre, while the Liberals are at the 
right of the centre. The anti-immigrant party Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang is at the extreme 
right of the spectrum. It is noteworthy that due to the “cordon sanitaire” this party 
participates in none of the Flemish local governments.8  
                                                 
 
8  The “cordon sanitaire” is a formal agreement by all the other parties that they will never talk to the Vlaams 
Belang, neither they will form a government coalition with it at any level of government. 
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Some of the national parties changed their name during the years under review. In 1992, 
the PVV (Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang) changed its name to VLD (Vlaamse 
Liberalen en Democraten). In 2001 the VU (Volksunie) split as a result of internal tensions 
into two parties : NVA (Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie), center right nationalist and SPIRIT, 
center left nationalist. Also in 2001 the CVP (Christelijke Volkspartij) and SP (Socialistische 
Partij) decided to change their names to, respectively, CD&V (Christen-Democratisch & 
Vlaams) and SP.a (Socialistische Partij Anders). Since 2003, the previously named 
AGALEV (Anders gaan leven) has gone by the name of GROEN!  
 
Table 3 Ideological complexion of municipal governments 
 
 1989-1994 1995-2000 2001-2006 
Minimum 2.8 2.7 2.8 
Maximum 5.6 6.1 6.0 
Average 4.8 5.0 4.9 
 
Source: MICE, based on Deschouwer (1996) & Rihoux (2001) 
 
However, policy is made by the local government as a whole, which is different from that 
of individual parties because many municipalities are governed by coalition governments 
(see Table 1 on p. 15). Ideological diversity is thus moderated. Table 3 presents the average 
ideological complexion of local governments as constructed by Kontopoulos & Perotti 
(1999).9 Their Ideological Complexion of the Government (ICG) index is a weighted 
average of the ideological scores, where the weight is the relative number of mayor or 
aldermen of a certain party in the government. ICG ranges from 2.7 to 6.1, with an average 
of 4.9 over the three legislatures under review. The ideological differences in governments 
are important determinants in fiscal policy as theories on partisan politics have shown (see 
Tufte, 1978). Therefore all analyses in this dissertation test for the impact of the 
government’s ideology.10 
                                                 
 
9  ICG is used previously in research on Flemish municipalities by Ashworth et al. (2006) and Geys (2007). 
10  Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) do not take ideology into account when estimating a vote-function. We add 
ideology to the analysis, but find no significant effect (see footnote 79 on p. 95). Although the final estimation 
(IX.) in chapter 5 on p. 160 does not contain ideological variables, they were tested in preliminary estimations 
(see footnote 141 on p. 164). 
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1.2 Fiscal context 
 
Local governments have wide-ranging budgetary and fiscal autonomy. They are authorized 
to decide independently on the level and the structure of revenues and expenditures. This 
paragraph first looks at revenues of Flemish municipalities, with special interests in tax 
revenue (1.2.1), then overviews their expenditures (1.2.2) and debt (1.2.3) and finally 
outlines the budgetary process (1.2.4). 
 
1.2.1 Revenues 
 
On the revenues side, three major resources can be distinguished. Figure 1 (left diagram) 
shows that taxation, grants from higher levels of government (which are for the most part 
unconditional) and “other revenues” −in which dividends from municipal associations are 
dominant− are the most important sources of revenues.  
 
Figure 1 Structure of Flemish local revenues (left diagram) and Flemish local tax revenues (right 
diagram), in percentages of total (tax) revenues, 2006 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Dexia, 2007; 5 
 
Taxation generates a little less than half of the Flemish municipalities’ revenues (47.2%). 
The diagram at the right of Figure 1 shows the composition of tax revenues. Over four 
fifths of this tax income derives from local income and local property tax. Local property 
tax (LPT) generates 43.7% of the tax revenues, while local income tax (LIT) represents 
38.8%. Both taxes are single rate surcharge taxes on the federal income tax and the regional 
property tax respectively. Higher governments define both tax bases while the local 
Councils are free to set the tax rate (including 0). The tax revenues are collected by the 
Flemish/federal government who transfer it to the local governments.  
43.7%
38.8%
17.5%
Local property tax Local income tax Other local taxes
47.2% 
41.2% 
11.6% 
Tax revenues Grants Other revenues (a.o. dividends) 
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The federal government’s income tax base is the comprehensive income of the taxpayer. 
The local income tax rate is set by the municipality as a percentage of the tax due by the 
taxpayer to the federal authority. A local tax rate of 1% logically means that local authority 
receives 1% on top of the tax a taxpayer pays to the federal government. Local income tax 
is automatically collected by means of advance tax payments. In 2006, the local income tax 
rate varied between 0% and 9% (on average 7.12% in 2006). The local share of tax revenue 
is thus only a fraction of the federal income tax on which it is based. 
 
Regional government’s property tax base is the assessed net rental value (cadastral income), 
which is the imputed income from the property that the taxpayer owns. This income is 
calculated by the tax department on the basis of objective criteria such as area and year of 
construction. Property taxes are levied by an assessment notice. Taxpayers pay property 
taxes to the Regional government, which transfers the local tax money to the local 
governments. Local property tax rates are expressed as a number of hundredths –or 
centimes– of the regional tax rate. A local government tax rate of 100 centimes equals the 
amount due to the regional government. The average local property tax rate in 2006 was 
1297, the minimum tax rate being 600 and the maximum 2250. The local share in property 
tax revenue is thus on average 13 times larger than the regional share. 
 
We should remark that there is a difference in the definition of “taxpayer” given the tax 
rate that is studied. The local income tax is a residence based tax with households as tax 
payers. The local property tax is a source based tax with the house-owner as tax payer. 
Important to mention is that companies too are subject to the local property tax. In the 
period 1991-2004, in Flanders 40% of property tax revenues came from legal persons while 
60% came from natural persons (VOKA, 2005).  
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Figure 2 shows the evolution of the average local property tax rates (LPTR) and the 
average local income tax rates (LITR) in Flemish municipalities in the period 1989-2006. 
LPTR corresponds with the left axis, while LITR is on the right axis. This figure show that 
average local tax rates show a slight upward trend (see dotted lines) over the period. 
 
Figure 2 Average LPTR (left axis), LITR (right axis) and linear trend lines (dotted lines) in Flemish 
municipalities, 1989-2006, N=308 
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Local income and local property taxes are the subject of the analyses in chapter 2 and 
chapter 4. Municipalities also collect local taxes for which they themselves set the tax base 
as well as the tax rate. Those taxes are the subject of the analysis in chapter 5. The average 
Flemish municipality collects about 15 of such taxes. However, most of these taxes are 
rather small in terms of revenue. Across all Flemish municipalities there are over 120 
different local taxes currently in use. They include taxes on private swimming pools, green 
taxes, taxes on advertising boards, taxes on camping grounds, taxes on the use of public 
domain, taxes on parking,… This multitude of different taxes is the most visible 
consequence of the Flemish municipalities’ fiscal autonomy.  
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As in most decentralised countries, local governments in Flanders depend heavily on higher 
levels of government for their revenue. Figure 1 on p. 20 shows that grants from higher 
governments are almost equal in importance to taxation in local governments’ revenues. 
Grants (which are for the most part unconditional) account for 41.2% of all revenue. Most 
of the grant revenue comes from the “Gemeentefonds”, which is in the care of the 
Regional governments.  
 
Other revenues −of which dividends from municipal associations and charges and user fees 
are the most important− are minor revenue sources for local governments, amounting to 
11.69% of the total. 
 
1.2.2 Expenditures 
 
Local expenditures can be reported using an economic or a functional classification (see 
Table 4). The economic classification distinguishes four categories of expenditures, of 
which the cost of personnel is the most important. Operating costs and debt servicing –the 
interest and capital payments that stem from local debt– present a budget share of about 
15% each. In 2006 over a quarter of the budget was allocated to transfers to inter- and 
intra-local government authorities such as public centres for social welfare, police 
departments, church fabrics and intermunicipal agencies. The largest part of the budget –
about 41%– is assigned to personnel costs. This is not surprising as the most important 
services provided at municipal level, such as education and public administration, are very 
labour intensive services. This is clear from the functional classification of the expenditures.  
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Table 4 Average municipal expenditure shares (budgets 2006) 
 
Economic classification Functional classification 
Personnel & operating costs 41.1% 
Education 30.5% 
Public administration 27.5% 
Transfers 27.0% 
Culture  11.6% 
Roads 10.9% 
Operating costs 17.9% 
Social services 5.8% 
Public safety 5.7% 
Debt service 14.0% 
Urban development 4.8% 
Others 3.2% 
Total 100% Total 100% 
 
Source : Dexia, 2007 
 
1.2.3 Debt 
 
Broadly speaking, local public debt consists of all types of debt for which a local 
government is the debtor and thus for which it is responsible for the debt service, that is 
the reimbursement of the capital and the interest payments (Vanneste, 2002).11 Even 
though they can arrange public loans, local governments almost exclusively borrow from 
banks. Four fifths of local debt is contracted at the long-term to finance investments 
(Dexia, 2007). Local governments can also make short-term debt to solve temporary 
problems of liquidity. Chapter 3 concentrates on long-term debt changes as dependent 
variable, while in the empirical analyses of chapter 2 and chapter 4 long-term debt will be 
used as control variable. This long-term debt approach follows Geys (2004) who states that 
long-term debt can be used as an indicator for a municipality’s budgetary stress. Short-term 
loans may only be an indication of temporary imbalances. Still the existence of long-term 
debt is not bad by definition. Indeed, loans are an important instrument to spread the costs 
of an investment over its lifetime. Finally, the long-term debt data-set we dispose of only 
takes into account debt for which the financial burden falls completely on the local 
government. Local governments’ debt they contract for third parties (e.g. public centres for 
social welfare), for which local governments pass through debt service to these third parties 
are not taken into account. This is because such loans have no impact on the municipality’s 
indebtedness (Geys, 2004). 
                                                 
 
11  Higher governments can subsidise a part of the yearly debt service through a specific grant. This is the case for 
(only) 1.4% of local public debt (Dexia, 2007).  
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Relatively, local public debt is about 5% of the total public debt (in terms of government 
debt under the Maastricht Treaty). In relation to GNP, local public debt is a little less then 
5%. On the balance sheet of local governments, local public debt represents about one 
quarter of the liabilities. Given that local governments are responsible for about half of 
total public investments, these levels of local public debt are more than acceptable (Dexia, 
2008). The level of long-term (own) debt in Flemish municipalities and its evolution over 
the period 1987-2001 is shown in Figure 3.12 
 
Figure 3 Average long-term (own) debt per capita (in euro), 1987-2001, N=29613 
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Source : MICE, VUB 
 
                                                 
 
12  This period corresponds largely with the period for which debt per capita is used in the empirical analyses. 
13  We are grateful to Benny Geys for sharing his data-set. In this data-set 10 municipalities are removed due to 
incomplete data-series. Moreover, Antwerp and Ghent were removed as they obtained sizeable reorganisation 
loans from the federal ‘hulpfonds tot financieel herstel van de gemeenten’ during the mid-1980s. This leaves us 
296 Flemish municipalities. Also debt variables introduced in the next chapters of this dissertation result from 
this data-set. 
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Figure 3 shows that the average long-term (own) debt per capita was 1068 euro in 2001 and 
that the level of debt presents an upward trend over the period under review. The 
reduction in 1997 was induced by the stock exchange introduction of Dexia Belgium shares 
in 1996. Local governments, the most important shareholders of Gemeentekrediet14, used 
the yield of the exceptional dividend to reduce debt. Strongest increases are in election 
years 1994 (10.1%) and 2000 (8.3%). 
 
1.2.4 Budgeting process 
 
In Belgium the fiscal year runs parallel to the calendar year (from 1 January to 31 
December). Prior to each fiscal year, the municipality must prepare a budget. This is 
important as no other expenditures but those ratified in the budget can actually take place 
(with minor exceptions in specific circumstances). In general, the first steps in the 
preparation of the budget are taken after the summer recess in August or September. Each 
local authority’s financial department then sets up a budget in order to match the 
municipality’s administrative and political objectives. This draft is based on the individual 
budgets brought forward by the various Alderman and is discussed by the College of 
Mayor and Alderman. The overall budget proposal that results from these discussions is 
then brought before the local Council for ratification and local tax rates can be decided. 
Only the budget and tax rates endorsed before 31 December can be executed. If local 
politicians do not reach agreement on the following year’s budget, and so tax rates are not 
approved by the Council prior to this date, the local government has no legal grounds to 
levy the taxes and a specific regulation comes into force with the previous year’s budget as 
a guideline. Following the fiscal year, the annual account is drawn up.  
 
                                                 
 
14  Dexia, called “Gemeentekrediet” before its stock exchange introduction, is a public credit institution devoted 
to financing the local public sector. 
 FLEMISH MUNICIPALITIES 
 27
The precise role of the various actors involved in this budgeting process cannot easily be 
put into general terms. Legally, there is only the stipulation that the presentation of the 
budget is a responsibility of the College. In practice, this does not necessarily mean that the 
College also sets up the budget. Indeed, in most –if not all– cases the College is supported 
by the finance department of the municipality. Its role is nonetheless vague and highly 
dependent on the characteristics of the local finance department (such as size and 
experience), the alderman responsible for the municipal finances and their mutual 
cooperation. These relations and the relative impact of the various actors, however, tend to 
differ across municipalities. 
 
1.3 Research on Flemish local fiscal policy 
 
Different models of fiscal policy-making decisions have been tested before on Flemish 
municipalities. Most of the research investigates whether different political, economic or 
demographic variables explain budgetary variables. Rather than a dry enumeration of 
research papers and their results, findings are assembled for some different theoretical 
models in the public choice literature, such as partisan politics, the weak government 
hypothesis, tax interaction models, the electoral cycle models and fiscal illusion. In the next 
chapter we will test these models on Flemish local tax rate policy. This section overviews 
the literature on Flemish local fiscal policy-making decisions. In Table A3 in appendix on p. 
199 research on fiscal policy in Flemish and Belgian municipalities is listed, while in this 
section the focus is on the findings of the research on a Flemish dataset.15  
 
Flemish local fiscal policy-making has been tested for the impact of ideological differences. 
Hibbs (1977) introduced the idea that ideological differences may play an important role in 
shaping public policy. In general leftist governments are expected to accept higher 
expenditures which have an effect on tax and debt policy. Studies on fiscal policy in 
Flemish municipalities show that fiscal policy is not strongly ideologically driven. Ashworth 
                                                 
 
15  Table A3 on p. 199 is structured in line with the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 when explaining the local 
income and local property tax rates.  
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et al. (2005) look for evidence whether leftist parties are willing to furnish higher levels of 
debt but are unable to find a significant impact of ideology.16 Geys (2007) finds only weak 
evidence that right-wing governments provide a higher growth rate of local public debt. 
Testing tax innovation determinants, Ashworth et al. (2006) find that, in accordance with 
the theoretical expectations, leftist governments are more likely to set new taxes. Ashworth 
& Heyndels (2000b) research politicians’ opinions concerning the local tax burden and find 
that left-wing politicians are more likely than right-wing politicians to classify a given tax 
burden as low. When local politicians are asked how they prefer to increase tax revenues, 
right-wing politicians prefer to increase income taxes, while left-wing politicians opt for 
raising property taxes (Ashworth & Heyndels, 2000a). Ashworth & Heyndels (1997) find 
no significant impact of ideology on the attitude of incumbents towards a given tax rate.  
 
It is not surprising that Geys (2007) finds effects of fragmentation on pre-electoral local 
debt policy. Table 1 on p. 15 shows that Flemish local governments exhibit a considerable 
degree of fragmentation, which inspired several scholars to test Roubini & Sachs’ (1989a, b) 
Weak Government Hypothesis (WGH) on Flemish local governments. This hypothesis 
states that weaker –i.e. more fragmented– governments tend to follow less restrictive fiscal 
policies leading to higher levels of expenditures as well as higher debts and deficits. 
Ashworth & Heyndels (2005) figure out how political fragmentation affects local Flemish 
governments’ reactions at the event of a major reform of the grant system. Their results 
reveal that under positive budgetary shocks −e.g. when grant revenue increases− 
fragmented governments spend more of the additional money, while spending is cut less 
under negative shocks −when grant revenues decrease. Ashworth et al. (2006) investigate 
the adoption of a (green) tax and find that coalitions are more likely to adopt this tax than 
single-party governments. However, this result is driven by the smaller (two-party) 
coalitions. Overall, they conclude that the greater the level of fragmentation of the 
municipal government, the lower the likelihood that a new tax will be set. Ashworth et al. 
(2005) analyse the effect of political fragmentation on local public debt. They cannot affirm 
that fragmentation significantly affects local public indebtedness in the long run. The 
                                                 
 
16  A higher debt level for leftist governments would result from the fact that the higher level of spending of 
leftist parties is not sufficiently compensated for by increased revenue generation. 
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number of parties does not affect the optimal level of local debt. Nevertheless, they find 
that fragmented governments experience difficulties in decision-making when confronted 
with an exogenous shock. In the short run, fragmented governments are less able to 
respond to such shocks. It takes more time to attain their optimal long-term level of public 
debt, which proves the existence of short-term effects of government fragmentation on 
indebtedness. Goeminne et al. (2008) analyse whether government fragmentation affects tax 
revenue forecast errors and find that governments with at least three parties are 
significantly more careful in their tax revenue projections than single- or two-party 
governments. Finally, we refer to Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) who analyse Flemish 
municipal elections during the period 1982 to 2000. They provide evidence that the number 
of parties in government has a positive effect on the vote. 
 
The yardstick competition theory assumes that incumbents mimic the tax-setting policy of 
neighbouring governments because they expect voters to use the fiscal policy of a 
neighbouring government as a yardstick to evaluate the fiscal policy of their own 
government when deciding whether or not to re-elect the incumbent government (Besley & 
Case, 1995a). Yardstick competition behavior was often tested in Flemish local 
governments. Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) confirm its existence in their vote-function 
model. They show that incumbents are punished for higher tax rates and that the electoral 
punishment depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. Ashworth et al. (2006) also 
endorse the yardstick competition hypothesis as they find evidence that adoption of a new 
tax is more likely when neighbouring municipalities have already introduced a similar tax. 
Ashworth & Heyndels (1997) analyse the politicians’ opinions concerning local tax rates. 
They find that political opposition to the local property tax rate is negatively related to the 
level of the tax rate in neighbouring municipalities. For local income tax rates, there is no 
significant effect. Ashworth & Heyndels (2000a & 2000b) agree that the higher the 
neighbouring tax burden or tax rate, the lower is political opposition to a given tax burden 
or tax rate.17 
 
                                                 
 
17  Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), Richard et al. (2005) and Van Parys & Verbeke (2007) provide evidence of 
interaction effects. Their analyses are based on a Belgian dataset. 
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Whether or not governments change their policy at election time is the central focus of 
electoral cycle models (Rogoff, 1990). The role of elections in fiscal policy is studied more 
profoundly in the theory of political budget cycles. There is a lot of empirical evidence to 
support the idea that incumbents, motivated by their chances of re-election, lower taxes, 
increase expenditures or raise grants before elections (Franzese, 2002 and Drazen, 2000). 
Flemish local governments’ fiscal policy also seems to be influenced by the time period to 
the next elections. As Ashworth et al. (2006) show, the further in time from an election, the 
more likely it is that a green tax will be installed. The electoral cycle is also found in the 
research of Ashworth et al. (2005), who find that Flemish local governments present first 
debt decreases after elections and then debt increases when elections are imminent. 
Increasing debt before elections could be the result of increasing expenditures and/or 
lowering taxation to attract voters. Geys (2007) relates the electoral cycle to fragmentation 
theory (see infra). This paper points to the level of government fragmentation as an 
intermediary factor in opportunistic political behavior. Using changes in debt growth as the 
dependent variable, the results suggest that the election-driven rise in debt growth rates is 
indeed affected by the fragmentation level of the government.  
 
Fiscal illusion theory has also been tested in Flemish municipalities. Fiscal illusion refers to 
features of the tax system that affect taxpayers’ tax burden perceptions and thereby cause 
them to underestimate how much tax they truly pay for government-provided goods 
(Gemmell et al., 2002). The literature describes different types of fiscal illusion, of which 
Heyndels & Smolders (1994) empirically confirm two.18 They find support for the tax 
complexity and flypaper effect hypotheses, while they are unable to confirm the renter 
illusion and income-elasticity hypotheses. Ashworth & Heyndels (1997 & 2000b) find no 
significant evidence of fiscal illusion when investigating the politician’s opinions of the local 
property tax rate or local tax burden. Evidence of the flypaper effect in the Flemish local 
context can be found in Bastiaens et al. (2001), Heyndels (2001) and Heyndels & Van 
Driessche (1998). Bastiaens et al. (2001) study the effect of local debt and unconditional 
                                                 
 
18  See section 2.3.5 on p. 45 for a more detailed discussion of the different types of fiscal illusion. 
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grants on local expenditure and tax policy. Heyndels (2001) looks for evidence of 
asymmetries in flypaper effects in Flemish municipalities. He finds that an increase in 
grants leads to additional spending, while a decrease in grants leaves the level of spending 
unaffected and is compensated for through additional taxation. Heyndels & Van Driessche 
(1998) analyse the responses of Flemish municipalities to budgetary windfalls of grants and 
tax revenue in order to empirically test the mental accounting model.  
 
1.4 Dataset 
 
The previous section shows that this work is not the first to test the different fiscal policy 
decision-making hypotheses on a dataset of Flemish municipalities. Ashworth et al. (2005) 
mention that, although country-level data dominate in the literature, a local-level context 
offers a number of advantages.  
 
First of all, municipalities have a homogeneous institutional context. Flemish municipalities 
share common political and constitutional systems, experience common economic shocks, 
employ similar budgetary processes and have identical electoral rules. Moreover, voter 
preferences are believed to be reasonably homogeneous across municipalities. Unlike 
studies using country data, we are able to control for institutional aspects and economic 
conditions that have been found in the literature to play an important role in determining 
fiscal policy choices. This allows us to concentrate on the crucial explanatory variables 
without the need to search for ways of controlling for the other variables. 
 
Second, Flemish municipalities have a parliamentary system which makes the results of 
analyses comparable to studies that have tested similar models on national levels.  
 
Third, when analysing local property tax and/or local income tax (changes), as in chapters 2 
and 4, there are some additional advantages, as both taxes are surcharge taxes on, 
respectively, a regional and federal tax. All municipalities have the same definition of the 
tax base since these are determined at a higher level. This is an advantage from an empirical 
point of view as we can focus on tax rate(s) (changes) without having to adjust for tax base 
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differences. Especially within the context of this dissertation, where strategic fiscal policy is 
central, the use of local property and/or local income tax is appropriate. It encourages both 
incumbents and inhabitants to make intermunicipal comparisons to strategically formulate 
or evaluate local fiscal policy respectively.  
 
A final advantage of a local data-set is related to the number of cross-sections. Municipal 
data allow testing models with a much larger number of observations, up to 308 in the 
Flemish context. Therefore, some authors like Van Parys & Verbeke (2007), Richard et al. 
(2005) and Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998) use Belgian municipal data. We only rely on fiscal 
data of Flemish municipalities. As Geys (2004) mentions, there are not only important 
political differences between Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia that would introduce 
numerous additional complexities; it is also difficult to find municipal data that are uniform 
over the different regions. 
 
The sources of the data are presented in appendix when providing descriptive statistics on 
the used variables.19   
                                                 
 
19  We refer to Table A1 on p. 195, Table A7 on p. 205, Table A10 on p. 207, Table A14 on p. 210 and Table A18 
on p. 213. 
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Chapter 2 : Tax rate determinants 
 
In general this dissertation focuses on fiscal policy in Flemish municipalities. More specifically in this 
chapter we study the tax rates of local income and local property taxes because they generate a quite 
significant amount of revenues for local governments. Though several scholars have tested the impact of 
fiscal illusion, electoral cycles, partisan and fragmentation effects on these Flemish local tax rates before, 
we look for effects of these variables using an extended dataset. Additionally we enter the groups of 
variables simultaneously.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
  
The way in which a government determines its tax rates and why policymakers change 
them has been studied before.  
 
Tax smoothing theory states that an efficient government fixes tax rates in a way that 
minimizes the costs of taxation over time. Consequently, governments will not adjust tax 
rates to temporary changes in expenditures or revenues and the planned tax rate is expected 
to be constant over time. Barro (1979) exploited this theory to explain the existence of 
surpluses and deficits.20  
 
However, empirical evidence (e.g. Strazicich, 1997) shows that tax rates are not constant 
over time and refutes tax smoothing theory. Governments do change tax rates and various 
motivations have been suggested. Hettich & Winer (1988, 1999) provide a theoretical 
framework on tax choices. They conclude that “tax systems can be viewed as the outcome 
of optimizing political and economic behavior” (Hettich & Winer, 1988; 711).  
 
                                                 
 
20  Tax smoothing in Barro’s (1979) model implies that the (overall) tax rate behaves as a random walk and the tax 
rate is a non stationary time series with a unit root. 
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The role of economic behavior was already present in standard Keynesian models that 
imply that fiscal policy is countercyclical to the business cycle. Economic and socio-
demographic conditions thus can be expected to induce tax rate changes (Chari et al., 1994). 
The impact of the choices of politicians concerning tax policy has been widely studied. In 
general the Hettich & Winer (1984, 1988, 1999) model assumes that the maximization of 
support for the government is the main objective when outlining fiscal policy. The 
probability of an individual voting for the governing party depends positively on the public 
services provided and negatively on the income loss of the individual due to taxation.  
 
Both the level of public services and the tax policy differ according to the partisan 
characteristics of the government. Theories on partisan politics attribute central importance 
to the ideological differences between groups within society and the parties that represent 
these groups (Tufte, 1978). Next to partisan influences, other theories point to politically 
inspired determinants of tax rates. The political budget cycle theory points to the impact of 
the timing of elections on tax rates (Franzese, 2002). Fragmentation and tax interaction 
theories show that, respectively, the composition of the government (Ricciuti, 2004) and 
the fiscal policy of neighbouring jurisdictions (Besley & Case, 1995a) frame tax policy as 
well. Finally, illusionary effects may explain the level of tax rates. Fiscal illusion refers to 
features of the tax system that result in an underestimation of the taxpayers’ tax burden or 
the tax price for the provision of public goods (Buchanan, 1967). 
 
The number of surveys that empirically investigate any one of the above determinants is 
impressive. Focusing on one feature permits a more detailed analysis of each individual 
determinant, but leaves the question unanswered how they are mutually related. The 
question whether tax rate determinants –that may explain tax rates when tested 
individually– also explain tax rates significantly when they are tested jointly remains 
empirically unanswered. Does one determinant interact with others? The purpose of this 
chapter is not only to test individual theories, but also to test a model that takes into 
account these theories mutually, which has –as far as we know– not been attempted before. 
Although it is impossible to capture all tax rate determinants in a model, this chapter 
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contributes to the existing literature in bringing together the most commonly cited political 
explanations for tax rates. In this chapter, we explain the local income tax rate and the local 
property tax rate on a dataset of Flemish municipalities. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 elucidates its focus and 
provides some contributions to the existing research. Section 2.3 reviews the literature on 
individual tax rate determinants and formulates some hypotheses. The empirical analysis is 
clarified in section 2.4, while the main findings are summarized in section 2.5. 
 
2.2 Discussion 
 
Attention to individual fiscal policy determinants has grown gradually. The concept of fiscal 
illusion was introduced by Puviani as early as 1903 but empirical literature on fiscal illusion 
has its origin in the mid 1970s with Oates’ (1975) test of the elasticity hypothesis.21 Also at 
that time Nordhaus (1975) popularized the political business cycle theory by stating that 
politicians attempt to create the most desirable economic conditions immediately before 
elections, knowing that costly policy adjustments are required after them.22 Shortly after, 
Hibbs (1977), followed by Tufte (1978), introduced the idea that the ideological differences 
of parties may play an important role in shaping public policy. Frey & Schneider (1978a & 
1978b) believe that ideological motives marks the chosen policy, but only early on in the 
legislative term. Opportunistic motivations tend to take the upper hand when elections are 
imminent. Since the mid 1980s, starting with Zodrow & Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson 
(1986), there has been an outpouring of academic research on tax competition, building on 
Oates’ (1972) attempt to understand the potential efficiency problems associated with 
competition for capital by local governments. At the end of the 1980s, Roubini & Sachs 
(1989a & 1989b) introduced the idea that public policy is also affected by the level of 
                                                 
 
21  In later years, Wagner (1976) introduced the Herfindahl concentration index to measure for complexity of the 
tax structure. At the end of the 1970s, Courant et al. (1979) and Oates (1979) introduced the flypaper effect as 
a case of fiscal illusion. Martinez-Vasquez (1983) was the first to explicitly focus on renter illusion.  
22  See section 4.2.1 on p. 125 for more references to the political business cycle literature. 
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government fragmentation. Ever since these seminal papers, each individual model has 
been intensively tested empirically on different types of datasets. This chapter contributes 
to this enormous literature by testing the theories jointly.  
 
Whereas most of the papers focus on tax revenues or tax rates defined as tax revenues as a 
share of GDP, we choose to adopt the tax rate in the sense of “tariff” as dependent 
variable.23 However, tax revenues information may be a less accurate reflection of elected 
officials’ intentions, as taxes paid may also reflect economic conditions of which the 
politician was unaware. We are convinced that for the panel of Flemish local authorities it is 
more convenient to explain tax rates –in the meaning of “tariffs”. The taxes under 
investigation are surcharge taxes whose precise rates the governments have to set, while the 
tax bases are based on the same legislation. This is an advantage from an empirical point of 
view.24 
 
Another contribution to the empirical research on tax rate determinants is the local context 
in which we test our hypotheses. Research on the determinants of tax rates at the municipal 
level is not that widespread. To the best of our knowledge only Allers & Elhorst (2005), 
Bastiaens et al. (2001), Bordignon et al. (2003), Brett & Pinkse (2000), Brueckner & Saavedra 
(2001), Buettner (2001), Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), Leprince et al. (2007), Richard et al. 
(2005), Solé Ollé (2003) and Van Parys & Verbeke (2007) investigate tax rate determinants 
at the local level. Tax rate determinants at higher government levels on the contrary have 
been examined extensively.25  
                                                 
 
23  Indeed, tax rates defined as tax revenues as a share of GDP are more common. Bizer & Durlauf (1990) 
demonstrate that average tax rates follow a pattern consistent with a political tax cycle and van der Ploeg 
(1989) shows that a government cuts the tax rate towards election eve in order to gain votes. Some studies rely 
on tax revenues. Poterba (1994) finds tax increases to be significantly smaller in election years than at other 
times. Yoo (1998) shows that Japanese tax revenues decrease by a statistically significant amount in the year 
immediately before elections to the House of Representatives. 
24  See section 1.4 on p. 31. 
25  Only some of the authors that examined tax rate determinants at higher government levels are Besley & Case 
(1995a), Besley & Rosen (1998), Case (1993), Esteller-Moré & Solé Ollé (2001), Feld & Reulier (2005), 
Goodspeed (2000), Hayashi & Boadway (2001), Hernández-Murillo (2003), Rork (2003) and Strazicich (2001).  
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Finally, we further narrow the focus of the analysis by giving specific attention to local 
inhabitant taxes. Ashworth & Heyndels (2000b) assume that politicians, being members of 
the majority in Flemish municipalities, try to maximize votes (in line with the Hettich & 
Winer tax structure model, see below) and show that local Flemish incumbents are sensitive 
to tax policy changes that have an impact on voters. Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) provide 
evidence that incumbents of Flemish municipalities are electorally punished for higher tax 
rates. Therefore references to the empirical literature of tax rate determinants will focus on 
studies of local inhabitant taxes. We refer to Table A2 in appendix on p. 196, where an 
overview is provided of previous papers that have studied local inhabitant tax rates.26 Whether 
or not our findings corroborate the existing literature is best assessed when referring to 
research on local inhabitant taxes. This should increase the comparability of our findings.27  
 
2.3 The literature on tax rate determinants 
 
Basically, tax systems embrace three components: tax rates, tax bases and special 
provisions, such as exemptions, credits and deductions. Our analyses explain 
simultaneously the local income tax rate and the local property tax rate of the Flemish 
municipalities. We focus on political forces, while economic forces are introduced in the 
analyses as control variables. This is in line with the Hettich & Winer tax structure model 
(Hettich & Winer, 1984, 1988, 1999).  
 
                                                 
 
26  To maximize comparability, in Table A2 papers are already ordered in line with the order in which hypotheses 
are presented in the next session. For this reason, papers that have tested more than one hypothesis appear 
several times. 
27  We are aware that, as well as inhabitant taxes, local governments may also levy business taxes. Bordignon et al. 
(2003), Buettner (2001), Brett & Pinkse (2000), Leprince et al. (2007), for example, examine local business tax 
rate determinants. But references to research on business taxes in the next section are restricted to a minimum. 
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2.3.1 The Hettich & Winer tax structure model 
 
The Hettich & Winer tax structure model, henceforth the “HW model”, explains fiscal 
choices and fiscal policies as equilibrium outcomes of a collective choice process that is 
constrained by political as well as economic forces. According to the HW model, tax 
policies and tax systems are the result of democratic choices. Traditionally the incentive and 
incidence effects of taxation and the implications of these effects on the efficient allocation 
of resources are the concerns of public finance. Besides this traditional concern, the HW 
model assigns an explicit role to the political process in analysing fiscal policy. It states that 
“a full understanding of taxation also requires [the] examination of the process by which 
tax structure is determined” (Hettich & Winer, 1999; 2). The HW model starts from a 
probabilistic voting model. The main assumptions of the model is that governments wish 
to maximize expected voter support across a heterogeneous electorate and that voters may 
or may not have complete information (Hettich & Winer, 1999; 25). Policy makers are no 
longer seen as benevolent social planners, but as self-interested politicians.  
 
According to the HW model, when going to the polls a voter i (with i=1,…,N number of 
voters) will evaluate on the one hand the benefits (bi) derived from the level of public 
goods and services provided (G) and on the other hand the loss in full income of the 
individual due to taxation needed to finance public output.28 The HW model assumes that 
tax revenue (Ti) depends on the tax rate (ti) and the level of taxable activity (Bi). Then the 
government has to choose the level of public expenditure (G) and tax rate ti so as to reduce 
the opposition to taxation (ci) and to maximize voter support 
{ }∑
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28  The loss in full income also depends on the deadweight loss or welfare cost of taxation (di). Hettich & Winer 
(1988) assume that di=0. 
  TAX RATE DETERMINANTS 
 39
and subject to the taxpayers’ responses to taxation. It is obvious that the benefits –that is 
the level of public goods and services– will positively affect and the loss in income –due tot 
taxation– negatively affect the probability of an individual voting for the government. The 
governments’ problem thus is to choose that level of taxation Ti and that level of public 
goods (G) so that the expected voter support is maximized. The level of taxation (and of 
public expenditures) that corresponds with maximized voter support can be graphically 
deduced from Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 Taxation when maximizing vote support 
 
Political cost    MPB          MPC   
Political benefit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MPC*=MPB* 
 
 
 
                                                              T*  Tax revenue 
 G* Public expenditures 
 
Assume that a government has to decide on the amount of public goods to be provided 
(G) and on the tax revenue (Ti) in order to collect the required budget. Politicians know 
that an increase of public expenditures increases voter support, while the opposite is 
expected for higher taxation. If this loss of support is seen as political costs, a political cost 
function can be created. Figure 4 presents the marginal political cost curve (MPC) 
representing marginal political costs (or the number of votes a government loses) of raising 
tax revenues. The marginal political benefit curve (MPB) reflects the electoral benefits 
obtained from an increase of public expenditures. MPC has a positive slope indicating that 
an increase of the tax revenues increases the political costs. The convexity of MPC explains 
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that the political cost increases progressively. The MPB has a negative slope to indicate that 
the marginal benefits from increasing public expenditures decrease with the level of 
government spending. A government optimizing the voter support will set taxation when 
the electoral cost of taxation equals the marginal benefit from government spending, thus 
at the level T* in Figure 4, corresponding to a level of t* given the tax base. In theory, a 
government aiming to maximize voter support should vary t* among taxpayers on a given 
tax base. Individual tax rates t* lead to the largest total vote support. However, a suchlike 
individual approach would increase administrative costs. Therefore in practice, taxpayers 
are grouped or all pay the same tax rate.  
 
Summarized, the HW model introduced self-interested politicians that aim to maximize 
voter support. The role of politics in the determination of tax policy thus should be taken 
into account when examining fiscal policy. Hettich & Winer (2002) themselves suggest 
some of these political determinants. They e.g. explicitly refer to the role of elections, the 
role of governance and the structural features of revenue systems. Therefore in the 
following of this chapter we focus on political forces that may explain the level of taxation.  
In the next sections 2.3.2 to 2.3.5 we review the literature on political tax rate determinants 
and formulate a number of testable hypotheses concerning the factors, ceteris paribus, 
affecting local tax rate policy.29 We should point to the fact that in this section, voters are 
the driving force while in the next sections governments are the driving force. Still both 
approaches are linked. E.g. left-wing governments face lower marginal political costs and 
choose higher optimal levels of public goods. Most of the variables tested in the next 
sections 2.3.2 to 2.3.5 have been tested before in research on fiscal policy in Flemish or 
Belgian municipalities as listed in Table A3 on p. 199.30 Most of the results are already 
introduced in section 1.3 on p. 27, in the introduction to fiscal policy research in Flemish 
municipalities. 
                                                 
 
29  When referring to empirical evidence in the following sections, we focus on the literature on local inhabitant tax 
rates as summarized in Table A2 in appendix on p. 196. 
30  The scope of research of the papers in Table A3 is wider than that of this chapter as we focus on tax rates 
solely. Papers are ordered according the hypotheses presented in the next section.  
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2.3.2 Composition of the government 
 
A large literature has examined whether the composition of the government affects fiscal 
policy. Mostly partisan or fragmentation characteristics have been the subjects of research, 
but the power of the government –mostly measured by an electoral margin variable– has 
also been studied. Is fiscal policy different when the government is left-wing or right-wing, 
when it is fragmented or not or when its electoral margin is low or high? The fiscal policy 
literature suggests it is and shows that the government’s characteristics play a role in 
forming fiscal policy. 
 
Partisan characteristics measure for the impact of ideological differences on policy outputs. 
Imbeau et al. (2001) explicitly state that “changes in the left-right party composition of a 
government are hypothesized to be related to changes in policy”.31 Fiscal policy theory 
believes that left-wing governments are more in favour of income redistribution and an 
active state than right-wing governments. This may lead to higher public expenditures 
(Hibbs, 1977 and Schmidt, 1996) resulting in higher tax rates. Leftist governments are thus 
expected to have a positive effect on tax rates, while the opposite is true for rightist 
governments. At the local level, the partisan hypothesis is confirmed by Solé Ollé (2003) in 
an investigation of the relation between tax mimicking and electoral accountability in 
Spanish municipalities. As a result we may hypothesize that:  
 
H1 : Leftist governments impose higher tax rates 
 
Other scholars suggest that more fragmented (or divided) governments increase public 
spending −which is reflected in a higher tax burden− because several conflicting political 
objectives have to be accommodated. This idea originates from The Weak Government 
Hypothesis (Roubini & Sachs, 1989a,b), which states that weaker –i.e. more fragmented– 
governments tend to follow less restrictive fiscal policies (for recent evidence see Ricciuti, 
                                                 
 
31  See Imbeau et al. (2001) for an overview of mainstream studies on partisan influences on policy outcome. 
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2004 and Borge, 2005; for a review see Ashworth et al., 2005). Fragmentation thus leads to 
higher levels of expenditure (see e.g. Volkerink & de Haan, 2001 and Ricciuti, 2004) as a 
result of which we can expect higher tax rates. Therefore we suggest that:  
 
H2 : More fragmented governments levy higher tax rates 
 
However, these theoretical expectations are not always confirmed by empirical research on 
local inhabitant tax rates. Solé Ollé (2003) shows that Spanish local coalition governments 
do not tax more heavily than single party governments.  
 
Finally, the power of a government may explain tax policy. Since Frey & Schneider (1978a), 
it is well-established that budgetary policy is affected by the incumbents’ electoral margin. 
The higher the electoral margin of the government, the less needs to engage in 
opportunistic fiscal behavior because it is relatively confident of re-election, regardless of its 
tax setting behavior. It thus does not have to care much about the loss of votes resulting 
from high tax rates. Solé Ollé (2003) and Allers & Elhorst (2005) show that fiscal policy 
depends on the electoral margin in Spanish and Dutch municipalities respectively. We 
hypothesize that: 
 
H3 : Governments with a large majority impose higher tax rates 
 
2.3.3 Spatial tax interaction 
 
Fiscal policy decisions of a government may be influenced by the fiscal policy decisions of 
neighbouring jurisdictions as a result of yardstick competition.32 Traditionally, the fiscal 
policy literature discerns two types of yardstick competition : tax mimicking and tax 
competition.  
 
                                                 
 
32  See Brueckner (2003) and Revelli (2005) for an overview of empirical models of strategic interaction that give 
rise to a spatial pattern in local government expenditures and revenues. 
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Tax mimicking theory shows that incumbents are likely to mimic the tax-setting of 
neighbouring governments. This is because voters are expected to use the fiscal policy of a 
neighbouring government as a yardstick to evaluate that of their own government when 
deciding whether or not to re-elect the incumbent government (Besley & Case, 1995a). 
Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998) present empirical evidence that in Belgian municipalities both 
local income and local property tax rates are influenced by the tax rate policies of 
neighbouring municipalities. Although the response to the rates of neighbouring 
municipalities only occurs slowly, Richard et al. (2005) support the idea of tax mimicking of 
local income and local property tax rates in Belgian municipalities. Allers & Elhorst (2005) 
and Solé Ollé (2003) bring forward evidence of tax mimicking behavior in Dutch and 
Spanish municipalities respectively. 
 
Tax competition theory suggests that the mobility of the tax base leads governments to 
adopt lower tax rates in order to attract part of the tax base from other jurisdictions 
(Zodrow & Mieszkowski, 1986).33 This competition can lead to tax rates that are low 
enough to result in the underprovision of public goods. This evolution is known in the 
literature as the “race to the bottom”.34 Although tax competition is well described in the 
literature (see Wilson, 1999), empirical evidence at the municipal level is scarce. We can 
only refer to Van Parys & Verbeke (2007), who show evidence of tax competition in 
Belgian municipalities, and to Brueckner & Saavedra (2001) who find similar empirical 
evidence among cities in the Boston metropolitan area.35  
 
                                                 
 
33  Of course if the tax base is immobile, as for property taxes, lowering tax rates may have motivations other 
than attracting tax base from other jurisdistions (see tax mimicking).  
34  Tax rates in Flemish municipalities do not appear to present a “race to the bottom”. Average tax rates show a 
slight upward trend (as can be seen in Figure 2 on p. 22). This, however, need not imply that tax competition 
between Flemish municipalities is absent. Competition might keep rates lower than they would have been 
without tax competition. 
35  Feld & Kirchgässner (2001) use income tax rates as exploratory variables to show that citizens of a sample of 
137 Swiss cities choose their place of residence according to fiscal incentives. 
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The theory of yardstick competition suggest that fiscal policy may be influenced by that of 
the neighbouring jurisdictions, so we hypothesize that: 
 
H4 : Tax rates interact with neighbouring tax rates 
 
2.3.4 Elections 
 
Whether or not governments change their policy at elections is the central focus of 
electoral cycle models. To name some, Bizer & Durlauf (1990), Poterba (1994) and Tufte 
(1978) provide evidence from different countries –and differing time periods– that 
politicians manipulate tax levels for electoral purposes. They support the idea that lowering 
taxes –but also increasing expenditures or raising grants– before elections raises the 
government’s chances of re-election. The existence of political budget cycles at the local 
level is shown by e.g. Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006), Binet & Pentecôte (2004), Brender 
(2003), Drazen & Eslava (2005), Geys (2007) and Veiga & Veiga (2007)36. The idea of the 
political budget cycles is supported by the literature on vote and popularity functions. Vote-
functions explain the vote (or the change in the vote) for the government at elections 
through (the change in) economic, political, but also tax variables (Nannestad & Paldam, 
1994). The theoretical expectation is that tax rate reductions (increases) or the abolition 
(introduction) of (new) taxes increase (decrease) the popularity of the government. Vermeir 
& Heyndels (2006) provide evidence that in Flemish municipalities lower tax rates do 
indeed have a positive impact on electoral outcomes. Political budget cycle and vote-
                                                 
 
36  Ashworth et al. (2005) find that Flemish local governments present first debt decreases after elections and then 
debt increases when elections are imminent. Ashworth et al. (2006) show that the further in time from an 
election, the more likely it is that Flemish governments installs a green tax. Binet & Pentecôte (2004) show that 
election-motivated tax manipulation in French municipalities can be achieved by tax rate cuts. Brender (2003) 
shows that the fiscal performance of Israeli mayors substantially affected their re-election probabilities in the 
1998 campaign, but not in the 1989 and 1993 campaigns. Drazen & Eslava (2005) find a pre-electoral increase 
in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditures in Colombian 
municipalities in the period 1987-2000. Geys (2007) finds that in election years debt growth rates increase with 
the number of parties in the College of Mayor and Aldermen in 294 Flemish municipalities over the period 
1977-2000. Solé Ollé (2003) finds that in 105 Spanish municipalities in the surroundings of Barcelona tax 
increases occur in post-election years in the period 1991-1999. Veiga & Veiga (2007) find that expenditures of 
Portuguese municipalities over the 1979-2000 period increased in pre-election periods, especially on items that 
are highly visible to the electorate (e.g., highways and streets).  
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function studies thus endorse the statement that election moments play an explanatory role 
in governments’ policies. We therefore test hypothesis 5: 
 
H5 : Tax rates increase in post-election years and decrease when elections are near  
 
2.3.5 Fiscal illusion 
 
Fiscal illusion refers to a systematically biased perception of fiscal parameters and is based 
on the misperception of the cost of government by voters. This misperception is 
influenced by the way the government raises revenues. Fiscal illusion allows the 
government to raise taxes while minimizing voters’ resistance. The literature discerns 
various types of fiscal illusion. First, the flypaper effect (or grant illusion) refers to the 
phenomenon whereby the expenditure stimulus from unconditional grants exceeds that 
from an equivalent increase in the electorate’s private income (Courant et al., 1979). A 
second source of fiscal illusion is related to the elasticity of tax receipts and stresses the 
difference between discretionary and automatic tax increases (Oates, 1975). Tax income 
growth due to the automatic responsiveness of the tax system to changes in economic 
activity remains invisible for the taxpayer, while changes in fiscal revenue due to a political 
action are highly visible. Higher levels of expenditure will be the result of automatic tax 
increases of which the political costs will be minimized. A third type of fiscal illusion can be 
found in the complexity of the tax structure. It may be difficult for voters to know the total 
amount of taxes paid when the tax structure is complex. Numerous small taxes rather than 
a few significant ones make it difficult for the taxpayer to identify the cost of government 
and thus may create illusionary effects (Heyndels & Smolders, 1994). Finally, renter illusion 
exists when local taxation is significantly property based. Most property tax systems tax 
property owners, not occupants, so that only property owners are likely to perceive 
correctly the local tax-price. Renters underestimate their true tax price as they forget that (a 
part of) the property tax is shifted to them through the rent they pay. This explains why 
renters accept more easily higher levels of local expenditure (Blom-Hansen, 2005). 
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Evidence of fiscal illusion at the local level which explains levels of expenditure is present. 
Dollery & Worthington (1999), Gemmell et al. (2002), Heyndels & Smolders (1994) and 
Pommerehne & Schneider (1978) suggest the existence of illusionary effects in Australian, 
British, Flemish and Swiss municipalities respectively. Winter & Mouritzen (2001) find 
evidence for fiscal illusion in Odense, a Danish city. These authors investigated “full” fiscal 
illusion models, while others look for evidence of only one of the four sources of fiscal 
illusion. Their studies are thus similar to those of Barnett et al. (1991) and Heyndels (2001), 
who discuss flypaper effects at the municipal level. Renter illusion at the local level is 
empirically tested by, among others, Bergstrom & Goodman (1973), Beck (1984) and 
Blom-Hansen (2005), while DiLorenzo (1982) tests the elasticity of tax receipts. For 
research on the complexity of the tax structure we can refer to Heyndels & Smolders 
(1995).  
 
As this overview shows, fiscal illusion models are used to explain higher expenditure levels. 
Fiscal illusion can also be used as an explanation for the level of tax rates, as Bastiaens et al. 
(2001) confirm. Therefore we expect higher tax rates when fiscal illusion is present and 
formulate the following (sub-)hypotheses taken into account the different types of fiscal 
illusion :   
 
H6.1 : The presence of grant illusion positively affects tax rates 
H6.2 : The elasticity of the tax receipts positively affects the tax rates 
H6.3 : The more complex the tax structure, the higher the tax rates 
H6.4 : The presence of renter illusion positively affects tax rates 
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2.4 Empirical analysis 
 
To empirically test the hypotheses formulated in the previous section, we use a dataset of 
308 Flemish municipalities for the period 1990-2001. Section 2.4.1 introduces our 
dependent variables. Section 2.4.2 provides a detailed account of the model’s specification 
and the measurement of our variables. Section 2.4.3 presents the methodology and 
empirical results. 
 
2.4.1 Dependent variables 
 
The dependent variables of the analysis, LITR and LPTR, represent the local income tax 
rate and the local property tax rate. We refer to section 1.2.1 starting on p. 20 for more 
details on local income and local property taxes.  
 
2.4.2 Empirical model 
 
We estimate the following system of equations (I.) to test our hypotheses (subscripts i and t 
referring to municipalities and time respectively): 
 
(I.) LITRit =  α1 + α2 POLit-1 + α3 INTERit + α4 TBEit + α5 ILLUSit + α6 LPTRit 
+ α7 DEMOit-1 + α8 TBASEit-1 + α9 TDEPit-1 + α10 DEBTit-1            
+ α11 TRENDt + uit 
 LPTRit =  β1 + β2 POLit-1 + β3 INTERit + β4 TBEit + β5 ILLUSit + β6 LITRit   
+ β7 DEMOit-1 + β8 TBASEit-1 + β9 TDEPit-1 + β10 DEBTit-1             
+ β11 TRENDt + vit 
 
The dependent variables LITR and LPTR represent the local income tax rate and the local 
property tax rate.  
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POL is a vector of political variables, containing partisan and fragmentation characteristics, 
as well as a variable taking into account the political strength of the government.37  
 
To test H1, that is the impact of partisan characteristics on the local tax rates, we introduce 
the Ideological Complexion of the Government (ICG) index as developed by Kontopoulos 
& Perotti (1999) and used previously in research on Flemish municipalities by Ashworth et 
al. (2006) and Geys (2007). ICG takes into account the ideological position of the 
government and positions the government on a left-right scale with 0 representing extreme 
left and 10 representing extreme right.38 As we hypothesized that leftist governments levy 
higher tax rates, the expected value of ICG is negative.  
 
H2 stated that fragmented governments are expected to levy higher tax rates. Different 
operationalisations to test the impact of fragmentation on the tax rates are tested. First we 
add the number of parties of the current government (NPARit-1) to measure the effect of 
fragmentation. Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006), Geys (2007) and Goeminne et al. (2008) have 
previously found a non-linear effect of government fragmentation on local government’s fiscal 
decision-making. Consequently, we then test a non linear specification, adding a squared term 
of NPARit-1. We also take into account size inequalities to pay attention to the importance 
of the various parties in the decision process and therefore introduce alternatively the 
effective number of government parties (ENPARit-1) as employed by Ashworth et al. (2005 
& 2006) before. Again we also introduce its squared term to test possible non-linearities. 
Another operationalisation to test for non-linearities is the introduction of dummy 
variables TWOPARit-1 and LARGEPARit-1 for governments consisting of, respectively two 
and at least three parties –with single party governments as the remaining category.  
 
                                                 
 
37  All political variables are fixed over the legislature and measured at the time of the previous elections.  
38  For more information on the calculation of ICG see section 1.1.3 on p. 19. 
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The seats margin (SEATMAR) is taken into account to measure the strength of the 
government. It is computed as the difference between the percentage of the seats of the 
government parties in the Council and 50%.39 H3 predicts that tax rates increase with 
SEATMAR, thus a positive value is expected.  
 
INTER is a vector of spatial tax interaction variables. Like Ashworth & Heyndels (1997), 
Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), Van Parys & Verbeke (2007) and Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) 
the average tax rates of the neighbouring jurisdictions (LITRN and LPTRN) are added to 
the model to test H4.40. Both the empirical literature on tax mimicking and that on tax 
competition (e.g. Heyndels & Vuchelen, 1998; Brueckner & Saavedra, 2001 and Van Parys 
& Verbeke, 2007) use the average tax rates of neighbouring municipalities to measure for 
the existence of tax mimicking or tax competition. This implies that it will be impracticable 
to distinguish between the tax mimic and tax competition effect, or thus we look for 
evidence of yardstick competition.41 Traditionally yardstick competition theories test 
whether a policy instrument of a jurisdiction is significantly affected by the same policy 
instrument in competing jurisdictions, a so-called “within policy interaction”. Nevertheless, 
a “cross policy interaction” is possible. This occurs when a jurisdiction reacts to a tax rate 
change of (one of) its neighbours by changing another tax rate. Van Parys & Verbeke 
(2007) show that tax instruments in Belgian municipalities should indeed be considered 
together. Their analysis indicates that Belgian local property (income) tax rates not only 
depend on those of their neighbours, but also on their income (property) tax rates. 
Therefore we add both LITRN and LPTRN in both tax rate regressions. 
 
                                                 
 
39  While Ashworth et al. (2005) & (2006) use the number of seats in excess of majority, we take into account the 
percentage of seats above 50% to control for the size of the Council.  
40  We calculate unweighted averages. For Flemish municipalities across the language boundary, only Flemish 
neighbours are taken into account. As it has no Flemish neighbours, Voeren is removed from the dataset when 
testing interaction effects.  
41  Brueckner (2003) shows that the reaction functions to test each interaction model separately have the same 
form, so that it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to empirically verify which model is appropriate. 
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Whether or not the time to next elections has an impact on local tax rates will be measured 
by TBE. This variable takes into account the time before elections in years and has value 5 
in post-election years, 4 in the second year after the election and so on to end with value 0 
in the election year. This technique has been used by Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006) to find 
evidence of an electoral cycle in research on fiscal policy in Flemish municipalities. For our 
purpose, the idea is that local politicians, motivated by their chances of re-election, lower 
taxation before elections. As Ashworth et al. (2006) find non-linearities in the electoral cycle 
when analysing local public debt, we introduce both TBE and its squared term.42  
 
To empirically test the fiscal illusion hypotheses, we introduce ILLUS, a vector of fiscal 
illusion variables. Different types of fiscal illusion are introduced in section 2.3.5. In this 
chapter we test three of them. 
 
First we test for the presence of a possible flypaper effect. As in Bastiaens et al. (2001), 
GRANT is defined as the unconditional grants per capita to capture a possible flypaper 
effect. As higher grants may obscure the real tax price of public goods, it may have a 
positive impact on the demand for public goods and thus on tax rates (to finance this 
increased demand). The presence of a flypaper effect should result in a positive value for 
GRANT.  
 
Second, we take into account the elasticity of the tax receipts by the variable TEL. Similar 
to Heyndels & Smolders (1994), we introduce the proportion of total tax revenue generated 
by the local income tax to capture a possible elasticity effect. TEL thus is calculated as 
(income tax revenues/total tax revenues). When no income taxes are levied, TEL has value 
0. When only income taxes are levied, TEL has value 1. We prefer the proportion of local 
income tax revenue to that of local property tax revenue to construct TEL as the tax base 
                                                 
 
42  An alternative method to confirm econometrically the existence of tax rate cycles could be to introduce a 
vector of five dummy variables, each for the number of years to the next election year. Bischoff (2004) uses 
this method to search for electoral cycles when analysing the accuracy of the tax projections of the German 
states. Results of this alternative method (not shown) are highly comparable to the results presented in Table 
10. As Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006) also apply the TBE approach on a dataset of Flemish municipalities, we 
present the TBE approach for reasons of comparability.  
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of LITR is responsive to changes in economy, while this is not true for the tax base of 
LPTR. The assessed net rental value (cadastral income) nor the Flemish regional tax rate 
has changed, so the tax base of LPTR was stable over the period under review. Should the 
elasticity of the tax receipts cause fiscal illusion, then we expect a positive value for TEL. 
More elastic tax revenues should increase spending and again this could have a positive 
impact on tax rates.  
 
Third, the complexity of the tax structure is measured by HHI. Following Wagner (1976) 
the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) is frequently used to measure the complexity of a 
jurisdiction’s tax structure, as in, for example, Bastiaens et al. (2001), Dollery & 
Worthington (1999), Heyndels & Smolders (1994) and Misiolek & Elder (1988). The HHI 
is calculated as the sum of squared shares of the individual tax items ti in the total local tax 
revenues and by definition varies between 0 and 1. Municipalities relying on just one tax 
source have index 1. The more taxes a government levies and the more the tax revenues are 
equal to each other, the lower the HHI-value. Complex tax structures thus present low 
HHI-values. We expect that a more complex tax structure reduces the political cost of 
raising local tax rates and induces higher tax rates, resulting therefore in a negative value.  
 
Finally the renter illusion hypothesis was presented in section 2.3.5. To measure a renter 
illusion effect, the percentage of residences that are non-owner-occupied may be 
introduced in the LPTR estimation.43 In Flemish municipalities the percentage of 
residences that are non-owner-occupied is gathered in the national census. Censuses are 
carried out at intervals of 10 years, so we lack yearly data to test the renter illusion 
hypothesis. Yet to test renter illusion, we project the percentage of residences that are non-
owner-occupied for the years in between by spreading the change over 10 years equally 
among the years in between. Renters underestimate their true tax price and therefore   
accept more easily higher levels of local expenditure (Blom-Hansen, 2005) that for their 
part lead to higher levels of tax rates. A positive coefficient thus is expected. 
 
                                                 
 
43  We only test the renter illusion hypothesis for the LPTR as LITR is not a property based tax. 
CHAPTER 2  
 52 
Next to these tax rate determinants that are the result of the government’s fiscal policy 
decisions –discussed in sections 2.3.2 to 2.3.5– we introduce the tax rate of the other tax as 
well as socio-economic, demographic and budgetary determinants as control variables in 
our model.  
 
The introduction of the other tax rate controls for the interdependence of different tax 
instruments. Hettich & Winer (1988) show that political-cost-minimizing politicians 
diversify tax revenues among different taxes. In these models municipalities are assumed to 
use different taxes up to the point where marginal political costs are equated for all taxes. If 
so, an increase in the political cost of raising one particular tax rate prompts an adjustment 
in the other tax rate(s). Therefore we introduce, as do Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), the 
level of LITR in the LPTR estimation and vice versa.  
 
DEMO is a vector of demographic and socio-economic variables and controls for 
intermunicipal differences in preferences for local public services. The size of the 
municipality (POP), the share of young (YOUNG) and old people (OLD) and the rate of 
unemployment (UNEMPL) reflect the needs for general and specific public services 
respectively.44 Positive coefficients are expected. 
 
Revenue-generating characteristics refer to the capability of the government to collect 
revenues. Tax rates depend in the first place on the tax base yield (TBASE). For the local 
income tax rate, TBASE is measured as the tax revenue per capita of one percent local 
income tax. As Van Parys & Verbeke (2007) mention this measure is preferred to the 
average income per capita since it takes into account the progressiveness of the federal 
income tax. To capture the local property tax base we use the tax revenue per capita of one 
                                                 
 
44  POP is measured as the number of inhabitants. YOUNG and OLD are calculated as the percentage of 
inhabitants that are below 20 and over 64 respectively. UNEMPL is the percentage of inhabitants that are 
unemployed. 
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percent (this equals 100 opc.) local property tax.45 If TBASE represents the capability of 
the government to collect revenues, a negative sign for TBASE can be expected. Indeed, a 
higher tax base allows lower tax rates for a given level of tax revenues. Still the tax base may 
also represent the demand for public goods and services. The idea here is that the demand 
for public goods and services increases with income, requiring additional financial 
resources, leading to higher tax rates. The sign of TBASE thus is a priori unknown.  
Second, tax rates also depend on the availability of alternative revenue sources (Hettich & 
Winer, 1999; 290). The more a government depends on its tax revenues, the higher the tax 
rates are expected. To measure the dependence of the tax revenues, we introduce TDEP. 
In the LITR (LPTR) estimation, this variable is constructed as the part of local income 
(property) tax revenues in total revenues. 
 
The level of debt can be of importance for fiscal policy. If a jurisdiction is confronted with 
higher levels of debt, higher tax rates can be expected given the resulting interest and 
amortization payments. We introduce DEBT as the debts per capita (in €1000).  
 
Following Solé Ollé (2003) and Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), some variables –more 
precisely the political and demographic variables, the tax base variables and the debt 
variables– are lagged one year because tax rates are set ex ante; that is, they are fixed in the 
autumn of the previous year. GRANT, on the other hand, is not lagged because 
governments know in advance the level of grants they will receive in the next fiscal year. 
No lags were introduced for the interaction variables because municipalities do not have to 
wait a year to observe the tax rates of neighbouring municipalities.46  
 
                                                 
 
45  For both tax base variables, the tax revenue per capita of one percent (100 opc.) local income (property) tax is 
calculated by dividing the total income (property) tax revenue of municipality i by the local income (property) 
tax rate and by the number of inhabitants.  
46  The setting of tax rates provokes a lot of public discussion. Council meetings –where these tax rates are 
discussed– are open to the public and politicians from neighbouring municipalities often meet so they are 
likely to be aware of tax rates in neighbouring municipalities and thus can react immediately. A similar 
assumption is made for Flemish municipalities in Geys (2006; 451) and Werck et al. (2008; footnote 10), but 
also in Buettner (2001; 227) for German local governments. 
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The inclusion of a linearly increasing trend variable (TREND) accounts for the (slight) 
upward trend in the dependent variables. The dotted lines in Figure 2 on p. 22 represent 
the linear trend lines. 
 
Table A1 in appendix on p. 195 shows some descriptive statistics concerning both the 
dependent and the explanatory variables.47 
 
2.4.3 Methodology & results 
 
We construct a model that regresses simultaneously LPTR and LITR on various local 
characteristics that, according to the theoretical expectations, may influence the tax rates. 
Some of these characteristics open up a discussion concerning some challenging 
econometric issues. 
 
First we are confronted with a “between municipalities” simultaneity problem. To measure 
for the impact of yardstick competition, neighbours’ tax rates are introduced in the 
regression. These tax rates are supposed to be endogenous. The tax rate in municipality i 
depends on that in municipality j, but also vice versa. This introduces a specific simultaneity 
problem, which is well established in the spatial econometrics literature (cf. Cliff & Ord, 
1973). In general the presence of endogenous regressors at the right-hand side of the 
equation leads to biased OLS estimates. Following Besley & Case (1995a), Heyndels & 
Vuchelen (1998), Brett & Pinkse (2000), Buettner (2001) and Solé Ollé (2003), we adopt an 
instrumental variables (IV) approach that controls for additional spatial auto-correlation of 
residuals, as demonstrated by Kelejian & Pruncha (1998). Like Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998; 
99), we introduce the neighbouring municipality’s average income, its population size, its 
                                                 
 
47  As also for the employed datasets in other chapters, sources of the data are presented in the last column of the 
descriptives-tables in appendix. 
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percentages of people under 20 and over 64 years and its average tax rates over the past 5 
years48 as instruments in the model.  
 
Second, the government decides on both LPTR and LITR in the same period and within 
the same (economic, political as social) context. Therefore the error term of the LPTR 
estimation could be correlated with the error term of the LITR estimation. We thus are 
confronted too with a “within municipality” simultaneity problem. Traditionally, Zellner’s 
SUR method is then suggested.49 This method permits to control for possible interaction 
effects in the setting of both tax rates. This interaction is not unlikely as Hettich & Winer 
(1988) state that municipalities use different taxes up to the point where marginal political 
costs are equated for all taxes. If so, an increase in the political cost of increasing one 
particular tax rate prompts an adjustment in the other tax rates. Consequently we may be 
confronted with a “within municipality” simultaneity problem. Therefore we introduce for 
the LPTR equation LITR as explanatory variable (and vice versa, see supra). To take into 
account econometrically the fact that governments consider all tax rates when setting each 
one individually, a simultaneous setting should be estimated. We thus have to construct a 
system that represents a tax structure of which both tax rates are part. It is especially “the 
interactions between the taxes [which] determine the characteristics of the tax system” 
(Gentry & Ladd, 1994; 747). Like Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998) we introduce a pooled 
three-stages least squares (3SLS) estimation. While two-stage least squares (2SLS) solve the 
“between municipalities” simultaneity problem, 3SLS allow cross-correlation between the 
equations and thus also solve the “within municipality” simultaneity problem. In fact 3SLS 
is a combination of 2SLS and SUR (Zellner & Theil, 1962). The 3SLS procedure allows for 
the interaction between the settings of these separate taxes. The 3SLS technique estimates 
both regressions simultaneously and corrects for the possible simultaneity of the left-hand-
                                                 
 
48  Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998) introduce the average tax rates of the period 1983-1990 in their cross section 
analysis of (Belgian) LITR and LPTR in 1991. 
49  The Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method is presented in Chapter 4 when testing whether or not 
vote expectations play a role in changing tax rates before elections. See section 4.4.3 on p. 136 for more details 
on the SUR method. 
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side variables. Both dependent variables are regressed on all the independent variables in 
the first stage. Here the reduced-form coefficients are estimated. The second stage uses the 
estimated values of the dependent variables derived from the first stage as independent 
variables to obtain 2SLS estimates using IV methods for both equations in the system. 
Finally, in the third stage of 3SLS, estimates of all the coefficients in the entire system of 
equations are obtained simultaneously using generalized least squares (GLS). 
 
Before running our model, we tested for the existence of multicollinearity in our dataset by 
running a correlation analysis. The correlation matrix indicated that the pair wise 
correlation coefficients of POP with respectively DEBT and GRANT are over the 
suggested threshold of |r|>0.80 (see Gujarati, 2003; 359). A remedial measure then is to 
remove one of the highly correlated variables from the model. Still we keep POP in the 
analysis as throwing out POP from the model might bias the grant and debt effect. 
Keeping GRANT and DEBT from the analysis is neither recommended as GRANT is the 
focal variable to measure the grant illusion effect and DEBT is a central variable in the next 
chapter. Therefore we keep all variables to the model to prevent the analyses from 
specification errors. Indeed, “do nothing” is another option in the presence of 
multicollinearity. Remind that even in the presence of near multicollinearity least squares 
estimators are best, linear and unbiased (Gujarati, 2003; 366).50  
 
Although time-series datasets are sensitive to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, the 
3SLS estimation technique presents consistent estimates despite the possible existence of 
these features (Wooldridge, 2002; 194).  
 
                                                 
 
50  For an unbiased estimator the average or expected value is equal to the true value. A best estimator is an 
efficient estimator, in other words it has the least variance. 
  TAX RATE DETERMINANTS 
 57
To test the different hypotheses of sections 2.3.2 to 2.3.5, we run as many models as there 
are formulated hypotheses. Each hypothesis is thus individually tested in a model 
explaining both tax rates by the hypothesis-specific variable and the control variables. Then 
we bring all hypotheses together in a single model. In each table, different regression results 
are shown. The most general possible estimations in columns (1) and (2) include all the 
available explanatory variables. We then gradually eliminate the least significant variables 
until we obtain models with only statistically significant −at least at the 10% level− 
coefficients in columns (3) and (4). If possible, references are made to previous literature 
on fiscal policy in Flemish and Belgian municipalities. For an overview of this research we 
refer to Table A3 in appendix on p. 199. 
 
A. INDIVIDUAL HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
In general, results of the individual hypothesis tests match reasonably well with the 
predicted effects. Many coefficients are significant and −when testing the individual 
hypotheses− our models explain about 50% of the variance of LITR and between 55% and 
70% of the variance of LPTR. For both tax rates, there is an essential increase of the R²s 
when testing the fiscal illusion hypothesis (see Table 11 on p. 67). Here R²s are respectively 
64% and 85%. In general the explanatory power of the presented models is much higher 
than previous research on LITR and LPTR (cf. Bastiaens et al., 2001 and Heyndels & 
Vuchelen, 1998).51 It seems that the panel characteristics of our dataset contributes to a 
higher explanatory power of the models. The adjusted R²s give no indication that 
regressors are added without contributing to the explanatory power of the model. Wald 
tests were performed and reject the null hypotheses that all slope coefficients of our 
analysis are equal to zero.  
                                                 
 
51  The Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998) cross-section analysis on Belgian municipalities tests interaction effects and 
explains 15% of LITR and 44% of LPTR. Also Van Parys & Verbeke (2007) test interaction effects, but do 
not present R² values. As in our analysis, they use panel-data (of Belgian municipalities). Bastiaens et al. (2001) 
estimate both tax rates simultaneously on a cross-section datasat of Flemish municipalities and explain 25% of 
LITR and 36% of LPTR. 
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Turning to the tests of the different hypotheses formulated in sections 2.3.2 to 2.3.5. 
 
Table 5 presents the model to test hypothesis 1, on partisan politics.  
 
Table 5 Estimation results of the 3SLS estimation of H1 (on partisan politics) 
 
Dep. Var. 
1 2 3 4 
LITRt LPTRt LITRt LPTRt 
Intercept 
4.474 
(11.33) 
*** 
 
-623.397 
(-7.39) 
*** 
 
4.267 
(23.31) 
*** 
 
-623.397 
(-7.39) 
*** 
 
ICGt-1 
-0.156 
(-5.87) 
*** 
 
-23.428 
(-3.93) 
*** 
 
-0.157 
(-5.98) 
*** 
 
-23.428 
(-3.93) 
*** 
LITRt -  
32.656 
(10.53) 
*** 
 
-  
32.656 
(10.53) 
*** 
 
LPTRt 
0.001 
(17.66) 
*** 
 
-  
0.001 
(17.66) 
*** 
 
- 
 
OLDt-1 
-3.640 
(-4.09) 
*** 
 
3155.891 
(16.01) 
*** 
 
-3.248 
(-5.44) 
*** 
 
3155.891 
(16.01) 
*** 
YOUNGt-1 
-0.595 
(-0.59) 
 
1272.509 
(5.82) 
*** 
 
-  
122.509 
(5.817) 
*** 
 
UNEMPLt-1 
9.463 
(6.30) 
*** 
 
5004.601 
(16.56) 
*** 
 
9.800 
(7.04) 
*** 
 
5004.601 
(16.56) 
*** 
POPt-1 
2.23E-05 
(20.41) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(10.25) 
*** 
 
2.23E-05 
(20.14) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(10.25) 
*** 
TBASEt-1 
-0.111 
(-28.54) 
*** 
 
-27.782 
(-36.18) 
*** 
 
-0.110 
(-29.17) 
*** 
 
-27.782 
(-36.18) 
*** 
TDEPt-1 
11.378 
(50.40) 
*** 
 
3391.824 
(68.48) 
*** 
 
11.380 
(50.41) 
*** 
 
3391.824 
(49.53) 
*** 
DEBTt-1 
-0.069 
(-14.84) 
*** 
 
-4.723 
(-4.48) 
*** 
 
-0.069 
(-14.91) 
*** 
 
-4.723 
(-4.48) 
*** 
TRENDt 
0.116 
(19.11) 
*** 
 
21.518 
(21.87) 
*** 
 
0.116 
(19.13) 
*** 
 
21.518 
(21.87) 
*** 
R² 0.502  0.617  0.502  0.617  
Adjusted R² 0.500  0.616  0.500  0.616  
Wald F-stat (p) 356329.60 (p<0.01) 355878.00 (p<0.01) 
N 3673 3673 3673 3673 
Note: t-values between brackets (except for Wald-test where p is presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Wald statistic has a 
Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated parameters).  
 
ICG measures the impact of the ideological position of the government on both tax rates. 
In line with the theoretical expectations, ICG presents a negative coefficient for both tax 
rates. Leftist governments thus impose higher tax rates than rightist governments. For each 
increase by one unit ICG LITR and LPTR reduce with respectively 0.16% and 23 centimes. 
The findings that ideology has an impact on Flemish local fiscal policy is in keeping with 
the results of Ashworth & Heyndels (2000a & 2000b), Ashworth et al. (2006) and Geys 
(2007), which all find significant coefficients for the ideological variables, while in the tests  
conducted by Ashworth & Heyndels (1997) and Ashworth et al. (2003 & 2005) there is no 
evidence that ideology is important for Flemish local fiscal policy. 
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Table 6 shows the results of the estimation to test hypothesis 2, concerning government 
fragmentation. To present the results of the estimations using the 3 different fragmentation 
operationalisations conveniently arranged in a single table, we only present the most 
efficient estimation results in Table 6, thus leaving out insignificant coefficients. 
Nevertheless, the interested reader may find the results of the estimations including all 
coefficients in appendix (see Table A4 on p. 202). 
 
Table 6 Estimation results of the 3SLS estimation of H2 (on fragmentation) – Most efficient regressions 
 
Dep. Var. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  
Intercept 
3.428 
(27.625) 
*** 
 
-774.919 
(-9.16) 
*** 3.283 
(23.68) 
*** 
 
-762.640 
(-8.99) 
*** 3.427 
(27.61) 
*** 
 
-779.319 
(19.14) 
*** 
NPARt-1 -  
42.824 
(2.65) 
*** 
- 
 
- 
 
-  - 
 
NPAR²t-1 
0.013 
(3.06) 
*** 
 
-10.213 
(-2.72) 
*** 
- 
 
- 
 
-  - 
 
ENPARt-1 -  - 
 0.268 
(2.88) 
*** 
 
36.995 
(1.76) 
* 
-  - 
 
ENPAR²t-1 -  - 
 -0.080 
(-3.35) 
*** 
 
-9.339 
(-1.74) 
* 
-  - 
 
TWOPARt-1 -  - 
 
-  - 
 
-  
27.111 
(4.34) 
*** 
LARGEPARt-1 -  - 
 
-  - 
 0.117 
(2.96) 
*** 
 
- 
 
LITRt -  
33.175 
(10.68) 
*** 
-  
32.950 
(10.60) 
*** 
 
-  
33.325 
(10.75) 
*** 
LPTRt 
0.001 
(17.51) 
*** 
 
- 
 0.001 
(17.58) 
*** 
 
- 
 0.001 
(17.57) 
*** 
 
- 
 
OLDt-1 
-2.937 
(-4.93) 
*** 
 
3174.384 
(16.05) 
*** -3.145 
(-5.24) 
*** 
 
3167.629 
(16.01) 
*** -2.814 
(-4.71) 
*** 
 
3189.573 
(16.19) 
*** 
YOUNGt-1 -  
1260.174 
(5.70) 
*** 
-  
1240.732 
(5.63) 
*** 
-  
1367.793 
(6.18) 
*** 
UNEMPLt-1 
10.401 
(7.46) 
*** 
 
5055.487 
(16.71) 
*** 10.659 
(7.54) 
*** 
 
5099.596 
(16.88) 
*** 
 
10.746 
(7.75) 
*** 
 
5007.525 
(16.60) 
*** 
POPt-1 
2.20E-05 
(19.98) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(10.22) 
*** 2.24E-05 
(20.34) 
*** 
 
0.002 
(10.020) 
*** 
 
2.20E-05 
(20.07) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(10.18) 
*** 
TBASEt-1 
-0.112 
(-29.21) 
*** 
 
-27.804 
(-36.00) 
*** -0.111 
(-28.75) 
*** 
 
-27.878 
(-36.16) 
*** 
 
-0.111 
(-29.22) 
*** 
 
-27.843 
(-36.28) 
*** 
TDEPt-1 
11.326 
(50.04) 
*** 
 
3377.134 
(49.26) 
*** 11.332 
(50.09) 
*** 
 
3383.700 
(49.19) 
*** 11.315 
(50.00) 
*** 
 
3385.199 
(49.53) 
*** 
DEBTt-1 
-0.067 
(-14.37) 
*** 
 
-4.692 
(-4.43) 
*** -0.067 
(-14.16) 
*** 
 
-4.299 
(-4.02) 
*** -0.068 
(-14.42) 
*** 
 
-4.622 
(-4.39) 
*** 
TRENDt 
0.118 
(19.20) 
*** 
 
21.431 
(21.68) 
*** 0.116 
(19.00) 
*** 
 
21.413 
(21.72) 
*** 0.117 
(19.14) 
*** 
 
21.530 
(21.89) 
*** 
R² 0.498  0.616  0.499  0.616  0.498  0.618  
Adjusted R² 0.497  0.615  0.497  0.615  0.497  0.617  
Wald F-stat (p) 354013.60 (p<0.01) 353865.30 (p<0.01) 353576.30 (p<0.01) 
N 3673 3673 3673 
Note: t-values between brackets (except for Wald-test where p is presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
Wald statistic has a Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated parameters).  
 
In line with Ashworth & Heyndels (2005), Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006), Geys (2007), 
Goeminne et al. (2008) and Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) Table 6 shows that fragmentation 
affects local fiscal policy in Flemish municipalities. In general, we can state that the effect of 
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fragmentation on tax rate policy is not linear. Indeed, NPAR² (in columns 1 & 2) and 
ENPAR² (in columns 3 & 4) present significant coefficients for both tax rates. Also most 
of the above mentioned papers provide evidence of a non linear effect of fragmentation on 
local fiscal policy. There broad-based coalitions are suggested to be more likely to follow 
fiscal policies representative of a larger part of the population (see e.g. Lijphart & Crepaz, 
1991). These broad-based coalitions might thus be less prone to threats of minor interest 
groups, limiting increases in expenditures and thereby the need to set higher tax rates. This 
idea is confirmed by our results. Still, the pattern of the results is not a simple one. Due to 
the significant coefficients for both ENPAR and ENPAR² in both estimations, the 
ENPAR approach (columns 3 & 4) may claim the recommendation to be the preferential 
approach. However, none of the approaches excels in increasing the explanatory power of 
the model. Indeed, R²s are similar for the different operationalisations, it thus becomes 
difficult to recommend one or another approach to test the impact of fragmentation on 
local fiscal tax rate policy. Therefore, in the following of this dissertation the different 
fragmentation operationalisations will be consequently tested, while at least the approach 
leading to the most efficient results will be presented. Returning to the results in Table 6. 
For both quadratic approaches the impact of fragmentation on the tax rates is calculated 
and is presented in Figure 5 on p. 203 in appendix. On the leftist (rightist) axis, the curves 
in black (grey) show the impact of fragmentation on LPTR (LITR). We distinguish between 
the actual number of parties approach (full lines) and effective number of parties approach 
(dotted lines). The curves for LPTR are concave. In the ENPAR approach LPTR increases 
until ENPAR is 1.98 (+36.64 centimes). Then, the increase loses power and when ENPAR 
exceeds 3.97, LPTR decreases. When taking into account NPAR, LPTR is the highest for 
governments with 2 government parties (+44.79 centimes). Governments with 5 parties 
have the lowest LPTR (-41.22 centimes). This concave course is only retrieved for LITR 
when ENPAR is chosen as fragmentation variable. Here the maximum LITR is recovered 
when ENPAR is 1.66 (+0.23%). When ENPAR exceeds 1.66, the increase of LITR 
diminishes and when ENPAR is 3.37, LITR decreases. When measuring fragmentation 
using NPAR, LITR increases more proportional to the number of parties.  
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Hypothesis 3, concerning the power of the government, is tested in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 Estimation results of the 3SLS estimation of H3 (on government strength) 
 
Dep. Var. 
1 2 3 4 
LITRt LPTRt LITRt LPTRt 
Intercept 
3.974 
(10.24) 
*** 
 
-729.705 
(-9.02) 
*** 
 
3.508 
(27.86) 
*** 
 
-729.705 
(-9.02) 
*** 
 
SEATMARt-1 
-0.511 
(-3.82) 
*** 
 
-79.628 
(-2.66) 
*** 
 
-0.525 
(-3.94) 
*** 
 
-79.628 
(-2.66) 
*** 
 
LITRt -  
32.119 
(10.26) 
*** 
 
-  
32.119 
(10.26) 
*** 
 
LPTRt 
0.001 
(17.14) 
*** 
 
-  
0.001 
(17.09) 
*** 
 
-  
OLDt-1 
-3.534 
(-3.90) 
*** 
 
3245.782 
(16.29) 
*** 
 
-2.678 
(-4.43) 
*** 
 
3245.782 
(16.29) 
*** 
 
YOUNGt-1 
-1.282 
(-1.27) 
 
1242.160 
(5.66- 
*** 
 
-  
1242.160 
(5.66- 
*** 
 
UNEMPLt-1 
10.587 
(6.98) 
*** 
 
5197.641 
(17.22) 
*** 
 
11.337 
(8.12) 
*** 
 
5197.641 
(17.22) 
*** 
 
POPt-1 
2.19E-05 
(19.85) 
*** 
 
0.002 
(9.90) 
*** 
 
2.19E-05 
(19.92) 
*** 
 
0.002 
(9.90) 
*** 
 
TBASEt-1 
-0.112 
(-28.45) 
*** 
 
-27.582 
(-35.54) 
*** 
 
-0.111 
(-28.96) 
*** 
 
-27.582 
(-35.54) 
*** 
 
TDEPt-1 
11.308 
(49.69) 
*** 
 
3351.609 
(48.68) 
*** 
 
11.309 
(49.69) 
*** 
 
3351.609 
(48.68) 
*** 
 
DEBTt-1 
-0.067 
(-14.33) 
*** 
 
-4.378 
(-4.15) 
*** 
 
-0.068 
(-14.41) 
*** 
 
-4.378 
(-4.15) 
*** 
 
TRENDt 
0.116 
(18.73) 
*** 
 
21.589 
(21.88) 
*** 
 
0.115 
(18.70) 
*** 
 
21.589 
(21.88) 
*** 
 
R² 0.502  0.617  0.501  0.617  
Adjusted R² 0.500  0.616  0.500  0.616  
Wald F-stat (p) 349134.60 (p<0.01) 348128.80 (p<0.01) 
N 361952 
Note: t-values between brackets (except for Wald-test where p is presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Wald statistic has a 
Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated parameters).  
 
The expectation was that stronger majorities would be less liable to opportunistic fiscal 
behavior as they are relatively confident about re-election, regardless of their tax setting. 
They thus should not have to care much about the loss of votes because of high tax rates. 
Both regressions of our model present a significantly negative coefficient for the 
SEATMAR variable, indicating that more powerful governments levy lower tax rates. 
Although contrary to the expectations, this result may not be that surprising. A stronger 
majority may indeed be less liable to opportunistic behavior without this automatically 
leading to higher tax rates. On the contrary, good vote perspectives may create a working 
environment in which a government is able to focus only on the needs of the municipality 
independent of possible opportunistic or strategic motivations. This may lead to lower tax 
                                                 
 
52  Compared with Table 5 and Table 6 we lose some observations due to the lack of some SEATMAR values. 
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rates. Indeed, a strong government may more easily reduce spending (Volkerink & de 
Haan, 1999). There is for example no need to gain additional votes by increasing 
expenditures or developing impressive (and costly) investment projects. Instead, the 
government can develop long-term planning with a staggering of investments over 
different terms, tax rates need not be increased after elections to permit tax decreases in 
election years, and so on. Governments that are more confident about re-election are thus 
not (or less) tempted to act opportunistically and are able to focus on the good governance 
of the municipality. This may lead to more efficient governments, resulting in lower tax 
rates. 
 
Hypothesis 4 was related to the impact of neighbouring municipalities’ fiscal policy 
decisions. We present two approaches. In Table 8 the “within policy interaction” approach 
is considered, while in Table 9 the “cross policy interaction” is tested. As in most of the 
literature on Flemish local fiscal policy, the analyses provide evidence of interaction effects 
on the setting of local tax rates.53  
 
                                                 
 
53  Only Ashworth et al. (2003) could not confirm their expectations about the role of neighbouring policies on 
the municipality’s own fiscal policy. 
  TAX RATE DETERMINANTS 
 63
Table 8 Estimation results of the 3SLS estimation of H4 (on policy interaction – within policy 
interaction) 
 
Dep. Var. 
1 2 3 4 
LITRt LPTRt LITRt LPTRt 
Intercept 
2.725 
(6.01) 
*** 
 
-677.465 
(-9.51) 
*** 
 
2.682 
(11.01) 
*** 
 
-677.010 
(-9.52) 
*** 
LITRNt 
0.126 
(3.43) 
*** 
 
-  
0.126 
(3.45) 
*** 
 
- 
 
LPTRNt -  
0.499 
(29.85) 
*** 
 
-  
0.499 
(29.86) 
*** 
LITRt -  
33.689 
(12.00) 
*** 
 
-  
33.691 
(12.00) 
*** 
LPTRt 
0.001 
(17.27) 
*** 
 
-  
0.001 
(17.34) 
*** 
 
- 
 
OLDt-1 
-3.381 
(-3.88) 
*** 
 
1578.766 
(8.68) 
*** 
 
-3.307 
(-5.61) 
*** 
 
1577.829 
(8.68) 
*** 
YOUNGt-1 
-0.112 
(-0.11) 
 
536.144 
(2.76) 
*** 
 
-  
534.993 
(2.76) 
*** 
UNEMPLt-1 
11.191 
(7.63) 
*** 
 
4419.530 
(16.49) 
*** 
 
11.256 
(8.31) 
*** 
 
4419.081 
(16.49) 
*** 
POPt-1 
2.19E-05 
(20.51) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(13.52) 
*** 
 
2.19E-05 
(20.55) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(13.52) 
*** 
TBASEt-1 
-0.107 
(-26.73) 
*** 
 
-20.192 
(-27.04) 
*** 
 
-0.107 
(-27.57) 
*** 
 
-20.191 
(-27.04) 
*** 
TDEPt-1 
11.114 
(49.10) 
*** 
 
2744.030 
(41.41) 
*** 
 
11.114 
(49.12) 
*** 
 
2744.073 
(41.41) 
*** 
DEBTt-1 
-0.067 
(-14.64) 
*** 
 
-6.016 
(-6.46) 
*** 
 
-0.067 
(-14.68) 
*** 
 
-6.016 
(-6.46) 
*** 
TRENDt 
0.112 
(18.42) 
*** 
 
12.303 
(13.22) 
*** 
 
0.112 
(18.52) 
*** 
 
12.301 
(13.21) 
*** 
R² 0.514  0.701  0.514  0.701  
Adjusted R² 0.513  0.700  0.512  0.700  
Wald F-stat (p) 397861.90 (p<0.01) 397754.60 (p<0.01) 
N 366154 
Note: t-values between brackets (except for Wald-test where p is presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Wald statistic has a 
Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated parameters).  
 
Table 8 shows that “within policy interaction” effects are present. The results provide 
support for the yardstick competition hypothesis. The coefficients indicate that 
governments whose neighbours increase their average income (property) tax rate by 1 
percentage point will also increase the LITR (LPTR) by 0.126 (0.499) percentage points. 
The tax rate of the neighbouring municipalities thus are used as a yardstick, still their effect 
is partial. The effect of the neighbouring municipalities’ tax rates is clearly stronger in the 
case of LPTR. 
 
                                                 
 
54  Removing Voeren from the dataset reduces the number of observations by 12 compared with Table 5 and 
Table 6. 
CHAPTER 2  
 64 
Table 9 Estimation results of the 3SLS estimation of H4 (on policy interaction – cross policy 
interaction) 
 
Dep. Var. 
1 2 3 4 
LITRt LPTRt LITRt LPTRt 
Intercept 
1.852 
(3.92) 
*** 
 
396.898 
(0.66) 
 
1.974 
(7.97) 
*** 
 
1145.404 
(2.93) 
*** 
 
LITRNt 
0.527 
(10.12) 
*** 
 
-179.705 
(-1.79) 
* 
 
0.554 
(11.87) 
*** 
 
-320.083 
(-4.21) 
*** 
 
LPTRNt 
-0.003 
(-11.34) 
*** 
 
0.723 
(5.60) 
*** 
 
-0.003 
(-16.16) 
*** 
 
0.901 
(9.28) 
*** 
 
LITRt -  
44.468 
(6.98) 
*** 
 
-  
52.227 
(9.97) 
*** 
 
LPTRt 
0.002 
(20.10) 
*** 
 
-  
0.002 
(22.18) 
*** 
 
-  
OLDt-1 
-0.613 
(-0.66) 
 
1610.579 
(8.36) 
*** 
 
-  
1802.249 
(8.87) 
*** 
 
YOUNGt-1 
0.602 
(0.60) 
 
79.504 
(0.24) 
 -  -  
UNEMPLt-1 
1.966 
(1.17) 
 
5052.108 
(11.21) 
*** 
 
-  
5589.666 
(12.180) 
*** 
 
POPt-1 
1.86E-05 
(16.41) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(8.98) 
*** 
 
1.77E-05 
(16.09) 
*** 
 
0.002 
(8.49) 
*** 
 
TBASEt-1 
-0.130 
(-29.00) 
*** 
 
-22.379 
(-15.26) 
*** 
 
-0.129 
(-34.77) 
*** 
 
-24.023 
(-19.16) 
*** 
 
TDEPt-1 
10.016 
(40.44) 
*** 
 
2673.231 
(32.93) 
*** 
 
9.881 
(43.65) 
*** 
 
2600.809 
(29.65) 
*** 
 
DEBTt-1 
-0.057 
(-12.04) 
*** 
 
-5.811 
(-5.88) 
*** 
 
-0.055 
(-11.92) 
*** 
 
-5.832 
(-5.35) 
*** 
 
TRENDt 
0.163 
(21.61) 
*** 
 
10.842 
(8.40) 
*** 
 
0.168 
(24.94) 
*** 
 
9.784 
(8.03) 
*** 
 
R² 0.487  0.661  0.471  0.558  
Adjusted R² 0.486  0.660  0.470  0.556  
Wald F-stat (p) 477398.60 (p<0.01) 480981.60(p<0.01) 
N 3661 
Note: t-values between brackets (except for Wald-test where p is presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Wald statistic has a 
Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated parameters).  
 
Results in Table 9 show that there is not only evidence of within-policy interaction, but also 
offers evidence of cross-policy interaction. Columns three and four show that LITR is not 
only defined by the level of LITRN, but also by the level of LPTRN. In this context, the 
within-policy interaction coefficient (of LITR) increases (from 0.126 to 0.554), showing 
evidence that the level of LITRN becomes more important in setting LITR, still this effect 
is compensated for at the expense of the level of LPTRN. An increase of LPTRN by 100 
centimes reduces LITR by 0.3%. The same conclusion can be drawn for LPTR. Again the 
within-policy coefficient (of LPTR) increases (from 0.499 to 0.901) and the increase is 
compensated for at the expense of the level of LITRN. Here an increase of LITRN by 1% 
reduces LPTR by 320 centimes.    
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Taking the within- and cross-policy interaction effects together, the results of Table 9 
indicate that the change of LITRN by 1% changes LITR by 0.544% and LPTR by 320 
centimes  in the opposite direction. A change in the average neighbouring local income tax 
rate is thus only partly compensated for. The same conclusion can be drawn for changes in 
the LPTRN. Again a change in the average neighbouring local property tax is 
undercompensated for. If LPTRN is changed by 100 centimes, LPTR responds in the same 
direction by 90 centimes, while the LITR moves in the opposite direction by 0.3%.  
 
Both the results of the within- and cross-policy approach indicate that incumbents are 
more sensitive to changes in their neighbours’ average property tax rate than in their 
average income tax rate. LPTR stronger follows changes in LPTRN than LITR follows 
changes in LITRN. Governments thus seem to fear more the electoral impact of not 
following local property tax rate reductions than of not following the local income tax rate 
reductions of their neighbours. We thus may assume that incumbents find LPT more 
electorally costly than LIT. To explain why incumbents may think that voters have more 
LPTR than LITR in mind when they enter the voting booth, we can appeal to differences 
in visibility (see Kone & Winters, 1993) and differences in tax base stability. Firstly, 
Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) illustrate that in Flemish municipalities the local property tax 
may be assumed to be more visible than the local income tax since it is levied by an 
assessment notice. LIT, on the other hand, are automatically collected since it is a tax which 
is deducted at source. Moreover, monthly bank statements indicating earnings do not 
mention the share of it which goes to local income tax. This is only visible in the final tax 
assessment, which inhabitants receive not earlier than at the end of the year following the 
fiscal year. The fact that LPT is much more present in total property tax due than LIT is 
present in total income tax due is another factor which makes it more visible. This 
inequality could give the inhabitants the impression that LPT is more “local” than LIT and 
thus make incumbents more responsible for LPTR than for LITR. Secondly, the tax base 
of LIT is more sensitive to changes in the business cycle than that of LPT. Governments 
can thus appeal to exogenous evolutions to justify LITR changes. As a result, LPTR 
changes can be attributed to incumbents as political acts, while LITR changes can easily be 
assigned to economic developments exogenously initiated. 
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Hypothesis 5 concerns the impact of the electoral cycle on local tax rates.  
 
Table 10 Estimation results of the 3SLS estimation of H5 (on electoral cycles) 
 
Dep. Var. 
1 2 3 4 
LITRt LPTRt LITRt LPTRt 
Intercept 
3.543 
(9.12) 
*** 
 
-794.681 
(-9.91) 
*** 
 
3.101 
(22.78) 
*** 
 
-794.681 
(-9.91) 
*** 
 
TBEt 
0.185 
(6.12) 
*** 
 
56.286 
(8.45) 
*** 
 
0.185 
(6.14) 
*** 
 
56.286 
(8.45) 
*** 
 
TBE²t 
-0.033 
(-5.74) 
*** 
 
-8.449 
(-6.62) 
*** 
 
-0.033 
(-5.76) 
*** 
 
-8.449 
(-6.62) 
*** 
 
LITRt -  
31.326 
(1021) 
*** 
 
-  
31.326 
(1021) 
*** 
 
LPTRt 
0.001 
(17.37) 
*** 
 
-  
0.001 
(17.33) 
*** 
 
-  
OLDt-1 
-3.604 
(-4.05) 
*** 
 
3099.078 
(15.908) 
*** 
 
-2.799 
(-4.71) 
*** 
 
3099.078 
(15.908) 
*** 
 
YOUNGt-1 
-1.207 
(-1.21) 
 
1123.595 
(5.22) 
*** 
 
-  
1123.595 
(5.22) 
*** 
 
UNEMPLt-1 
10.745 
(7.14) 
*** 
 
5152.767 
(17.33) 
*** 
 
11.457 
(8.26) 
*** 
 
5152.767 
(17.33) 
*** 
 
POPt-1 
2.24E-05 
(20.50) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(10.62) 
*** 
 
2.24E-05 
(20.58) 
 
0.003 
(10.62) 
*** 
 
TBASEt-1 
-0.112 
(-28.83) 
*** 
 
-28.349 
(-37.29) 
*** 
 
-0.111 
(-29.31) 
*** 
 
-28.349 
(-37.29) 
*** 
 
TDEPt-1 
11.463 
(50.50) 
*** 
 
3434.604 
(50.69) 
*** 
 
11.465 
(50.50) 
*** 
3434.604 
(50.69) 
*** 
 
DEBTt-1 
-0.069 
(-14.73) 
*** 
 
-4.771 
(-4.58) 
*** 
 
-0.069 
(-14.83) 
*** 
 
-4.771 
(-4.58) 
*** 
 
TRENDt 
0.127 
(20.03) 
*** 
 
24.454 
(23.42) 
*** 
 
0.126 
(20.00) 
*** 
 
24.454 
(23.42) 
*** 
 
R² 0.502  0.627  0.502  0.627  
Adjusted R² 0.501  0.626  0.501  0.626  
Wald F-stat (p) 357466.40 (p<0.01) 356524.80 (p<0.01) 
N 3673 
Note: t-values between brackets (except for Wald-test where p is presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Wald statistic has a 
Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated parameters).  
 
Table 10 provides evidence of an electoral cycle for both the LITR and the LPTR. In line 
with the expectations and with the course of the curves of Figure 2 on p. 22, we find that 
governments impose lower tax rates in election years and that they increase tax rates once 
elections have taken place. As in Ashworth et al. (2005), the electoral cycle variables present 
a non-linear path of fiscal policy variables. This is in line with a standard finding in the 
public choice literature (Imbeau & Chenard, 2002). Both the LITR and LPTR increase 
once elections took place. The highest tax rates are observed 3 years before elections. Then, 
LITR is 0.26% higher than in election years, while LPTR is 14 centimes higher. When 
elections come near tax rates reduce to present the lowest level over the electoral cycle in 
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the election years.55 From these results we could conclude that incumbents find both tax 
rates electorally costly. 
 
Finally we test hypothesis 6, on fiscal illusion.  
 
Table 11 Estimation results of the 3SLS estimation of H6 (on fiscal illusion) 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Dep. Var. LITRt LPTRt LITRt LPTRt 
Intercept 
-0.107 
(-0.27) 
 
1602.551 
(23.31 
*** 
 
-0.107 
(-0.27) 
 
1547.094 
(25.94) 
*** 
GRANTt 
-0.003 
(-5.28) 
*** 
 
0.290 
(2.55) 
*** 
 
-0.003 
(-5.28) 
*** 
 
0.292 
(6.34) 
*** 
TELt 
6.239 
(30.26) 
*** 
 
-2087.134 
(-57.13) 
*** 
 
6.239 
(30.26) 
*** 
 
-2073.597 
(-69.90) 
*** 
HHIt 
-3.085 
(-13.75) 
*** 
 
-24.994 
(-0.62) 
 
-3.085 
(-13.75) 
*** 
 
-  
RENTt -  
2.635 
(6.63) 
*** 
 
-  
2.533 
(7.45) 
*** 
LITRt -  
93.034 
(36.53) 
*** 
 
-  
94.564 
(44.72) 
*** 
LPTRt 
0.002 
(29.65) 
*** 
 
-  
0.002 
(29.65) 
*** 
 
- 
 
OLDt-1 
4.799 
(5.62) 
*** 
 
345.459 
(2.28) 
** 
 
4.799 
(5.62) 
*** 
 
327.908 
(2.47) 
** 
YOUNGt-1 
4.728 
(5.02) 
*** 
 
-1175.118 
(-7.28) 
*** 
 
4.728 
(5.02) 
*** 
 
-1031.470 
(-7.31) 
*** 
UNEMPLt-1 
4.319 
(2.95) 
*** 
 
-2065.650 
(-8.24) 
*** 
 
4.319 
(2.95) 
*** 
 
-1856.660 
(-8.68) 
*** 
POPt-1 
2.54E-05 
(14.66) 
*** 
 
-0.001 
(-0.58) 
 
2.54E-05 
(14.66) 
*** 
 
-  
TBASEt-1 
-0.072 
(-19.18) 
*** 
 
-35.187 
(-61.02) 
*** 
 
-0.072 
(-19.18) 
*** 
 
-35.195 
(-68.15) 
*** 
TDEPt-1 
4.308 
(12.59) 
*** 
 
959.185 
(14.61) 
*** 
 
4.308 
(12.59) 
*** 
 
934.874 
(16.765) 
*** 
DEBTt-1 
-0.063 
(-13.20) 
*** 
 
0.941 
(1.13) 
 
-0.063 
(-13.20) 
*** 
 
-  
TRENDt 
0.074 
(11.34) 
*** 
 
27.648 
(30.95) 
*** 
 
0.074 
(11.34) 
*** 
 
27.479 
(42.22) 
*** 
R² 0.636  0.841  0.636  0.845  
Adjusted R² 0.635  0.840  0.635  0.845  
Wald F-stat (p) 727195.30 (p<0.01) 756642.20 (p<0.01) 
N 304056 
Note: t-values between brackets (except for Wald-test where p is presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Wald statistic has a 
Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated parameters).  
 
Table 11 provides evidence of fiscal illusion, still the results are not univocal. For the LPTR 
there is evidence that confirms the hypotheses of grant illusion and renter illusion. Indeed, 
GRANT and RENT provide significant coefficients with the expected signs. In line with 
                                                 
 
55  The joint impact of TBE and TBE² on LITR and LPTR for all years of the electoral cycle are presented in 
Table A5 on p. 203 in appendix. 
56  Our sample is reduced by two years compared to the previous tables as we do not posses individual tax 
revenue data –needed to calculate HHI– for the years before 1992. 
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Heyndels & Smolders (1994) and Van Parys & Verbeke (2007) we find evidence for the 
grant illusion effect. Indeed, higher grants may obscure the real tax price of public goods 
leading to an increase in the demand for public goods with a higher LPTR as consequence. 
Contrary to (the cross-section analyses of) Ashworth & Heyndels (1997), Heyndels & 
Smolders (1994) and Schockaert (1987) we find empirical evidence of renter illusion in 
Flemish municipalities. In line with the expectations we find that a higher percentage of 
renters in the municipality pushes the LPTR up. This provides evidence that renter illusion 
reduces the political cost of LPTR. In line with the test of the interaction hypothesis, this 
provides evidence that LPTR is electorally costly for local incumbents.57 The higher the 
percentage of renters, the more the burden of high tax rates is exported to the owners (that 
may vote in other municipalities). This way of thinking also counts in the other direction. 
The positive sign may also suggest that incumbents are aware that property tax may be 
electorally costly when a municipality has a high percentage of owner residents (or thus a 
low percentage of renters). Indeed, owner residents can pay back the government for high 
LPTR in the voting booth, while renters may forget that the property tax is shifted to them 
through the rent they pay. The sign of HHI is in line with the expectations, still the 
coefficient remains insignificant. As in Heyndels & Smolders (1994), the sign of TEL is 
negative. This is opposite to the expectations. There is no evidence that a higher elasticity 
of the tax revenues increases LPTR. On the contrary, the negative sign points to a lower 
LPTR with high tax elasticity. This may suggest that in the LPTR estimation TEL suffers 
from a “tax dependence bias”. The higher the percentage of local income tax revenues in 
total tax revenues, the less it is dependent on those of local property tax, so the less need to 
set high LPTR. This is in line with the positive sign of control variable TDEP.58  
 
                                                 
 
57  On p. 65 differences in visibility and differences in tax base stability are quoted to support the idea that LPT 
may be electorally costly for incumbents. 
58  The control variables are discussed in section c. starting on p. 75 
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Contrary to the LPTR estimation, in the LITR estimation the expected positive sign for 
TEL is confirmed. This could be evidence of the tax elasticity hypothesis, still the positive 
sign is in line with the “tax dependence bias” as suggested in the LPTR estimation. The 
findings on tax complexity are in line with Bastiaens et al. (2001). As these authors we test 
the complexity hypothesis on LITR and LPTR, but find only support for LITR. The more 
complex is the tax structure, the higher is LITR. Or thus a higher complexity of the tax 
structure may reduce the political cost of raising LITR, while this is not true for LPTR. 
These findings are opposite to those when testing the interaction effects. On p. 65 we 
suggested that LPT was more electorally costly than LIT. Still there are arguments why LIT 
would be more electorally costly than LPT. Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) propose that in 
Flemish municipalities LIT may indeed have a higher electoral cost than LPT as these two 
differ in terms of the definition of the tax base. The property tax is source based, so tax 
exportation may occur. This is opposite to the income tax that is residence based. Source 
based taxation allows for tax exportation, possibly lowering the expected political cost 
associated with the property tax. Finally, companies pay local property taxes too but have 
no direct vote for municipal elections. Another reason thus why LPT may be less 
electorally costly than LIT. As in Van Parys & Verbeke (2007) there is no evidence of grant 
illusion in the LITR estimation. Moreover, the sign of GRANT is opposite to the 
expectations. Higher levels of grants lead to lower LITR. This negative coefficient may 
reject the hypothesis of grant illusion, still it may present evidence that local governments 
have lower LITR the higher the grant revenue. Here the negative coefficient may thus 
measure the availability of alternative revenue sources, rather than a grant illusion effect.  
 
To summarize the findings concerning all individual hypotheses, Table 12 provides an 
overview of the results. Both LITR and LPTR seem, in a univariate interpretation, to be 
sensitive to ideology, to fragmentation, to the power of the majority and to interaction 
effects. The fragmentation hypothesis cannot be confirmed, still results show that tax rates 
depend on fragmentation. In line with Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006), Geys (2007) and 
Goeminne et al. (2008) the effect of fragmentation on local fiscal policy is non-linear. 
Initially tax rates increase with the level of fragmentation, still for higher levels of 
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fragmentation, tax rates are set at a lower level. Only for the fiscal illusion, the findings are 
not that univocal. For the LPTR there is evidence of grant illusion and of renter illusion, 
while the tax complexity and tax elasticity hypotheses are confirmed for LITR. 
 
Table 12 Findings of the individual hypothesis tests 
 
Hypothesis 
Individual H-testing 
LITR LPTR 
H1 on partisan politics Confirm Confirm 
H2 on fragmentation Non linear Non linear 
H3 on government strength Opposite sign Opposite sign 
 
H4 on interaction Within Confirm Confirm 
Cross Confirm Confirm 
H5 on electoral cycles Confirm Confirm 
 
H6 on fiscal illusion H6.1  Grant illusion Opposite sign Confirm 
H6.2  Tax Complexity Confirm No evidence 
H6.3  Tax Elasticity Confirm Opposite sign 
H6.4 Renter illusion - Confirm 
 
B. JOINT HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
The above tests produce findings comparable to those in the literature on the specifically 
tested tax rate determinants. And yet these individual analyses may lead to contradictory 
conclusions. For example, we found evidence that suggests that income tax is electorally 
more costly than property tax when testing the tax complexity hypothesis, while the 
evidence concerning the policy interaction effects or concerning renter illusion suggests the 
opposite conclusion. What has to be borne in mind is that, when setting the tax rate, 
incumbents may simultaneously take into account the time to elections, the tax rates of 
their neighbours, their ideological preferences and so on. The individually tested tax rate 
determinants thus all contribute at the same time. Below, therefore, we test all hypotheses 
jointly. Results are in Table 13 and permit to figure out whether or not the analysed 
determinants are jointly of impact on tax rates in Flemish municipalities. Again we test 
different fragmentation operationalisations. To facilitate the comparison between the 
different approaches, we again −as in Table 6 on p. 59− only present the most efficient 
regressions in Table 13, while the regression results including all variables are presented in 
the appendix (Table A6 on p. 204).  
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Table 13 Estimation results of the 3SLS estimation of all joint hypotheses – Most efficient regressions 
 
Hyp. Dep. Var. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  
 
Intercept 
-0.743 
(-1.69) 
* 
 
3418.063 
(9.63) 
*** -0.701 
(-1.64) 
 
3472.004 
(9.53) 
*** -0.842 
(-1.97) 
** 
 
3473.083 
(9.76) 
*** 
1 ICGt-1 
-0.090 
(-3.60) 
*** 
 
41.917 
(5.30) 
*** -0.092 
(-3.82) 
*** 
 
45.059 
(5.47) 
*** -0.086 
(-3.61) 
*** 
 
41.642 
(5.30) 
*** 
2 NPARt-1 
-0.119 
(-1.84) 
* 
 
45.002 
(2.68) 
*** 
-  -  -  - 
 
 NPAR²t-1 
0.025 
(1.68) 
* 
 
-8.277 
(-2.14) 
** 
-  -  -  - 
 
 ENPARt-1 -  - 
 -0.063 
(-2.95) 
*** 
 
103.164 
(4.45) 
*** 
-  -  
 ENPAR²t-1 -  - 
 
-  
-22.916 
(-3.84) 
*** 
-  -  
 TWOPARt-1 -  - 
 
-  - 
 -0.045 
(-1.78) 
* 
 
21.270 
(2.98) 
*** 
 LARGEPARt-1 -  - 
 
-  - 
 
-  
19.911 
(1.90) 
* 
 
3 SEATMARt-1 
-0.243 
(-1.99) 
** 
 
-  -  - 
 -0.235 
(-1.93) 
* 
 
- 
 
4 LITRNt 
0.319 
(6.95) 
*** 
 
-389.582 
(-6.70) 
*** 0.310 
(6.74) 
*** 
 
-409.166 
(-6.71) 
*** 0.318 
(6.91) 
*** 
 
-387.052 
(-6.71) 
*** 
 LPTRNt 
-0.002 
(-8.15) 
*** 
 
0.631 
(8.30) 
*** -0.002 
(-7.88) 
*** 
 
0.656 
(8.20) 
*** -0.002 
(-8.10) 
*** 
 
0.628 
(8.34) 
*** 
5 TBEt 
0.081 
(3.14) 
*** 
 
31.684 
(4.65) 
*** 0.082 
(3.21) 
*** 
 
31.064 
(4.47) 
*** 0.081 
(3.16) 
*** 
 
31.528 
(4.65) 
*** 
 TBE²t 
-0.011 
(-2.33) 
*** 
 
-3.900 
(-3.05) 
*** -0.012 
(-2.41) 
** 
 
-3.723 
(-2.86) 
*** -0.012 
(-2.34) 
** 
 
-3.877 
(-3.05) 
*** 
6.1 GRANTt 
-0.003 
(-4.74) 
*** 
 
0.723 
(4.32) 
*** -0.003 
(-4.99) 
*** 
 
0.735 
(4.32) 
*** -0.003 
(-4.72) 
*** 
 
0.721 
(4.32) 
*** 
6.2 TELt 
5.537 
(26.17) 
*** 
 
-1924.881 
(-33.51) 
*** 5.545 
(26.25) 
*** 
 
-1933.764 
(-33.09) 
*** 5.538 
(26.18) 
*** 
 
-1923.429 
(-33.60) 
*** 
6.3 HHIt 
-3.128 
(-14.35) 
*** 
 
361.299 
(5.01) 
*** -3.121 
(-14.40) 
*** 
 
376.496 
(5.05) 
*** -3.119 
(-14.33) 
*** 
 
357.121 
(5.00) 
*** 
6.4 RENTt -  
1.851 
(3.29) 
*** 
-  
1.835 
(3.20) 
*** 
-  
1.859 
(3.32) 
*** 
 
LITRt -  
110.811 
(21.24) 
*** 
-  
112.125 
(21.01) 
*** 
-  
110.637 
(21.34) 
*** 
 
LPTRt 
0.002 
(28.24) 
*** 
 
- 
 0.002 
(28.28) 
*** 
 
- 
 0.002 
(28.30) 
*** 
 
- 
 
 
OLDt-1 
6.526 
(8.01) 
*** 
 
- 
 6.201 
(7.65) 
*** 
 
-  6.502 
(7.97) 
*** 
 
- 
 
 
YOUNGt-1 
6.177 
(6.91) 
*** 
 
-2538.261 
(-9.36) 
*** 5.966 
(6.73) 
*** 
 
-2553.287 
(-9.22) 
*** 6.106 
(6.76) 
*** 
 
-2517.584 
(-9.25) 
*** 
 UNEMPLt-1 -  -  -  -  -  -  
 
POPt-1 
2.23E-05 
(13.26) 
*** 
 
-0.002 
(-3.42) 
*** 2.32E-05 
(13.84) 
 
-0.002 
(-3.64) 
*** 2.23E-05 
(13.25) 
*** 
 
-0.002 
(-3.42) 
*** 
 
TBASEt-1 
-0.082 
(-21.67) 
*** 
 
-36.955 
(-32.33) 
*** -0.081 
(-21.49) 
*** 
 
-37.276 
(-31.69) 
*** -0.082 
(-21.75) 
*** 
 
-36.926 
(-32.44) 
*** 
 
TDEPt-1 
4.615 
(13.91) 
*** 
 
968.783 
(9.47) 
*** 4.620 
(13.97) 
*** 
 
962.281 
(9.22) 
*** 4.613 
(13.92) 
*** 
 
972.060 
(9.53) 
*** 
 
DEBTt-1 
-0.056 
(-12.25) 
*** 
 
2.290 
(1.93) 
* -0.058 
(-12.69) 
*** 
 
3.044 
(2.49) 
*** -0.056 
(-12.23) 
*** 
 
2.282 
(1.93) 
* 
 
TRENDt 
0.101 
(13.95) 
*** 
 
20.380 
(12.23) 
*** 0.101 
(13.99) 
*** 
 
19.680 
(11.54) 
*** 0.101 
(13.94) 
*** 
 
20.415 
(12.32) 
*** 
 R² 0.642  0.642  0.644  0.627  0.642  0.650  
 Adjusted R² 0.640  0.640  0.642  0.625  0.640  0.648  
 Wald F-stat (p) 711580.10 (p<0.01) 729700.80 (p<0.01) 637581.50 (p<0.01) 
 N 3323 
Note: t-values between brackets (except for Wald-test where p is presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Wald statistic has a 
Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated parameters).  
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A quick glance at the results shows that the results of the individual analyses do not hold in 
the joint analysis. We discuss the results hypothesis by hypothesis.  
 
The results show that in the integrated analyses, partisan politics remain to have a 
significant impact on both LITR and LPTR. Leftist governments levy higher LITR in the 
joint model. As such, the LITR estimation supports hypothesis 1. The coefficient of ICG 
shows that its impact on tax rates is reduced by about 40% compared to the individual 
model. While in the individual test there was also a significant negative coefficient for ICG 
in the LPTR estimation, in the joint analysis, against the expectations, the coefficient is 
positive. This provides evidence that leftist governments impose lower LPTR. The results 
of the ICG variable in the joint analysis thus show that leftist governments tend towards 
high income tax rates, while they prefer low property tax rates. This is in line with the 
general idea that left-wing governments rely more heavily on the taxation of personal 
income as they favour the progressivity of tax schedules59 –as in the federal income tax on 
which the local income tax is a surcharge (see for example Cusack & Beramendi, 2006 and 
Imbeau et al., 2001). On the other hand, the local property tax in Flemish municipalities 
lacks progressivity. This could be an explanation why leftist governments rely more on 
income taxes. 
 
For hypothesis 2 on fragmentation, we again test different operatonalisations. For LPTR, 
the results are more or less similar to that of the individual hypothesis test. There is a non 
linear impact of fragmentation on LPTR. First LPTR increases with the level of 
fragmentation, then it decreases. The “concave impact” of fragmentation on LPTR thus 
remains present in the joint hypotheses test. The results for LITR are opposite to the 
findings of the individual analyses. Here the results suggest lower LITR with an increasing 
level of fragmentation. In the ENPAR-approach this effect is linear, in the NPAR- and 
dummy variable approach it is non-linear. In line with the previous findings of non-
linearities in fiscal policy decision making and with the results of the individual hypothesis 
test, we prefer to recommend the non-linear approach. 
                                                 
 
59  Wilensky (2002; 235) explicitely states that “especially progressive income taxes are the favourites of leftist 
parties everywhere”. 
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The SEATMAR coefficient (to test hypothesis 3) is only significant in the LITR estimations 
when using the above suggested approaches of testing fragmentation, that is using NPAR or 
the dummy variables. As in the individual hypothesis test, the coefficient is negative. Unlike the 
individual test, there is no indication in this joint hypotheses test that the power of the 
government explains LPTR.  
 
The results testing hypothesis 4 in the joint hypothesis setting correspond to those in the 
individual test. They show that tax rates depend on those of neighbouring municipalities, 
both in within- and cross-policy approaches. However, we find in the joint hypothesis 
setting that for both tax rates the within-policy loses power. Both coefficients are lower in 
the joint model. The same is true for the cross-policy interaction term LPTRN in the LITR 
estimation, while the coefficient of LITRN in the LPTR estimation gains in absolute value, 
suggesting a stronger cross-policy interaction effect than in the individual hypothesis test.  
 
As in the individual hypothesis test, the joint analysis supports hypothesis 5 for both tax 
rates. Evidence is found that both LITR and LPTR are higher in post-election years and 
decreases when elections come near. All coefficients have smaller absolute values, 
suggesting that in the joint hypotheses test the role of the electoral cycle diminishes.   
 
Finally the joint analysis presents significant coefficients for all tested hypotheses on fiscal 
illusion. Again there is no overall confirmation possible of  hypothesis 6 on fiscal illusion. 
Comparable to the individual analysis, the sign of GRANT is negative in the LITR 
estimation, while it is positive in the LPTR estimation. The conclusion made in the 
individual analysis thus remains its validity. Still, in the joint analysis, the level of grants 
gains power. The coefficient more than doubles in the joint analysis, suggesting a stronger 
grant illusion effect in the joint analysis. The results for TEL are comparable between the 
individual and joint approach. As in the individual analysis, we can confirm the tax 
complexity hypothesis for LITR. Opposite to the findings of the individual analysis, HHI 
presents a significant coefficient in the LPTR estimation. Contrary to the fiscal illusion 
expectations, the coefficient is positive. Still this effect is not that surprising. In the absence 
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of fiscal illusion, HHI represents the spread of tax revenues over the different taxes. The 
more different taxes a government levies, the lower the average revenues per tax it needs to 
collect the needed total tax revenues. Therefore governments with a higher number of 
taxes are able to set lower LPTR. In other words, when the total tax revenues can be spread 
over more taxes, LPTR decreases. Finally, as in the individual hypothesis, there is evidence 
of renter illusion in the LPTR estimation. 
 
The joint analysis thus presents results which are different from those of the individual 
analyses. Not only the power of the effects may differ; the results also show that the joint 
analysis may lead to opposite findings compared to the individual analysis. This can be seen 
in Table 14 that provides an overview of the general findings of both the individual 
hypothesis tests and of the joint hypotheses test. The joint analysis approach seems to 
affect especially LPTR. Most conspicuous here is that the hypothesis on partisan politics is 
confirmed in the individual analysis for both tax rates, while the joint analysis produces 
opposite results for LPTR. The results of hypothesis 3 for LPTR cannot be confirmed in 
the joint analysis. Finally in the joint analysis there is evidence that tax complexity is 
important in the setting of the LPTR, while the individual analysis fails to present a 
significant effect. These results show that individual analyses may lead to conclusions that 
can not be confirmed or even can be contradicted when the model is enriched with 
additional explanatory variables. The joint analysis even provides additional evidence that 
tax complexity also affects the setting of LPTR. These observations enforce our view that 
both tax rates are simultaneously affected by all of the tested variables and that we should 
attach more importance to the results of the joint analysis. 
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Table 14 Findings of the individual hypothesis tests and of the joint hypotheses tests 
 
Hypothesis 
Individual H-testing Joint H-testing 
LITR LPTR LITR LPTR 
H1 on partisan politics Confirm Confirm Confirm Opposite sign 
H2 on fragmentation Non linear Non linear Non linear Non linear 
H3 on government strength Opposite sign Opposite sign Opposite sign No evidence 
 
H4 on interaction Within Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
Cross Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
H5 on electoral cycles Confirm Confirm Confirm Confirm 
 
H6 on fiscal illusion H6.1 Grant illusion Opposite sign Confirm Opposite sign Confirm 
H6.2 Complexity Confirm No evidence Confirm Opposite sign 
H6.3 Elasticity Confirm Opposite sign Confirm Opposite sign 
H6.4 Renter illusion - Confirm - Confirm 
 
The question now is what makes the results of the LPTR estimation different in the two 
kinds of analysis? A number of additional analyses –not shown– were performed, 
combining different individual hypotheses to find out whether some variable(s) may 
dominate other(s). For each of the “dissident” variables (ICG, SEATMAR and HHI) we 
started from the single model and added variables to see the reaction of the “dissident” 
variable. The partisan variable ICG switches sign as soon as the fiscal illusion variables are 
introduced. Also the change of the effect of SEATMAR can be attributed to the fiscal 
illusion variables. The introduction of the policy interaction variables have the same effect  
on SEATMAR. Finally, HHI gains significance only in the joint model when all hypotheses 
are tested. In the absence of these variables, a model testing the hypotheses on partisan 
politics, on the power of the government or on the complexity of the tax system may lead 
to premature conclusions. 
 
C. CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
Finally some general findings on the control variables. As we prefer the joint analysis to the 
individual analyses (see p. 74), the discussion of the control variables is focussed on the 
former. 
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In line with the HW-model we find that municipalities have coherent tax policies in that the 
level of LITR is significantly and positively affected by the level of LPTR (and vice versa) 
in each model. This finding is comparable to Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), who also found 
these cross-effects between the two tax rates. Solé Ollé (2003), however, failed to find such 
effects.  
 
Next the variables reflecting the needs for general and specific local public services (POP, 
OLD, YOUNG and UNEMPL) are discussed. First, there is no evidence that the 
unemployment rate affects local tax rate policy. This is not surprisingly as unemployment 
policy is in the hands of the federal and regional government. The cost of unemployment 
thus is particularly defrayed by higher governments. Consequently it does not affect the tax 
rates at the local level. POP, OLD and YOUNG all affect the LITR in a significantly 
positive way. This is in line with the expectations. We cannot find a similar effect on the 
LPTR estimations. There OLD loses significance. The results also show that both larger 
and younger municipalities have lower LPTR.  
 
The coefficient of DEBT is significant in both regressions.60 The sign of the coefficient is 
different in both regressions. For LPTR the sign is in line with the expectations positive. 
Higher levels of debt may lead to higher interest payments and higher tax rates. In the 
LITR regression, DEBT present negative values. The observation that low levels of debt go 
together with high tax rates may suggest that –despite the low interest and small 
amortization payments faced– governments with low debt levels have to set high tax rates 
to finance their current expenditures.61 In this situation, and given that increasing tax rates 
is electorally costly, incumbents are not expected to increase tax rates to an even higher 
level in order to finance additional interest and amortization payments (as a consequence of 
                                                 
 
60  Bastiaens et al. (2001) do not find a significant effect of debt on the local government’s tax policy. 
61  Flemish municipalities are not allowed to finance current expenditures through loans. Except for the interest 
and amortization payments (that appear in the current budget), the capital budget and the current budget are 
strictly separated. Only investments in public infrastructure may be financed through borrowing. 
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higher debts).62 In other words, the political cost of raising taxes may be higher than the 
political cost of reducing the level of local investments. This is in line with the Alesina & 
Perotti (1995) findings on the debt policies of a panel OECD countries.63  
 
Finally, we consider the results of TDEP, TBASE and TREND. TDEP and TREND 
present the expected signs. The more a government depends on a certain tax, the higher 
the rates and the slight positive trend in the dependent variables is taken into account in the 
significant positive coefficient of TREND. TBASE seems to measure the government’s 
capability to collect revenues as a negative sign is expected. A high tax base allows to set 
low taxes and vice versa.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to bring together different explanations for local tax rate 
policy in one single model. Based on a large literature on tax rate determinants, we 
formulated hypotheses to test the presence of fragmentation effects, partisan effects, 
interaction dynamics, electoral cycles and fiscal illusion effects. The literature provides 
evidence for each of the individual hypotheses. The results of the individual analyses are 
quite similar for LITR and LPTR. For both tax rates, the results allow to confirm the 
hypotheses on partisan politics, on spatial tax interaction and on electoral cycles. There is 
also evidence of a non-linear impact of government fragmentation on the level of both tax 
rates. This is not in line with the theoretical expectation, but follows the empirical findings 
of previous research on Flemish local fiscal policy making. For both tax rates we find that 
stronger governments have lower tax rates. This provides evidence that a strong 
government may more easily reduce spending (Volkerink & de Haan, 1999). The results of 
                                                 
 
62  This reasoning also works in the opposite direction. Governments with low tax rates have some margin to 
increase their rates to finance an increase of expenditure due to higher interest and amortization payments that 
are the result of a high level of debt. 
63  “Fiscal adjustments that relied primarily on tax increases […] failed to stop permanently the growth of public 
debt. On the contrary, successful adjustments are those that aggressively tackle the expenditure side” (Alesina 
& Perotti, 1995; 239). 
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the fiscal illusion test differ according to the tax rate. The grant illusion and the renter 
illusion effects are confirmed for LPTR, while the tax complexity and the tax elasticity 
effects are confirmed for LITR. 
 
These individual analyses, however, test the presence of only one determinant at a time. We 
do not know of a model that measures for the joint impact of various different 
explanations. And yet the setting of tax rates is subject to all these determinants 
simultaneously. The main contribution of this chapter is that our analyses not only test six 
individual hypotheses but also attempt to test the joint impact of these theories. We are 
aware of the fact that the development of a comprehensive tax choice model is a task that 
is beyond the reach of this chapter and it was not our intention to create a global model. It 
has, however, been shown that, although largely described in significant models 
individually, theories on fiscal policy need to be studied and interpreted simultaneously. 
Our results show that especially for the LPTR, individual analyses may lead to premature 
conclusions. Unlike the individual models, the joint model presents evidence that tax 
complexity affects LPTR, while the power of the government loses its significance in the 
joint model. Additional analyses indicate that the fiscal interaction variables and the fiscal 
illusion variables are responsible for these changes and thus have an important impact of 
the results of the analyses. The LPTR estimations of the joint model also provide a change 
in the sign of the partisan variable. This switch only appears when all hypotheses are tested 
simultaneously. We conclude from these “changing results” that testing individual models 
may lead to different conclusions from those suggested when, as in reality, several tax rate 
determinants are taken into account simultaneously. Therefore we prefer the results of the 
joint analysis.  
 
Still, we are conscious of the risk in testing the joint impact of these theories. The 
preliminary results of our joint hypothesis model show that there is evidence that testing a 
single theory model may lead to premature conclusions. Analyses of tax rate policy which 
neglect the joint impact of the variables may thus suffer from misspecification. 
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Finally, a word on the deviant findings relative to the political cost of the tax rates. When 
testing the policy interaction effects, we concluded that LPT is more electorally costly than 
LIT. When searching for the presence of an electoral cycle, we found that both tax rates 
increase after and reduce before elections, suggesting that both tax rates may have considerable 
electoral costs. Finally, the existence of renter illusion suggested that again LPT is electorally 
costly for incumbents. Obviously, none of the analyses reject that LPT involves electoral costs, 
so we may conclude that the characteristics of the tax rates suggest that LPT is more electorally 
costly than LIT. To explain why incumbents may think that voters have more LPTR than 
LITR in mind when they enter the voting booth, we can appeal to differences in visibility 
and differences in tax base stability.  
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Chapter 3 : Strategic use of debt 
 
In this chapter the focus is on strategic debt models. We review the literature on strategic debt models 
and apply the insights of these models on our dataset of Flemish municipalities. In the following chapters 
we then use the ideas of the strategic debt models to formulate hypotheses on pre-electoral tax rate policy 
and on the variation between budgeted and collected tax revenues. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Though tax-smoothing theory (Barro, 1979) suggests that deficits and surpluses are used to 
minimize the distorting effects of taxation, political economy models not only relate deficits 
and debt to the business cycle; they also point to the role of the timing of elections when 
framing fiscal policy.64 This literature suggests that governments change fiscal policy to 
attract more votes and to increase their chances of getting re-elected.65 But it are not only 
governments who believe they have a good chance of staying in office that may change 
fiscal policy. An interesting finding is that governments expecting to be replaced might 
adapt fiscal policy too. The time-inconsistency theory of politics (see Kydland & Prescott, 
1977; Fischer, 1980) predicts that judgements about the likelihood of a regime change drive 
policy changes. A government expecting a regime change may opt to follow a second-best 
policy when this allows to control the fiscal setting of the future government. The creation 
of debt by the previous government puts a constraint on the new government that will 
have no choice but to accept it, possibly having to sacrifice parts of its own expenditure 
programme. This situation is described in the literature on strategic deficit and debt 
behavior. 
                                                 
 
64  Still there are several other political economic models that explain budget deficits, such as the ideological 
orientation and political fragmentation of the government, the form of the budgetary institutions, the degree 
of government stability, and so on. See Franzese (2001) for an excellent overview.  
65  For example Alesina et al. (1992) find evidence of systematic differences in fiscal and monetary policy in pre-
election years. 
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In this chapter we investigate empirically whether strategic debt behavior is present in 
Flemish municipalities. Crucial in empirical tests on strategic debt behavior is to find a 
good proxy for the government’s expectation of a regime change. For this purpose most 
previous empirical analyses on strategic debt models introduce historical political stability 
information. The novelty of this chapter is that the approach taken here is that a variable 
which measures the probability of electoral defeat should be based on the electorate’s 
determinants to evaluate the government’s policy. Therefore, we introduce the literature on 
vote functions to estimate the probability of electoral defeat.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 of this chapter is an 
overview of the relevant literature. Section 3.3 formulates some observations on the present 
state of the research in this field. Section 3.4 presents models to estimate the probability of 
electoral defeat (in section 3.4.1) and to empirically test the presence of strategic use of debt 
(in section 3.4.3). The results of the empirical analyses are discussed in sections 3.4.2 and 
3.4.4. Some extensions are presented in section 3.4.5. Finally, concluding comments are 
given in section 3.5. 
 
3.2 The literature 
 
The literature on strategic deficit and debt behavior originates from the question whether 
incumbent policy makers run higher budget deficits than they would otherwise do if they 
were confident of re-election?  
 
The strategic use of debt literature arises from the paper of Persson & Svensson (1989) 
(henceforth PS model). The PS model argues that voters have heterogeneous preferences 
concerning the size of the government. Some of the voters want the government to 
provide a significant level of public goods, while others are in favour of less government 
interference. The PS model assumes that incumbents adapt to the voters’ preferences and 
act accordingly. This model predicts rightist governments awaiting a regime switch to run 
budget deficits up to a much higher level than when they feel secure about their political 
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future. The idea is to reduce the public spending of the following (leftist) government by 
creating more debt. Higher levels of debt bring along higher interest charges and thus 
reduce the scope for policymaking of the next government. The opposite reaction is 
expected when a leftist government anticipates a regime change. Leftist governments 
traditionally favour higher public expenditures. The PS model predicts that leftist 
governments will run a budget surplus if they know they will be succeeded by a rightist 
government. This budget surplus enlarges the budget of the succeeding rightist government 
and induces it to spend more than it otherwise would have.  
 
The theoretical work of Persson & Svensson (1989) was followed by the contribution of 
Alesina & Tabellini (1990) (henceforth AT model), also theoretical in nature. This paper 
also emphasizes strategic considerations in the formation of debt policy, but from a 
different viewpoint. While the PS model focuses on the level of spending, the AT model 
assumes that governments differ with respect to their preferences concerning the composition 
of government spending. Again this is a reflection of the voters’ preferences. When the 
government expects to be replaced, it runs a budget deficit which will bring the 
composition of future public spending closer to its preferences. In fact, the deficit allows 
the current government to spend more on public goods than it prefers by reducing future 
spending on the public goods it gets little utility from. Consider, for example, a government 
which prefers spending on education to road construction and assume that it expects to be 
replaced by a government with the opposite preferences. The current government could 
expect that spending on education will be cut by the next government. Therefore it can opt 
to run up a deficit and spend the extra resources on education as an advance on the 
spending cut in education that will follow with the take-over of the next government. 
Today’s government thus ties the hands of future governments by allocating future tax 
revenues to service debt. The marginal cost of repaying the additional debt falls thus on the 
preferences of the new government, about which the departing government cares little.  
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The AT model expects a deficit bias irrespective of the government’s political ideology; that 
is, regardless of the government’s political preferences, the existence of a strong likelihood 
of being voted out of office will generate an incentive to issue debt. The AT model thus 
yields a symmetric prediction on the role of the probability of electoral defeat. The PS 
model’s prediction, on the other hand, is non-symmetric. This model predicts that only 
right-wing governments issue debt. So whereas in the AT model the probability to be voted 
out of office raises debt per se, this is only the case for right-wing governments in the PS 
model.  
 
The AT and PS model differ with respect to the assumptions made concerning the utility 
functions of the parties. They both assume that the political polarization and the likelihood 
of a regime switch are major determinants of the pre-electoral debt policy. Fiscal policy will 
thus be more volatile when governments expect to be replaced than when they don’t. 
 
Various authors have extended, criticized or empirically tested the PS and AT models.66 
Lockwood et al. (1996) build on the PS model. They assume that two parties alternate in 
power and have different preferences over the level of public good provision. Lockwood et 
al. (1996) innovate in assuming that incumbents do not care about –or care sufficiently little 
about– policy outcomes when not in power. Parties in power thus are expected to be 
myopic near the end of their term of office. Incumbents have the incentive to finance their 
expenditures by issuing debt, knowing that they will not have to face the consequences of 
debt financing for a while −the so-called “quasi-finite horizon effect”. According to 
Lockwood et al. (1996), this implies that pre-electoral debt expansion is dominating the 
strategic effects of the PS model, so that in their models strategic effects appear of only 
                                                 
 
66  Aghion & Bolton (1990), Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Milesi-Ferretti & Spolaore (1994) also present models that 
explain the strategic use of debt, but from another point of view. These authors assume that budget deficits are 
used strategically to influence election outcome. They focus on the impact of debt decisions on the probability 
of getting re-elected, while in the seminal strategic debt models of AT and PS –the subject of our analysis– the 
causality is inverse. Therefore we do not go more deeply into these papers. 
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secondary importance. Incumbents only have an incentive to use debt strategically to affect 
their successor’s tax and spending decisions insofar as it influences the level of debt that 
the (current) incumbent party will inherit when it is next returned to power. So, 
predominantly, the “quasi-finite horizon effect” rules.  
 
The Martimort (2001) model contradicts the expectations of the PS model. The major 
contribution of the Martimort (2001) model is that it stresses the strategic role of budget 
deficits when parties differ only with respect to their redistributive concerns67. According to 
Martimort (2001), political regime switching introduces fluctuations in the distribution of 
utility in the economy. These fluctuations justify strategic budget distortions by 
governments currently in office and willing to favour their redistributive concerns against 
the policies of a future government.  
 
Contrary to the PS model, Martimort (2001; 573) expects “leftist governments to be more 
inclined to redistribute income. By running a deficit today, the leftist government ensures 
that society gets poorer tomorrow. A future rightist government will have to redistribute 
more. The implemented tax policy will thus be close to what a leftist government would 
have chosen itself. On the contrary, by running a surplus today, a rightist government 
relaxes the burden of taxation imposed by tomorrow’s leftist government on high income 
agents. This leftist government will be less eager to redistribute and will adopt the rightist 
party’s behavior.” 
 
For empirical research on strategic debt models, we refer to the findings of Pettersson-
Lidbom (2001), Lockwood et al. (1996), Carmignani (2003), Crain & Tollison (2003), Grilli 
et al. (1991), Lambertini (2003), Franzese (2001) and Ashworth et al. (2005). 
 
                                                 
 
67  While each type of government maximizes a social welfare function, a rightist government prefers more 
allocative efficiency and less redistribution than a leftist government. 
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Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) and Lockwood et al. (1996) present evidence consistent with the 
PS model. Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) examines the accumulation of debt by Swedish local 
governments and finds significantly positive effects of the probability of electoral defeat on 
the accumulation of debt. Using a dataset of 277 municipalities for the period 1974 to 1994, 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) finds strong differences between right- and left-wing 
governments. As expected by the PS model, right-wing governments accumulate more debt 
(+15%) when facing a higher probability of defeat, whereas the opposite occurs for left-
wing governments (-11%). Lockwood et al. (1996) not only build on the PS model 
theoretically but also test their hypotheses empirically. Using annual data for the United 
Kingdom on government debt (and taxes and expenditures) for the period 1956 to 1996, 
their empirical findings are largely consistent with the theoretical expectations (as described 
earlier). 
 
Carmignani (2003) and Crain & Tollison (1993) build on the AT model and find empirical 
support for it. For a sample of western European democracies, Carmignani (2003) shows 
that government instability −when it involves a replacement of decision-makers− increases 
the size of deficits.68 Crain & Tollison (1993) employ data from U.S. states covering the 
period 1968 to 1989 and report that as the likelihood of a government change increases, the 
volatility of fiscal measures –and specifically taxes and the surplus/deficit levels– increases. 
 
Other empirical studies by Grilli et al. (1991), Lambertini (2003), Franzese (2001) and 
Ashworth et al. (2005) find no significant evidence for the strategic use of debt or deficits. 
Grilli et al. (1991) investigate the reasons for the existence of differences in the debt-to-
GNP-ratio in 18 OECD countries over the period 1960-1989, but find no evidence that 
                                                 
 
68  We find no further information on the entities or on the time period of Carmignani’s (2003) dataset. 
Carmignani (2003; 2) only mentions that the sample comprises western European democracies. At the end of 
the paper Carmignani (2003; 38) also remarks that the size of the sample is relatively small and that the panel is 
a pooled cross-section time series. 
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supports the PS or AT models. Lambertini (2003) uses U.S. (1960-1995) and pooled data 
for 16 OECD countries (1960-1992) to test both the PS model and the AT model. For the 
U.S. dataset opinion polls are used to measure the probability of being voted out of office, 
while for OECD countries a probit equation on the probability of government change is 
estimated. For the AT model, Lambertini (2003) tests whether government outlays on 
defence are higher under more conservative governments and whether government 
expenditures on social security and welfare are higher under more liberal governments. For 
the PS model, Lambertini (2003) investigates whether cyclically adjusted government 
budget surpluses are lower under conservative than liberal governments. Results show that 
there is no evidence that confirms the expected effects, irrespective of the model adopted 
(AT or PS). For none of the datasets as measured by Lambertini (2003) does the probability 
of being voted out of office have a significant effect on the government budget surplus. 
 
Franzese (2001) examines the political determinants of debt and deficits for 21 OECD-
countries and, like Lambertini (2003), rejects the predictions of strategic use of debt 
models. Franzese’s (2001) bivariate analysis shows that his “risk replacement variable” does 
not correlate with debts or deficits. As Franzese (2001) points out himself, a bivariate 
analysis is actually inapt to explore conditional hypotheses like strategic use of debt 
theories. More importance, he argues, should be attached to his multivariate analyses. His 
multivariate model, however, provides no support for strategic debt policy. The risk 
replacement variable is marginally significant and suggests that the probability of being 
voted out of office provokes governments to engage in debt policy manipulation, but 
contrary to the PS model, leftist governments increase and rightist governments decrease 
deficits when the replacement risk increases.  
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Finally, Ashworth et al. (2005) examine the impact of government fragmentation on local 
government indebtness in Flemish municipalities for the period 1977-2000. Their analysis 
shows no significant impact of the number of excess seats of the ruling parties on local 
debt. Therefore they conclude that the lack of a significant impact “indicates a lack of 
evidence for strategic debt usage in Flanders”.  
 
To summarize, the empirical evidence in the literature shows no consensus on whether or 
not the incumbent’s probability of being voted out of office explains pre-electoral debt 
policy.  
 
3.3 Discussion 
 
Although different models provide theoretical explanations for budget deficit or debt 
changes, the empirical evidence is relatively weak. This does not necessarily mean that the 
strategic models can be refuted. But some observations can be made. 
 
First, the empirical disagreement indicates that fiscal decisions are the outcome of a more 
complicated political process. Variables other than the probability of being voted out of 
office also seem to matter for fiscal policy. Lambertini (2003) suggests that macro-
economic and other exogenous events not accounted for in the PS or AT models also 
explain budget deficits or surpluses. To reduce the impact of these exogenous events, it 
might be advisable to look for evidence of the strategic use of debt behavior on single-
country data, so that the impact of these types of events is constant over all observations. 
Consequently it is not coincidental that Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) finds evidence of the 
existence of the strategic use of debts when analysing Swedish municipalities.  
 
Second, we could question whether evidence of the strategic use of debt models can be 
found outside two-party systems or similar situations. The AT model is developed in a two-
party environment. The PS model explains the behavior of “a” rightist government 
expecting to be replaced by “a” leftist government or vice versa, but gives no consideration 
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to the precise composition of each government. The empirical tests that support the 
strategic use of debt models have all been performed on governments operating within a 
two-party system.69 But what if more than two parties are running for government? On the 
one hand the strategic use of fiscal policy could become less attractive the larger the 
coalition becomes. This is because increasing debt might reduce the future policy options 
of one or more of the coalition partners who might return to office as members of a new 
coalition. This is not unlikely in coalition governments since the probability that at least one 
of the members stays in office increases the higher the number of coalition partners. Grilli 
et al. (1991) also point out that changes in coalition governments are rarely due to a total 
breakdown of the underlying coalition. On the other hand, Ashworth et al. (2006) state that 
parties in a coalition are on average less certain of future power than parties not sharing 
power. Indeed, coalition parties not only have to ‘win’ the elections; they also have to 
survive the ensuing coalition negotiations. Hence, their shorter time horizon may lead 
coalition governments to be more sensitive to the strategic use of debt. Consequently 
fragmented governments are expected to more strongly (and consciously) engage in debt 
creation in election years. The role of fragmentation in strategic debt models thus should be 
clarified. 
 
Third, the theoretical PS model assumes that incumbents know that they will be replaced. 
What about the situation when electoral uncertainty leads to uncertainty about the nature of 
succeeding governments? Although Persson & Svensson (1989; 342) conjecture that 
uncertainty about whether the current government will remain in power or not would not 
fundamentally change their findings, Alesina & Tabellini (1990) introduce uncertainty in 
their theoretical model. In fact, empirical models also differ from the PS model and 
introduce a variable that measures the probability of electoral defeat to take into account 
uncertainty. Reviewing the literature, we find as many approaches to calculating that 
                                                 
 
69  Although Swedish local governments operate in a multi-party system, Pettersson-Lidbom (2001; 575, footnote 
10) reduces his dataset to a two-party environment, only taking into account strict left- or right-wing 
governments. Undefined governments, that is when neither left-wing nor right-wing parties constitute a 
majority, are removed from the dataset. 
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probability as there are empirical studies on the strategic use of debt. In addition to 
differences in model specification –such as time period, sample or differences in the 
definition of what is seen as deficit or debt– we suggest that the definition of the crucial 
variable concerning re-election prospects may explain the inconsistency in the empirical 
findings. We do not dispute that what moves governments to act strategically (or not) 
before elections is their assessment of upcoming electoral outcomes. We only address 
disagreement in the construction or measurement of that crucial variable. 
 
3.4 Empirical analysis 
 
The setting of our empirical analysis follows from the considerations above. We empirically 
test the existence of strategic debt models on single-country data. Our dataset consists of  
294 Flemish municipalities covering four election periods (1982, 1988, 1994 and 2000). 
Though there are 308 municipalities, data unavailability precludes the use of more than 
these 294.70 In Flemish municipalities multiple parties with various ideological 
characteristics compete for office in a system of proportional representation. Therefore our 
analysis will take into account ideological differences as well as possible fragmentation 
effects. Finally, we take into account uncertainty about future government participation.71 
Our crucial variable to proxy the probability of electoral defeat is not constructed ad hoc, 
but is derived from the literature on vote functions. 
                                                 
 
70  See footnote 75 on p. 94 for more details on the unbalanced dataset. 
71  In Flemish municipalities governed by a coalition, it is not uncommon that even before elections have taken 
place different parties meet and talk about the formation of the next government. Indeed, Ackaert (2006; 62) 
shows that in the build-up to the elections of October 2000, in 67.4% of the municipalities discussions about 
future coalitions took place during the summer. One thus could argue that in 67.4% of the Flemish 
municipalities, incumbents of a majority of the municipalities are certain about the participation of their party 
in the next government. We doubt this reasoning. First, Ackaert (2006; 63) shows that in 43.6% of those 
municipalities, the preparatory talks broke down even before elections. Second, the findings stem from a 
questionnaire during summer 2000, while tax policy decisions have to be made before the end of the year 
before elections (see section 1.2.4 on p. 26). The incidence of preparatory talks about one year before elections 
thus will be less frequent than reported. Third, Ackaert (2006) does not indicate which parties took part in 
these preparatory talks. It thus may be that only some or even none of the current government parties were 
involved. Finally, these preparatory talks or agreements are no permit to actual government participation once 
elections take place. 
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First we introduce a vote function to proxy the probability of electoral defeat. Second we 
test the presence of strategic use of debt in Flemish municipalities. The construct of the 
analysis permits a distinction between the PS- and AT-variants of strategic use of debt 
models, but also allows to verify the Martimort (2001) findings. Finally some extensions to 
the analyses are presented. 
 
3.4.1 Expectation of electoral defeat 
 
The strategic debt models assume that governments that expect to be replaced will change 
debt before elections. Crucial in these models is the introduction of a measure for the 
probability of electoral defeat. Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), Carmignani (2003) and 
Lambertini (2003) create each a –different– auxiliary equation that links the unobserved 
variable, that is, the expectation of electoral defeat, to a set of observable variables that 
might be expected to affect the probability of electoral defeat. The Pettersson-Lidbom 
(2001) set of explanatory variables is restricted to historical voting patterns and the 
frequency of previous government changes. Franzese (2001), Grilli et al. (1991), Ashworth 
et al. (2005) and Crain & Tollison (1993) also use historical stability variables. Franzese 
(2001) launches a “replacement risk variable”, which is simply the inverse of the actual 
duration in years of the incumbent’s mandate, i.e., the hazard rate of losing office in a year. 
Grilli et al. (1991) use the frequency of government changes in the past, while Crain & 
Tollison (1993) measure the probability of no regime change from historical seats shares. 
Ashworth et al. (2005) use the number of seats in excess of a simple majority (since 
previous elections). Carmignani (2003) estimates the probability of government termination 
by a probit analysis with different variables. Besides the stability of the government in the 
previous year, political fragmentation, political polarization and GDP growth in the current 
and previous year are introduced into the equation. Lambertini (2003) introduced two 
constructs to estimate a government’s prospects. She first estimates an index of political 
affiliation of the government, calculated on election dates, change-of-government dates, the 
direction of the change in government and the ideological position of the government. A 
change in the value of the index is thus a change in the government in the Lambertini 
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(2003) model. Secondly, in her analysis on U.S. data, she introduces opinion polls as proxy 
for the probability of electoral defeat.72  
 
Different authors used different methods to estimate the probability of electoral defeat. 
The question of what a good proxy might be remains open. We are conscious that the real 
expected probability of re-election or electoral defeat is hard to measure. The literature so 
far is focused on historical political stability determinants only. As well as these, other 
determinants, such as economic, tax and political variables, may explain whether 
incumbents get re-elected or not. Ultimately, when judging the probability of electoral 
defeat, incumbents need to assess voters’ likely behavior in the voting booth. It thus 
becomes important for incumbents to evaluate the relevant determinants that voters have 
in mind when voting for or against the current government. The determinants of voting 
behavior have been studied intensively in the literature on vote functions (see e.g. Paldam 
& Schneider, 1980; Nannestad & Paldam, 1994, Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Revelli, 2002; 
Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006; Geys & Vermeir, 2008). In general these functions explain the 
vote (or the change in the vote) for the government at elections by (the change in) political, 
economic and tax variables (Nannestad & Paldam, 1994). Though part of the political 
variables are historical stability variables, vote functions are not restricted to these. 
 
The novelty of this chapter is that we introduce a vote function to measure the expectation 
of the probability of electoral defeat. Mughan (1987; 198) makes clear that the primary 
purpose of vote functions should be forecasting –“predicting the outcome of an event 
before it occurs”– instead of explaining. Norpoth & Gschwend (2003) also show that a 
model based on the insights from electoral research could be a good instrument to predict 
the level of votes cast for incumbents. In this chapter we will use the insights of vote 
                                                 
 
72  We do not dispute the accuracy of opinion polls, but we are not convinced that this is the best proxy for the 
government’s expectation of electoral defeat in a multiparty system. Typically, and as in Lambertini (2003), 
opinion polls do not poll for the continuation of the government, which is the crucial variable in the literature 
on the strategic use of deficits or debt, but for the intention of the electorate to vote for a specific party or a 
specific candidate. Therefore, although opinion polls can be used to estimate the probability of electoral defeat 
in a two-party system, this is not obvious in a multi-party system as in our dataset. 
  STRATEGIC USE OF DEBT 
 93
function models to estimate the probability of electoral defeat of the incumbents. If they 
expect not to remain in power, the incumbents could decide to act strategically. 
 
In our analysis we estimate the prospects of electoral defeat from the Vermeir & Heyndels’ 
(2006) vote function for Flemish municipalities. To test whether yardstick voting is present 
in Flemish municipalities, Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) empirically analyse the votes at 
municipal elections. They find that incumbents are punished for higher tax rates. Moreover, 
the electoral punishment depends on the tax rates in neighbouring municipalities, so 
empirical evidence of yardstick competition is provided. Next to the tax variables –the 
focus of the Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) research– their analysis also contains political and 
economic variables. As such their model is a good starting point given the purpose of this 
chapter.  
 
Still, our aim is not explaining votes, but estimating the incumbents’ judgement of their 
electoral prospects. Next we introduce these prospects in the explanation of debt policy 
changes in election years. Therefore we first reconstruct Vermeir & Heyndels’ (2006) vote 
function. Second, we will apply this function on the pre-electoral years’ values of its 
explanatory variables to calculate the government’s vote expectations. This adjustment is 
necessary as Flemish local governments have to endorse the (Balanced) Budget before 
December 31 of the year before.73 If incumbents would like to act strategically in the 
election year, changes in the level of debt thus should be agreed on in the year before 
elections. The decision whether or not to change local debt strategically in election year t 
thus has to be made in year t-1. Indeed, incumbents have to judge their electoral prospects 
one year before elections. Given both the role of each of the explanatory variables in the 
vote percentage and their values in the pre-election year t-1, we can generate the expected 
number of votes of the government at the timing of  the Budget. 
 
                                                 
 
73  We may refer to section 1.2.4 on p. 26 for a more detailed description of the budgetary proces. 
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First, we reconstruct Vermeir & Heyndels’ (2006) vote function estimation as presented in 
equation (II.) that explains the percentage of votes the incumbent party (or parties74) 
receives at the elections in year t : 
 
(II.) Vit =  α1 + α2 Vit-6 + α3 TAXit + α4 NTAXit + α5 EXPit + α6 NEXPit + α7 NTIit + 
α8 UNEMPLit + α9 NPARit + year dummies + party dummies + uit  
 where: i = 1,..., N; t = election years  
 
Vit represents the vote percentage of the government party (parties) of municipality i in 
election year t. The first explanatory variable is the vote percentage of the same 
government party (parties) in the previous elections (Vit-6). The coefficient of Vit-6 is 
expected to have a positive impact on the number of votes.75 TAXit is a vector of tax 
instruments and includes the local income tax rate (LITRit) and the local property tax rate 
(LPTRit). We expect the tax rates to have a negative impact on the vote percentage. Per 
capita public expenditure (EXPit) is included to measure for the quantity (and/or quality) of 
public output. A positive impact on the votes is expected from this. We refer to the theory 
of yardstick voting –which suggests that voters compare their own municipality to their 
neighbouring municipalities when deciding on their vote (Besley & Case, 1995a and Revelli, 
2002)– to include tax variables of neighbouring municipalities (NTAXit). We introduce the 
                                                 
 
74  The vote share corresponds with the sum of the shares of the coalition partners in the case of coalition 
governments. 
75  Two remarks concerning this variable. First, this variable is not strictly a lagged dependent variable. This could 
be a lagged dependent variable, but only when the previous government stayed in office. Second, the definition 
of this variable implies that the dataset does not contain data of all Flemish municipalities. Sometimes it is 
impossible to calculate previous election results of the government. Parties may split up, merge with another 
party or change their names. Also parties can disappear and not compete in next elections or a member of the 
government can change parties. The dataset –that corresponds with that of Vermeir & Heyndels (2006)– only 
contains observations of which previous election results can be indisputably calculated. We thus are 
confronted with an unbalanced panel as we do not have observations for every election in every municipality. 
Finally our dataset contains 688 observations of 294 (out of 308) municipalities. 
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average local tax rates of the neighbouring municipalities (LITRNit and LPTRNit)76. Also 
the average per capita expenditures (NEXPit) of the neighbouring municipalities is 
introduced. Average local tax rates of neighbouring municipalities are expected to positively 
affect the votes, while negative values are anticipated for the average per capita 
expenditures of the neighbouring municipalities. As the literature on economic voting77 
suggests that governments are held accountable for economic developments, net taxable 
income (NTIit) and the unemployment rate (UNEMPLit) are introduced.78 Income is 
expected to have a positive effect on votes, while the opposite is true for unemployment. 
Political characteristics enter vote function (II.) through the number of government parties 
(NPARit) which measure for clarity of accountability.79 More coalition partners are 
expected to reduce transparency. Fragmented governments are thus held less accountable 
for positive and negative developments (Powell & Whitten, 1993). As governments are 
more punished for negative developments than they are rewarded for positive 
developments, Nicholson & Segura (2002) show that fragmented governments generally 
suffer smaller electoral losses. A positive effect of the number of government parties on the 
vote is thus expected. The possibility of vote swings among government parties is another 
                                                 
 
76  As in chapter 2 all “neighbouring” variables are estimated as the unweighted average of the values of the 
Flemish neighbouring municipalities. For Flemish municipalities across the language boundary, only Flemish 
neighbours are taken into account. Therefore Voeren is removed from the dataset as it has no Flemish 
neighbours. 
77  The literature on economic voting presumes that voters observe the government’s management of the 
economy. In short, if the economy does well, voters conclude that the government is competent. If the 
economy does poorly, they conclude that the government is bad. In the former case, voters re-elect the 
government, in the latter case they vote for the opposition. See Lewis-Beck & Paldam (2000) for an overview. 
78  Remark that these economic variables are the result of macro-economic policy which is mainly a federal and 
regional responsibility. Despite their objective to interfere local governments may still have a (marginal) 
influence or may be held accountable by the electorate. Local governments can e.g. approve the layout of 
additional company grounds or decide to lower local company taxes to stimulate local economic activity. 
79  Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) do not enter a measure for the government’s ideology in their vote-function. We 
tested the impact of the ideological complexion of the government on the votes in Table A9 on p. 206. As can 
be seen from this table, the ICG-variable is not significant. Also possible interaction effects with the other 
political and tax variables fail to present significant coefficients. When removing insignificant variables from 
the model, our results are consistent with these of Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) as reproduced in column (2) of 
Table 15 on p. 98. 
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possible explanation for a positive coefficient as it is less clear which party voters might 
hold responsible for policy. Year dummies are introduced to capture possible year effects.80 
Finally, party year dummies are introduced, as Heath et al. (1999), Jérôme & Lewis-Beck 
(1999) and Revelli (2002) show that local election results reflect national party popularity 
rather than the appreciation of local developments and policies. The impact of national or 
regional politics on local elections is captured by the inclusion of party dummies for the 
five national parties that participated in municipal governments and this for each election 
year.81  
 
3.4.2 Methodology and results 
 
We intend to use the Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) vote function as an instrument to 
estimate the probability of electoral defeat. Therefore, we first reconstruct the results of 
Vermeir & Heyndels’ (2006) vote function as close as possible. They tested different 
approaches, including pooled OLS regressions, OLS regressions including fixed 
municipality effects, 2SLS regressions with and without municipality fixed effects and 
conclude that their preference goes to the 2SLS regression without municipality effects 
(Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006; 2295).82 Therefore we estimate equation (II.) technically 
analogous to Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) and use a 2SLS approach −without municipality 
effects− in which internal and neighbouring tax variables are instrumented.83 Frey & 
Schneider (1978b) and Schneider & Pommerehne (1980) show that tax variables in the UK 
and Australia respectively may not be assumed to be exogenous, as the level of popularity 
                                                 
 
80  Year effects are introduced to measure the electoral change common to all governments in a certain year. 
Vermeir & Heyndels (2006; footnote 20 on p. 2291) provide the example of the electoral rise of the extremist 
party Vlaams Blok (Vlaams Belang). 
81  We introduced dummies for the liberal democratic VLD, for the social democratic SP.a, for the Christian 
democratic CD&V, for the ecologist GROEN! and for the nationalist VU. The extreme-right Vlaams Blok 
(Vlaams Belang) participates in none of the local governments. Some of these parties changed their name 
during or after the years under investigation. See section 1.1.3 on p. 13 for more detailed information. 
82  We refer to Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) for an overview of the results of all tested approaches. 
83  These “neighbouring tax variables” are the local income tax rate, the local property tax rate and per capita 
expenditures. 
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affects tax policy. We thus may expect that the error term is correlated with the tax rates. 
Neighbouring tax variables are instrumented because the presence of spatial correlation in 
the error is suggested by Revelli (2001) and Solé Ollé (2003) in their models on tax 
mimicking. We follow Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) by instrumenting own tax rates and per 
capita expenditures by the percentage of young people and elderly, the average sale price of 
small and middle sized houses and the number of inhabitants. Tax rates and per capita 
expenditures of neighbouring municipalities are similarly instrumented. The Sargan tests on 
the validity of the instruments indicate that the instruments are valid.84 Table 15 presents 
the results of the estimation. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are shown in 
Table A7 on p. 205 in appendix. 
 
                                                 
 
84  The Sargan test tests the validity of the instrumental variables. Under the null hypothesis that all instruments 
are valid –they are uncorrelated to some set of residuals– the Sargan statistic is Chi² distributed with R degrees 
of freedom (R being the number of instruments minus the number of estimated parameters). If we fail to 
reject the hypothesis –which is the case in our model, since p exceeds the value 0.10– the instruments are 
acceptable.  
CHAPTER 3 
 98 
Table 15 IV estimation of the vote share of the government parties in election year t 
 
Dependent variable :  
Vote share of the government parties (Vit) 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
Intercept 
40.814 
(1.67) 
* 15.233 
(1.22) 
 
Prior vote (Vit-6) 
0.760 
(15.91) 
*** 0.757 
(17.89) 
*** 
Local income tax rate (LITRit) 
-6.733 
(-2.08) 
** -5.413 
(-3.51) 
*** 
Local property tax rate (LPTRit) 
0.003 
(0.18) 
 
- 
 
Per capita expenditures (EXPit) 
-2.642 
(-0.39) 
 
- 
 
Local income tax rate neighbours (LITRNit) 
4.977 
(0.81) 
 7.050 
(2.71) 
*** 
Local property tax rate neighbours (LPTRNit) 
-0.004 
(-0.17) 
 
- 
 
Per capita expenditures neighbours (NEXPit) 
-17.077 
(-2.46) 
** -12.643 
(-3.12) 
*** 
Net taxable income (NTIit) 
-1.978 
(-1.55) 
 -1.666 
(-3.18) 
*** 
Unemployment rate (UNEMPLit) 
-2.481 
(-0.03) 
 
- 
 
Number of government parties (NPARit) 
2.197 
(1.73) 
* 2.157 
(3.60) 
*** 
1994 year effect (Y94) 
5.916 
(2.08) 
** 
- 
 
2000 year effect (Y00) 
3.292 
(1.02) 
 
- 
 
Party effects Yes  Yes 85 
Wald test party effects : F (p-value) 
1.355 
(p=0.17) 
 8.520 
(p<0.01) 
86 
R² 0.238  0.298  
Adjusted R² 0.208  0.291  
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value) 
2.529 
(p=0.28) 
 2.372 
(p=0.80) 
 
Note : N=688; Values in parentheses are t-values (except for Sargan and Wald tests, 
where p-values are presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
In this table, column (1) provides the most general results, while in column (2) only the 
statistically significant variables are maintained and as such provide the most efficient 
estimation. We focus on the latter. The prior vote (Vit-6), the municipality’s own local 
income tax rate (LITRit), the average local income tax rate in the neighbouring 
municipalities (LITRNit), the average per capita expenditure in the neighbouring 
municipalities (NEXPit), the net taxable income (NTIit) and the number of parties (NPARit) 
have a significant impact on the vote percentage of government parties. All significant 
                                                 
 
85  Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) present results with and without party-year dummies. As their regression with 
party-year dummies has the highest adjusted R², we reconstruct their model including those dummies. 
86  Insignificant party dummies are left out. The Wald test is performed for the remaining party dummies. 
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variables have the expected signs and the coefficients are highly comparable to Vermeir & 
Heyndels (2006).87 
 
It is clear from Table 15 that local tax policy has an impact on election results. The 
regression results show that the government’s local income tax rate negatively influences 
the vote percentage. High local income tax rates are thus electorally costly, while there is no 
evidence that local property tax rates have an impact on the votes for the government. This 
finding is opposite to what we have concluded in the previous chapter. Given the findings 
in chapter 2 our conclusion on p. 79 was that local property tax is more electorally costly 
than local income tax. We attach more importance to the findings in this section as here the 
impact of tax rates on the votes is estimated and thus really shows how votes depend on 
the tax rates, while in chapter 2 characteristics of tax rates are investigated that may explain 
or may suggest differences in electoral cost.88 
 
The average local income tax rate of the neighbouring municipalities affects the vote 
percentage positively, so voters use the tax policies of surrounding municipalities as a 
yardstick. Per capita expenditures in neighbouring municipalities have a negative effect on 
the vote percentage, while there is no significant impact of the expenditure level in the 
municipality itself.  
 
Also political variables are of importance when explaining the vote percentage. The number 
of government parties presents a positive coefficient, confirming that fragmented 
governments lose fewer votes. With regard to the party-year effects, we only find the 
dummy for the liberal party in 2000 to present a significant coefficient.89 
                                                 
 
87  We compare to Vermeir & Heyndels’ (2006) 2SLS results as presented in column (4) of (their) Table 5 (on p. 
2294). 
88  See p. 69 for arguments why local income tax would be more electorally costly than local property tax. 
89  The coefficient of this dummy is 3.761 (t=2.92, p<0.01) providing evidence that the Liberal party benefits at 
the local level from its electoral success at the Federal and regional government level. At both government 
levels, The Liberal party won the 1999 elections, re-entered the governing coalitions and delivered the prime 
ministers. Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) do not report on the party-year effects. 
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Finally, there is evidence that voters hold local governments responsible for macro-
economic policy as NTIit has a significant negative sign. Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) refer 
to the ‘clientele hypothesis’ by Rattinger (Rattinger, 1981 & 1991) as this may explain that 
“at lower levels of income, voters tend to stay with or go back to traditional government 
parties” (Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006; 2292)90. The lack of a significant impact of 
UNEMPLit suggests that voters do not hold local governments responsible for 
employment policy. Indeed, “most policy instruments to fight unemployment are in the 
hands of the federal an regional government”(Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006; 2292). 
 
The next step is to generate the forecasted values of the vote percentage. For each observation 
we generate the forecasted value of the vote percentage from the vote function as 
estimated in Table 15 using one year lagged values for the explanatory variables. 
 
In Table A8 on p. 205 we present some statistics on both the forecasted values resulting 
from the preceding analysis (Vfit)91 and the outcome of elections (Vit). Mean, median and 
maximum values are highly comparable. The histograms show that also the frequency 
distribution of both series is comparable. The correlation between the two values is 0.62. 
Whether or not these forecasted values explain strategic debt policy is estimated in the 
following section. 
 
                                                 
 
90  Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) ran separate regressions that show that less traditional parties -as the Green Party 
or Vlaams Belang that respectively were in power in only a few or in none of the municipalities- fare better at 
higher levels of income, while the opposite is true for traditional government parties. 
91  To indicate that we use forecasted values, we add an “f” to Vit. 
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3.4.3 Strategic use of debt 
 
In this section we test for the existence of the strategic use of debt in Flemish 
municipalities. In general, we look for evidence whether or not the change in debt in 
election years is directed by the government’s vote expectation. The theory of the strategic 
use of debt predicts governments not expecting to be re-elected in the next election to 
change debt. If so, the change of debt in election years should be a function of the 
governments’ re-election prospects. To empirically test this hypothesis, we run regression 
(III.), which explains debt policy changes in election years:  
 
(III.) ∆DEBTit = β1 + β2 PEDit + Xit + uit ;       
 where : i = 1,..., N; t = election years 1988, 1994, 2000 
 
The dependent variable ∆DEBTit measures the year-to-year change in debt per capita in 
election years and is explained by the probability of electoral defeat (PEDit) and some 
control variables (Xit).  
 
We build on the estimation of the vote percentage (Vfit) from sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 to 
take into account the government’s prospects of electoral defeat. We transform Vfit to a 
dummy variable (PEDit) that takes value 1 if the government does not expect to get a 
majority of the votes at the next elections −and thus is expected to be voted out of office− 
and 0 if it expects to get its mandate renewed. In other words, this dummy variable gets 
value 1 if the forecasted vote percentage (Vfit) is below majority (Vfit<50%) and 0 
otherwise. This operationalisation is inspired by Norpoth & Gschwend (2003) who find 
that governing coalitions whose parties obtain a majority in an election usually remain in 
office. In line with Norpoth & Gschwend (2003) we assume that governments that regain a 
majority of the votes stay in office, while those who fail in that objective are replaced by a 
new government. Dummy variable PEDit takes this assumption into account.  
 
Like Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), we try to discriminate between the PS and AT models. 
According to the AT model we may expect governments with expectations of defeat to 
issue debt irrespective of their political ideologies. Conversely, the PS model predicts that 
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only rightist governments issue debt when they expect to be replaced, while leftist 
governments are expected to do the opposite. The introduction of an interaction variable 
with product terms PEDit on the one hand and dummy variable LEFTMAJit on the other 
hand permits to distinguish between the two models. LEFTMAJit equals 1 if leftist parties 
have at least 50% of the seats in the College and 0 otherwise.92 The interaction also allows 
to test the Martimort (2001) findings that –opposite to the PS model– leftist governments 
that expect a defeat increase debt, while a decrease is expected for rightist governments 
with bad electoral prospects. To test these different models we extend equation (III.) to : 
 
(IV.) ∆DEBTit = β1 + β2 PEDit + β3 LEFTMAJit * PEDit + β4 LEFTMAJit + Xit + uit ;   
 where : i = 1,..., N; t = election years 
 
To find out whether our analysis presents evidence of the strategic use of debt, then in 
estimation (IV.) we should focus on β2 and β3. Whether strategic debt behavior is in line 
with the AT, the PS or the Martimort (2001) expectations depends on the interpretation of 
both coefficients simultaneously.  
 
If β2 is significantly positive, while the interaction variable β3 remains insignificant, there is 
support for the AT model, as governments –irrespective of their political ideologies– 
expecting an electoral defeat increase debt.  
 
                                                 
 
92  For the definition of our dummy variable LEFTMAJit we take into account the number of seats of the 
Socialists and of the Ecologists. As can be derived from Table 2 on p. 18 Deschouwer (1996) & Rihoux (2001) 
position the Christian Democrats, the Nationalists and local parties at the centre. The Ecologists and the 
Socialists are at the left of the centre, while the Liberals are at the right of the centre. The anti-immigrant party 
Vlaams Blok is at the extreme right of the spectrum. Thus in our analysis, we distinguish between leftist parties 
(LEFTMAJit=1) and parties on the centre or on the right of the centre (LEFTMAJit=0). This approach is in 
line with Pettersson-Lidbom (2001). Still to improve consistency between the different chapters of this 
dissertation, we also introduced alternative “left-wing” variables in conformity with those presented on p. 19. 
First ICGit was introduced. Alternatively we created a dummy variable LEFTGOVit taking value 1 if ICGit < 5 
and zero otherwise. None of the approaches improve the results, so in this section the results in line with the 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) approach are presented. In Table A12 on p. 209 we presents the estimation results 
including the alternative approaches. 
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Should the following three conditions be fulfilled, that is β2 is significantly positive, β3 is 
significantly negative and (β2 + β3) is negative, there is evidence for the PS model, in which 
leftist governments anticipating an electoral defeat decrease debt, while other governments 
with the same prospects increase debt.  
 
Finally, if β2 is significantly negative, β3 is significantly positive and (β2 + β3) is positive, 
there is evidence in line with the Martimort (2001) model that has opposite expectations to 
the PS model. 
 
Variable Xit in equation (IV.) stands for variables affecting debt policy. Although we expect 
strategic motivations for the change of debt, other determinants may also explain this 
change.  
 
First we take into account the level of debt in pre-election years (DEBTit-1). This variable 
can have opposing effects on the level of debt changes. On the one hand we may assume 
that governments with low debts have more “margin” to increase debt than governments 
with higher debt levels. Conversely, highly indebted governments are expected to be more 
unresponsive to increase debt as this would worsen their financial position all the more. An 
additional increase of debt raises –ceteris paribus– the cost of debt, that for its part may 
lead to an additional need for debt financing. Still this expected unresponsiveness may be 
unrealistic. Indeed, high levels of debt may become self-reinforcing. This is called the  
“snow ball effect” and should result in a positive sign. The sign of DEBTit-1 thus is a priori 
unknown. 
 
The change in the inhabitants’ net taxable income (∆NTIit), measured as the year-to-year 
change in the net taxable income per capita, can have two (opposing) effects on the 
evolution of the level of debt (Ashworth et al., 2005). On the one hand ∆NTIit is an 
indication of the change of the fiscal capacity of the municipality –as much of the local 
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revenue comes from local income tax. An increase of the net taxable income may reduce 
the need for loan financing, thus a  negative sign can be expected. On the other hand, 
∆NTIit may indicate changes in the demand for public goods and may increase this need 
for debt financing. This may lead to a positive sign (Geys, 2007). Taking both effects 
together, the sign of ∆NTIit is a priori uncertain. 
 
Not only changes in the taxable income, also changes in demographic and socio-economic 
variables may lead to changes in the demand for public expenditures and have an effect on 
debt evolution. In chapter 2 on p. 52 we introduced demographic and socio-economic 
variables in the tax rate estimations as they may reflect the needs for public services. When 
estimating debt policy changes, we may control for the impact of changes in these variables 
to capture changes in the demand for public expenditures that may explain for their part 
changes in debt policy (Ashworth et al., 2005 & Geys, 2007). Therefore we introduce the 
changes in the proportion of young inhabitants (∆YOUNGit), changes in the proportion of 
elderly inhabitants (∆OLDit), changes in the unemployment rate (∆UNEMPLit) and 
changes in the number of inhabitants (∆POPit) in estimation (IV.). These variables are the 
year-on-year change of the percentage of inhabitants that are, respectively, below 20, over 
64 and unemployed and the year-on-year change of the number of inhabitants. Each time 
positive coefficients are expected because higher levels of young, elderly and unemployed 
could represent a higher demand for specific heavy capital expenditures such as schools, 
care of the elderly or social housing, leading to higher levels of public debt (Bahl & 
Duncombe, 1993), while an increase in the number of inhabitants represents the need for 
additional public services and infrastructure in general. 
 
The change of debt may also respond to the financial costs of borrowing (Ashworth et al., 
2005 & Geys, 2007). The idea is that an increasing cost of borrowing restrains rational 
governments from increasing debt financing. Besides the level of debt, borrowing costs 
depend on the real interest rate on long-term (federal) government bonds. We introduce 
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this rate’s year-to-year change (∆INTERESTit) to measure changes in the cost of 
borrowing. A negative sign is expected.93  
 
Also political variables have received attention as determinants of debt policy before (see 
e.g. Alesina & Perotti, 1994; Gärtner, 2000; Ashworth et al., 2005). In our regression, 
ideological differences are taken into account by the introduction of dummy LEFTMAJit. 
We expect a positive value here, as in public finance literature it is widely accepted (see 
Hibbs, 1977) that leftist governments have higher spending, which we may assume that 
they are at least partly financed by debt. Leftist governments thus are expected to increase 
debt more easily. Higher spending may also be expected for fragmented governments. The 
Weak Government Hypothesis (Roubini & Sachs, 1989a,b) attributes higher public 
spending to more fragmented (or divided) governments because several conflicting political 
objectives have to be accommodated. Fragmentation (FRAGit) thus may more easily lead to 
an increase in debt. As in chapter 2 on p. 48 we operationalise FRAGit in different ways. 
We introduce the number of government parties (NPARit) as well as the effective number 
of government parties (ENPARit) to measure the effect of fragmentation. However, their 
effects on ∆DEBTit may not be linear. We refer to Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006), Geys 
(2007) and Goeminne et al. (2008) who have previously found a non-linear effect of 
government fragmentation on Flemish local governments’ fiscal decision-making. As a 
matter of fact Geys (2007; 246) finds that “in election years […] the growth rate of local 
public debt is lower for one-party governments compared to large coalitions94”. 
Consequently, we then test a non linear specification, adding squared terms NPAR²it and 
ENPAR²it. Alternatively, dummy variables TWOPARit and LARGEPARit for governments 
consisting of, respectively, two and at least three parties –with single party governments as 
the remaining category– are introduced.  
                                                 
 
93  Note that the interest rate varies over time but not over municipalities, it thus can only explain within 
municipality variation and not between municipality variation. 
94  In Geys (2007) “large coalitions” are coalitions with 3 or more parties. 
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Finally we introduce year-dummies to capture year effects.  
 
Replacing Xit in equation (IV.) with these control variables, we estimate the following 
equation:  
 
(V.) ∆DEBTit =  β1 + β2 PEDit + β3 LEFTMAJit * PEDit + β4 LEFTMAJit + β5 DEBTit-1 + 
β6 ∆NTIit + β7 ∆YOUNGit + β8 ∆OLDit + β9 ∆UNEMPLit +  β10 ∆POPit + 
β11 ∆INTERESTit + β12 FRAGit + year dummiest + uit ;  
 where : i = 1,..., N; t = election years  
 
3.4.4 Methodology and results 
 
Table 16 presents the results of the debt change estimation. A linear regression on panel 
data with random effects is implemented and covers data from 294 of the 308 Flemish 
municipalities.95 Since our number of years is small and the number of cross-sectional units 
is rather large, random effects model estimators are more efficient than fixed effects model 
estimators (Gujarati, 2003; 651). Moreover, introducing a fixed effects model would be 
expensive in terms of degrees of freedom since we have only three time series of data. The 
Hausman tests we present also suggest that it is safe to use random effects.96 
 
Before estimating our model, we test for the existence of multicollinearity in our dataset. 
Therefore we run a correlation analysis. The correlation matrix indicated that the pair wise 
correlation coefficient of ∆YOUNGit and the year dummy for 2000 (r=-0.97) exceeds the 
suggested threshold of |r|>0.80 (see Gujarati, 2003; 359). Therefore we shift the year 
dummy from the analysis. 
 
                                                 
 
95  We continue on the dataset used to estimate the vote-function. For remarks on the composition of the dataset 
we refer to footnote 75 on p. 94. In addition we lose one more observation as we do not have data for the 
level of debt per capita in 1993 for the municipality Aarschot. 
96  A Hausman test controls whether the H0 that the coefficients estimated by the random effects estimator are 
the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effects estimator. The insignificant p-values presented in our 
model indicate that we fail to reject the H0 and allows us to use random effects. 
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Table 16 presents results of the OLS estimation (with random effects) of per capita debt 
change in election years. Odd columns present results including all variables. More efficient 
regressions in which insignificant variables are omitted are presented in even columns. As 
in chapter 2 different operationalisations of the fragmentation variables are presented. In 
columns (1) and (2) we use the actual number of parties (NPARit) and its squared term. In 
columns (3) and (4) the effective number of parties (ENPARit) and its squared term is 
introduced. In columns (5) and (6) the dummy variable approach testing the impact of two 
party coalitions (TWOPARit) and coalitions with at least three parties (LARGEPARit) 
compared to single party governments. 
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Table 16 Estimation results of the debt change function, using OLS with random effects 
 
Dependent variable : ∆Debtit (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Intercept 
-1.327 
(-0.05) 
 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 21.105 
(0.74) 
 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 15.778 
(1.33) 
*** 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 
PEDit 
6.500 
(0.69) 
 
- 
 4.937 
(0.54) 
 
- 
 6.581 
(0.70) 
 
- 
 
PEDit * LEFTMAJit  
-9.536 
(-0.39) 
 
- 
 -10.104 
(-0.42) 
 
- 
 -10.065 
(-0.41) 
 
- 
 
LEFTMAJit 
-4.827 
(-0.34) 
 
- 
 -0.519 
(-0.04) 
 
- 
 -4.236 
(-0.30) 
 
- 
 
DEBTit-1 
0.018 
(1.62) 
 
- 
 0.019 
(1.71) 
* 
- 
 0.019 
(1.64) 
 
- 
 
∆NTIit 
55.006 
(1.44) 
 
- 
 55.722 
(1.46) 
 
- 
 54.867 
(1.44) 
 
- 
 
∆YOUNGit 
2973.019 
(2.07) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 3090.512 
(2.15) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 3045.109 
(2.12) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 
∆OLDit 
5345.037 
(2.085) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 5530.674 
(2.16) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 5412.55 
(2.11) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 
∆UNEMPLit 
17.770 
(0.03) 
 
- 
 23.823 
(0.03) 
 -  
14.072 
(0.02) 
 -  
∆POPit 
0.003 
(1.34) 
 
- 
 0.003 
(1.33) 
 -  
0.003 
(1.33) 
 -  
∆INTERESTit 
127.806 
(2.44) 
** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 132.539 
(2.53) 
** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 130.405 
(2.49) 
** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 
FRAG             
NPARit 
22.964 
(0.94) 
 
-  -  -  -  -  
NPAR²it 
-5.585 
(-0.94) 
 
-  -  -  -  -  
ENPARit - 
 
-  
-1.344 
(-0.04) 
 -  -  -  
ENPAR²it - 
 
-  
-0.641 
(-0.07) 
 -  -  -  
TWOPARit - 
 
-  -  -  
5.540 
(0.62) 
 -  
LARGEPARit - 
 
-  -  -  
0.402 
(0.03) 
 -  
Time dummy variable (1994) 
-45.681 
(-1.48) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
* -48.467 
(-1.56) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
* -47.055 
(-1.52) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
* 
R² 0.055  0.043  0.053  0.043  0.055  0.043  
Adjusted R² 0.036  0.038  0.036  0.038  0.036  0.038  
Hausman (p-value) 11.52 (p=0.56) 13.154 (p=0.43) 11.497 (p=0.57) 
Note : N=687; t-values between brackets (except for the Hausman tests where p-values are presented); * 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.  
 
Before focusing on the strategic debt hypotheses, we cast a quick glance at the control 
variables. First we refer to the absence of significant coefficients of any of the 
fragmentation variables. Government fragmentation thus seems to have no impact on debt 
changes in election years. Given this absence of significant coefficients and given that all 
other variables are identical between the different tested regressions, the most efficient 
regressions in the even columns are identical. Turning to the other control variables, we 
find significant positive coefficients for ∆YOUNGit, ∆OLDit and ∆INTERESTit. For 
∆YOUNGit and ∆OLDit this sign is in line with the expectations. If the percentage of 
young and elderly in the entire population changes by 1%, debt changes in the same way by 
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respectively 32.59 and 55.59 euros per capita. For ∆INTERESTit a negative coefficient was 
anticipated. While we expected governments to restrain from increasing debt financing 
when the cost of borrowing increases, the results show that an increase of the borrowing 
cost (by 1%) results in an increase of debt (per capita of 147.18 euros). Obviously 
governments do not succeed in reducing debt when costs increase, on the contrary they 
seem to engage additional debt to finance the increased cost of borrowing. This is in line 
with the so-called “snowball effect” and shows the perverse effect that high interest rates 
may have on indebtedness. This effect is also found by Ashworth et al. (2005) and Geys 
(2007). There is no indication that the level of debt, the change of income, the change of 
unemployment or the government’s size evolution affects debt changes in election years. 
Nor LEFTMAJit presents a significant coefficient. Finally, the dummy variable for the year 
1994 does present a significant coefficient. The negative value of this coefficient suggests 
that in that year debt increases are less strong. 
 
Focusing on the strategic debt hypotheses, we do not find support for the strategic use of 
debt in Flemish municipalities. The most efficient estimations in even columns show that 
governments that do not expect re-election have no significantly different level of debt in 
election years, as PEDit fails to present a significant coefficient. Neither the interaction 
variable (PEDit * LEFTMAJit) is significant. From this results there is no indication that 
Flemish municipalities that do not expect to get a majority of the votes strategically change 
debt in election years.  
 
3.4.5 Extension 
 
The findings in the previous section fail to confirm the existence of strategic use of debt in 
Flemish municipalities. Still, some extended analyses could be done.  
 
First, we test different levels of vote expectations to construct PEDit. We should remark 
that the construct presented above tests whether or not governments with vote 
expectations below 50% change debt policy in election years. First, this assumes that 
governments who are confident of staying into office are not expected to change debt 
CHAPTER 3 
 110 
strategically. This seems reasonable. Second, this also assumes a generalisation of all 
governments with vote expectations below 50% of who we do expect to change debt 
strategically. Maybe this assumption is too strict. Indeed, despite vote expectations below 
50%, their behavior may be mutually divergent. Especially governments with low vote 
expectations are expected to engage in strategic debt policy. On the contrary, governments 
with vote expectations only just below 50% may believe they will be able to attract 
additional votes necessary to get back into office and will not change debt strategically. 
Then the question is at what level of vote expectations governments without re-election 
expectations change debt strategically? We rerun the analyse above with a multitude of 
PEDxit dummies that cover the governments with vote-expectations below x-percent. In 
fact, in Table 17 we reconstruct PEDit to test whether governments with vote expectations 
below 49% (PED49it), below 48% (PED48it),… etc. change debt strategically.97 This enables 
us to test if the strategic debt effect is absent in general or if it kicks in at a lower level of 
vote expectations.  
 
Some remarks on the presentation of the results of this approach in Table 17. First, in 
column (1) we present the results when taking PED50it into account as a proxy for the 
probability of electoral defeat. This corresponds (of course) with the results as presented in 
Table 16, but the reprise of the results allows to compare the results more easily with those 
when lowering the vote expectations. Second, we do not run regressions for governments 
with vote expectations below 40% as the Hausman test suggests that random effects are 
not appropriate anymore below that level.98 For reasons of comparability we only present 
random effects results. Third, to provide a general view of the results of these additional 
analyses in one single table, we only present estimation results of the most efficient 
regressions (thus leaving out insignificant variables).99  
                                                 
 
97  These dummy variable gets value 1 if the forecasted vote percentage (Vfit) is below 49%, 48%,… etc. (thus 
Vfit<x%) and 0 otherwise 
98  Table A13 on p. 209 presents the number of observations for each PEDxit operationalisation. The number of 
observations with PEDxit = 1 reduces from 195 for PED50it to 32 for PED41it. 
99  When an interaction term is significant, the constitutive variables of the interaction model remains included 
regardless of whether they are significant. Insignificant constitutive variables are shown in italic. 
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Table 17 Estimation results of the debt change function given different levels of vote expectations, using OLS with random effects 
 
Dependent variable : ∆Debtit 
(1) 
PED50it 
 
(2) 
PED49it 
 
(3) 
PED48it 
 
(4) 
 PED47it 
 
(5) 
PED46it 
 
(6) 
PED45it 
 
(7) 
PED44it 
 
(8) 
PED43it 
 
(9) 
PED42it 
 
(10) 
PED41it 
 
Intercept 
34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 20.917 
(2.21) 
** 20.938 
(2.22) 
** 21.291 
(2.27) 
** 21.077 
(2.25) 
** 20.477 
(2.18) 
** 21.691 
(2.30) 
** 21.558 
(2.29) 
** 21.924 
(2.33) 
** 20.891 
(2.24) 
** 
PEDxit 
-  11.439 
(1.21) 
 16.286 
(1.65) 
 15.739 
(1.48) 
 18.982 
(1.65) 
 16.643 
(1.30) 
 4.443 
(0.32) 
 7.287 
(0.48) 
 3.962 
(0.22) 
 16.815 
(0.86) 
 
PEDxit * LEFTMAJit  
-  -59.751 
(-2.29) 
** -55.567 
(-1.90) 
* -58.297 
(-1.88) 
* -61.589 
(-1.96) 
* -91.759 
(-2.49) 
** -80.002 
(-2.04) 
** -82.882 
(-2.08) 
** -79.329 
(-1.84) 
* -107.182 
(-2.34) 
** 
LEFTMAJit 
-  6.864 
(0.53) 
 2.924 
(0.23) 
 1.647 
(0.13) 
 1.695 
(0.14) 
 1.968 
(0.16) 
 -0.320 
(-0.03) 
 -0.208 
(-0.02) 
 -1.177 
(-0.10) 
 -0.703 
(-0.06) 
 
DEBTit-1 
-  0.020 
(1.80) 
* 0.021 
(1.82) 
* 0.021 
(1.85) 
* 0.021 
(1.88) 
* 0.023 
(2.00) 
** 0.023 
(2.01) 
** 0.023 
(2.02) 
** 0.023 
(2.00) 
** 0.024 
(2.12) 
** 
∆NTIit - 
 
 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
∆YOUNGit 
3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 3395.893 
(2.39) 
** 3198.296 
(2.26) 
** 3263.821 
(2.30) 
** 3208.123 
(2.27) 
** 3295.086 
(2.33) 
** 3228.155 
(2.28) 
** 3241.853 
(2.29) 
** 3162.543 
(2.23) 
** 3179.011 
(2.25) 
** 
∆OLDit 
5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 5203.282 
(2.06) 
** 5145.907 
(2.04) 
** 5257.696 
(2.08) 
** 5325.530 
(2.11) 
** 5280.077 
(2.09) 
** 4996.167 
(1.97) 
** 4997.827 
(1.97) 
** 5098.493 
(2.02) 
** 5009.259 
(1.99) 
** 
∆UNEMPLit - 
 
 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
∆POPit - 
 
 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
∆INTERESTit 
147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 142.710 
(2.76) 
*** 134.103 
(2.60) 
*** 135.964 
(2.64) 
*** 133.687 
(2.59) 
*** 137.024 
(2.66) 
*** 136.111 
(2.64) 
*** 136.336 
(2.64) 
*** 133.473 
(2.59) 
*** 133.343 
(2.59) 
*** 
FRAG                     
NPARit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
NPAR²it -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
ENPARit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
ENPAR²t -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
TWOPARit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
LARGEPARit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
Time dummy variable (1994) 
-57.034 
(-1.88) 
* -56.044 
(-1.84) 
* -52.259 
(-1.72) 
* -53.145 
(-1.75) 
* -51.997 
(-1.71) 
* -52.801 
(-1.74) 
* -51.980 
(-1.71) 
* -52.163 
(-1.72) 
* -51.064 
(-1.68) 
* -50.92 
(-1.68) 
* 
R² 0.043  0.054  0.054  0.053  0.054  0.056  0.053  0.053  0.052  0.055  
Adjusted R² 0.038  0.043  0.042  0.042  0.043  0.045  0.042  0.042  0.041  0.043  
Hausman 
10.89 
(p=0.54) 
 11.88 
(p=0.45) 
 10.99 
(p=0.53) 
 12.80 
(p=0.38) 
 11.88 
(p=0.45) 
 11.09 
(p=0.52) 
 11.24 
(p=0.50) 
 11.29 
(p=0.50) 
 11.39 
(p=0.50) 
 15.72 
(p=0.20) 
 
Note : N=687; t-values between brackets (except for the Hausman tests where p-values are presented); * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.  
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From Table 17 it is clear that PED50it  indeed was chosen arbitrary. The creation of 
additional dummies for lower vote expectations shows that governments with vote 
expectations below 49% change debt differently than governments with higher vote 
expectations. Still this effect cannot be generalised to the PS, AT or Martimort (2001) 
model. Yet, for all tested operationalisations the PEDxit nor the LEFTMAJit variables are 
significant, still their interaction terms consequently present significant coefficients and thus 
strongly suggest that left-wing governments with bad re-election prospects have different slope 
coefficients. Moreover, the sign of the interaction term is negative, providing evidence that 
there is a negative impact of leftist governments with vote expectations below the 
appropriate percentages on the change of debt in election years. This behavior is in line 
with the PS model, but only for leftist governments not expecting to get into office again. 
Although it is not linear, the overall trend is that the lower the expected votes, the larger is 
the impact on debt changes (from 59.75 euros for PED49it to 107.18 euros per capita for 
PED41it) or thus the stronger the strategic reaction.  
 
If strategic debt policy in line with the PS model is observed for leftist majority 
governments only, then what can be an explanation for the absence of strategic debt 
behavior by the other governments? We suggest this could be explained by the 
consequences of strategic debt behavior on the government’s favourite policy if contrary to 
the expectations the government does return to office.100 If –as shown in Table 17– a leftist 
government with bad re-election prospects reduces debt before elections, but unexpectedly 
stays in office, this debt reduction does not prevent the leftist government to prolong its 
favourite policy in the next legislature. Indeed, debt reduction before elections creates 
financial margin to increase expenditures when returning into office. On the contrary, when 
a rightist government with bad re-election prospects increases debt before elections –as the 
                                                 
 
100  As already introduced on p. 41, fiscal policy theory believes that left-wing governments are more in favour of 
income redistribution and an active state than right-wing governments. This may lead to higher public 
expenditures (Hibbs, 1977 and Schmidt, 1996) resulting in higher tax rates. 
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PS model predicts– it will be confronted with negative consequences of its behavior on its 
favourite policy if it surprisingly regains majority. Indeed, an increase of the debt not only 
increases future expenditures –by means of reimbursements of the capital and the interest 
payments– it also foils the financial margin for tax reductions a rightist government is 
traditionally in favour of. Therefore, leftist governments are more expected to change debt 
strategically. 
 
With respect to the control variables, the results are comparable to these in Table 16.  
DEBTit-1 presents a significant positive coefficient indicating a positive effect of the level of 
debt in the year before elections on debt changes in election years. This positive sign may 
be another indicator of the “snow ball effect” suggesting that high levels of debt become 
self-reinforcing. 
 
In a second extension we perform an additional test concerning the role of government 
fragmentation. In section “3.3 Discussion” on p. 89 we already questioned the role of 
government fragmentation in strategic debt policy. As shown in that paragraph, the  
expectations are ambiguous. In estimation (V.) on p. 106 some fragmentation variables are 
introduced. These variables control for different levels of debt changes according to the 
level of fragmentation. As can be seen in Table 16 on p. 108, there is no significant impact 
of government fragmentation. Still, this does not necessarily mean that fragmentation has 
no impact at all on strategic debt behavior. It can play a role in strategic debt behavior too 
by means of a different reaction of a single party government and of a coalition 
government confronted with the same probability of electoral defeat. As can be seen from 
the discussion on p. 88 there are opposing expectations about the role of fragmentation on 
the strategic use of debt. To test these hypotheses, we rerun our regressions separately for 
single party governments and for coalition governments. Results are presented in Table 18 
in columns (1) to (3) for single party governments and columns (4) to (10) for coalition 
governments. Some remarks on the presentation of the results. First, when focussing on 
single party governments, LEFTMAJit and its interaction term with PED50it and PED49it are 
CHAPTER 3  
 114 
exact collinear. This indicates that all single party governments with a leftist majority have 
vote expectations below 49%. Indeed, when examining the dataset, the highest vote 
expectation of a single party government with a leftist majority is 48.92%. This makes it 
impossible to run the regressions including the test of strategic debt behavior including 
PED50it or PED49it. Consequently we present results starting with PED48it. Also for single 
party governments, results are limited to PED38it as there are no single party governments 
with a leftist majority that have vote expectations below 37%. Second, we do not run 
regressions for coalition governments with vote expectations below 43% as the Hausman 
test suggest that random effects are not appropriate anymore below that level. Again we 
only present random effects results for reasons of comparability. Finally, as in Table 17 we 
only present estimation results of the most efficient regressions (thus leaving out 
insignificant variables). 101 
 
                                                 
 
101  When an interaction term is significant, the constitutive variables of the interaction model remains included 
regardless of whether they are significant. Insignificant constitutive variables are shown in italic. 
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Table 18 Estimation results of the debt change function given different levels of vote expectations in single party governments, using OLS with random effects 
 
 Single Party Governments (N= 326) Coalition governments (N=361) 
Dependent variable : ∆Debtit 
(1) PED50it - 
PED49it 
 
(2) 
PED48it 
 (3)PED
47it→ 
PED38it 
 
(4) 
PED50it 
 
(5) 
PED49it 
 
(6) 
PED48it 
 
(7) 
PED47it 
 
(8) 
PED46it 
 
(9) 
PED45it 
 
(10) 
PED44it 
 
Intercept - 
 6.046 
(0.39) 
 17.302 
(1.21) 
 31.591 
(3.43) 
*** 30.123 
(3.13) 
*** 31.268 
(3.24) 
*** 31.540 
(3.28) 
*** 33.299 
(3.65) 
*** 32.674 
(3.42) 
*** 33.600 
(3.51) 
*** 
PEDxit - 
 10.559 
(0.86) 
 
-  - 
 24.243 
(1.35) 
 33.638 
(1.76) 
* 33.872 
(1.59) 
 
- 
 22.706 
(0.874) 
 3.791 
(0.13) 
 
PEDxit * LEFTMAJit  - 
 -241.10 
(-2.24) 
** 
-  - 
 -97.284 
(-2.82) 
*** -73.095 
(-1.74) 
* -83.422 
(-1.85) 
* 
- 
 -180.921 
(-2.92) 
*** -220.397 
(-2.94) 
*** 
LEFTMAJit - 
 207.844 
(2.06) 
** 
-  - 
 6.450 
(0.47) 
 -0.490 
(-0.04) 
 -1.346 
(-0.10) 
 
- 
 -0.836 
(-0.06) 
 -2.705 
(-0.21) 
 
DEBTit-1 - 
 0.031 
(1.70) 
* 0.033 
(1.83) 
* 
-  -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
∆NTIit -  
97.222 
(1.71) 
* -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
∆YOUNGit - 
 
- 
 
- 
 3421.232 
(1.95) 
* 3773.462 
(2.14) 
** 3396.354 
(1.93) 
* 3494.555 
(1.99) 
** 
- 
 3736.464 
(2.12) 
** 3750.392 
(2.13) 
** 
∆OLDit - 
 5777.578 
(1.92) 
* 
- 
 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  
∆UNEMPLit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
∆POPit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
0.005 
(1.78) 
* 
-  - 
 
∆INTERESTit - 
 
-  -  
186.661 
(2.89) 
*** 199.164 
(3.07) 
** 182.914 
(2.82) 
*** 187.220 
(2.90) 
*** 62.250 
(4.35) 
*** 196.455 
(3.03) 
*** 198.506 
(3.07) 
*** 
FRAG                     
NPARit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
NPAR²it -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
ENPARit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
ENPAR²t -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
TWOPARit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
LARGEPARit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
Time dummy variable (1994) - 
 38.852 
(3.12) 
*** 
- 
 -75.590 
(-2.02) 
** -82.578 
(-2.21) 
** -75.962 
(-2.02) 
** -77.181 
(-2.06) 
** 
-  
-81.319 
(-2.17) 
** -83.803 
(-2.24) 
** 
R² -  0.086  -  0.060  0.080  0.071  0.070  0.057  0.082  0.085  
Adjusted R² -  0.066  -  0.052  0.065  0.055  0.055  0.052  0.066  0.070  
Hausman - 
 
-102 
 10.922 
(p=0.45) 
 11.70 
(p=0.39) 
 12.07 
(p=0.36) 
 11.36 
(p=0.41) 
 16.73 
(p=0.12) 
 16.66 
(p=0.11) 
 13.68 
(p=0.25) 
 17.26 
(p=0.10) 
 
Note : N=687; t-values between brackets (except for the Hausman tests where p-values are presented); * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.  
                                                 
 
102  Hausman test is set to zero as cross-section test variance is invalid. 
CHAPTER 3  
 116 
When reviewing the results for single party governments and for coalition governments, we 
may confirm the idea put forward by Ashworth et al. (2006) that parties in a coalition are on 
average less certain of future power. This may lead them to be more sensitive to the 
strategic use of debt. Indeed, the results in Table 18 confirm that strategic use of debt is 
particularly observed by coalition governments.103 For single party governments, there is no 
evidence of strategic use of debt when vote expectations are below 47%. These findings are 
opposite to those for coalition governments. In general the estimations in Table 18 provide 
evidence of strategic use of debt in coalition governments when vote expectations are 
below 49%.104 Except for the PED48it estimation we again only find leftist majority 
coalition governments to change pre-electoral debt. Comparing the findings for coalition 
governments in Table 18 with the results from Table 17, absolute values of the interaction 
term’s (PEDxit * LEFTMAJit) coefficients are increased, suggesting stronger effects on the 
change of debt for coalition governments. We thus can conclude that strategic debt 
behavior is a phenomenon that can be observed especially in fragmented government 
scenarios. This may be due to the fact that as well as the electoral results, the ensuing 
coalition negotiations play a role in whether or not the government can continue with the 
same coalition partners as in the previous term. 
 
In a third extension we discuss a number of robustness tests relative to our crucial variable 
PEDxit. The novelty of this chapter has been that −unlike most previous literature on 
strategic debt models− we do not rely solely on historical political stability or on ex-post 
information to estimate the probability of electoral defeat. Nevertheless, we wonder what 
                                                 
 
103  The absence of significant coefficients for PEDxit, LEFTMAJit and their interaction terms result in the same 
estimation results for each PEDxit estimation when lowering the vote expectations below 47%. Therefore the 
results presented in column (3) count for each level of vote expectations below 47%. 
104  Remark that this is not true for the PED46it estimation. We do not have an idea why the interaction term loses 
significance at the 46-level, while it regains significance at lower levels of vote expectations. 
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the results would be if we do rely only on such measurements.105 Below we re-estimate 
equation (V.) replacing “our” PEDit by two alternatives.106 First, we introduce ex-post vote 
share for the incumbents as a proxy for the probability of electoral defeat. We thus 
exchange the prospects of electoral defeat (PEDxit) for the ex-post observation of electoral 
defeat (EEDxit). Again this variable is constructed as a dummy variable and takes value 1 if 
the percentage of votes is below x percent and 0 otherwise. Results are in Table 19. 
 
                                                 
 
105  Most of the estimates in literature on strategic debt rely on data that goes back more than one term. E.g Grilli 
et al. (1991), Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), Franzese (2001) and Crain & Tollison (1993) take into account the 
frequency of government changes in the past. Franzese (2001) uses the actual duration of the incumbent’s 
mandate. The setting of Flemish municipalities do not lend itself to suchlike variables that go back more than 
one term. First, there was the large-scale municipal amalgamation in 1976. This hinders the calculation of a 
frequency of governments changes with statisfactory variation. Second, local parties in Flemish municipalities 
frequently change their names or merge (see also footnote 75). Such characteristics make it difficult to 
calculate the duration of the incumbents’ mandate as they may stay in office –and carry on their policy– while 
they changed the name of the party.  
106  A third alternative is presented in Table A11 on p. 208 in appendix. There PEDit is changed by the vote 
expectations Vfit and tests the linear impact of vote expectations on the change of debt. These estimations do 
not follow from theoretical expectations pronounced in this chapter, but they are added to increase 
consistency between chapter 3 and chapter 4 where a linear impact of vote expectations on the change of tax 
rates is expected (see Table 21 on p. 139). No significant coefficents for Vfit are found. 
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Table 19 Estimation results of the debt change function given different levels ex post election results, 
using OLS with random effects 
 
Dependent variable : ∆Debtit 
(1) 
EED50it 
 (2) 
EED50it 
 (3) 
EED49it 
 (4) 
EED49→33it 
 
Intercept 
26.563 
(1.80) 
* 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 23.167 
(1.58) 
 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 
EEDxit 
-11.663 
(-1.35) 
 
- 
 -5.983 
(-0.67) 
 
- 
 
EEDxit * LEFTMAJit  
-27.224 
(-1.16) 
 
- 
 -31.622 
(-1.31) 
 
- 
 
LEFTMAJit 
4.328 
(0.31) 
 
- 
 4.706 
(0.343) 
 
- 
 
DEBTit-1 
0.020 
(1.75) 
* 
- 
 0.020 
(1.78) 
* 
- 
 
∆NTIit 
51.045 
(1.35) 
 
- 
 52.543 
(1.39) 
 
- 
 
∆YOUNGit 
3047.505 
(2.15) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 3104.462 
(2.19) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 
∆OLDit 
5428.766 
(2.14) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 5550.981 
(2.19) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 
∆UNEMPLit 
87.965 
(0.13) 
 -  75.664 
(0.11) 
 -  
∆POPit 
0.003 
(1.46) 
 -  0.003 
(1.40) 
 -  
∆INTERESTit 
132.138 
(2.55) 
** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 132.795 
(2.56) 
** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 
NPARit 
-2.390 
(-0.40) 
 -  -1.607 
(-0.269) 
 -  
Time dummy variable (1994) 
-47.470 
(-1.55) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
** -48.387 
(-1.58) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
** 
R² 0.060  0.043    0.043  
Adjusted R² 0.420  0.038    0.038  
Hausman 17.34 (p= 0.14) 17.05 (p=0.15) 
Note : N=687; t-values between brackets (except for the Hausman tests where p-values 
are presented); * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.  
 
Odd columns of Table 19 present results including all variables, while the more efficient 
regression in which insignificant variables are omitted is even columns. Columns (1) and (2) 
show the results when governments are expected to change debt strategically when they fail 
to get a majority of the votes, that is EED50it gets value 1 if the vote percentage is below 
50% and 0 otherwise. The results show that both EED50it and its interaction term with 
LEFTMAJit fail to present significant variables. Thus there is no indication of strategic debt 
behavior. The same conclusion results from regressions taking into account lower vote 
percentages to construct EEDxit. We only presented the results for EED49it in columns (3) 
and (4) while this exercise was repeated for each EEDxit with x between 50% and 33% − 
below 33% there are insufficient number of observations to run the regression. As the 
most efficient regressions −due to the lack of significant coefficients for EEDxit and its 
interaction term with LEFTMAJit− repeatedly lead to the same results we keep the 
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presentation of the results to that of EED50it and EED49it. Nevertheless, the results 
presented in column (4) count for all tested EEDxit variants. These results may suggest that 
the use of ex post vote results as a proxy for the probability of electoral defeat may not be 
optimal. While the use of vote expectations results in regressions providing evidence of 
strategic debt behavior for governments with a leftist majority, the crucial variables in the 
debt change estimation remain insignificant when using ex post vote percentages.  
 
Second, Ashworth et al. (2005; 403) consider that “governments with larger electoral 
margins may find it easier to remain in power after the next election”. This would lower the 
incentive to strategically use debt. Therefore we introduce SEATMARit, which takes into 
account the seats margin of the government. As in chapter 2 on p. 49, we compute the 
seats margin as the difference between the percentage of the seats of the government 
parties in the Council and 50%. The expectation is that higher margins lower the incentive 
to strategically use debt, so we expect the seats margin to negatively affect the level of debt 
changes. In Table 20 we introduce SEATMARit as a proxy for the probability of electoral 
defeat. In column (1) all coefficients are presented, while in column (2) only significant 
coefficients are retained. 
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Table 20 Estimation results of the debt change function given the seat margin of the government, 
using OLS with random effects 
 
Dependent variable : ∆Debtit (1)  (2)  
Intercept 
25.040 
(1.68) 
* 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 
SEATMARit 
-33.084 
(-0.71) 
 
- 
 
SEATMARit * LEFTMAJit  
-120.071 
(-0.95) 
 
- 
 
LEFTMAJit 
11.054 
(0.57) 
 
- 
 
DEBTit-1 
0.017 
(1.46) 
 
- 
 
∆NTIit 
54.766 
(1.44) 
 
- 
 
∆YOUNGit 
2882.337 
(2.02) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 
∆OLDit 
5504.764 
(2.16) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 
∆UNEMPLit 
91.086 
(0.13) 
 -  
∆POPit 
0.003 
(1.32) 
 -  
∆INTERESTit 
126.771 
(2.43) 
*** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 
NPARit 
-0.468 
(-0.08) 
 -  
Time dummy variable (1994) 
-45.314 
(-1.47) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
** 
R² 0.054  0.043  
Adjusted R² 0.037  0.038  
Hausman 13.80 (p= 0.31) 
Note : N=687; t-values between brackets (except for the Hausman 
tests where p-values are presented); * significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 5% and *** significant at 1%.  
 
In line with Ashworth et al. (2005) we fail to find evidence of strategic debt behavior. 
Columns (1) of Table 20 shows that SEATMAR has a negative coefficient, still it is not 
significant. The results presented in column (2) are similar to those previously found in 
absence of significant variables representing the probability of electoral defeat and its 
interaction with LEFTMAJit. The absence of a significant coefficient of SEATMAR may be 
not that surprising. SEATMAR only measures for the strength of the government, while  
for vote-function (II.) in Table 15 on p. 98 evidence is shown that votes (and thus also vote 
expectations) depend not only on the strength of the government (as measured by Vit-6 in 
the vote-function), but also on other variables. The absence of evidence of strategic debt 
behavior in Table 20 thus could be awarded to the fact that SEATMAR is only a rough 
estimate of the government’s re-election prospects. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses the literature on strategic use of debt models and empirically tests 
them on a dataset of Flemish municipalities. In general the literature on strategic debt 
models shows that the evidence is mixed and we suggest that the lack of an undisputed 
measure to estimate the probability of electoral defeat obstructs the formulation of a 
general consensus on this matter. Most of these measures are based on historical political 
stability information, which ignores the fact that incumbents have to try to estimate what 
voters have in mind in the voting booth when estimating the government’s probability of 
electoral defeat. As Baleiras (1997; 202) explicitly states “this probability depends on the 
electorate’s assessment of the incumbent’s performance while in office”. They thus 
consider not only historical, but also tax, economic and political variables. Therefore we 
introduce vote functions to estimate the prospects of electoral defeat. For the purpose of 
this chapter the vote function of Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) is used to construct a good 
proxy for the prospects of electoral defeat. Our main results show that the strategic use of 
debt in Flemish municipalities cannot be undisputedly confirmed. First, strategic debt 
cannot be stated for all governments with vote expectations below 50%. Still it can be 
observed for governments with expected vote percentages below 49%. Second, strategic 
debt changes can only be stated for leftist governments without re-election prospects, while 
the seminal models also formulate expectations about governments with opposing 
ideological characteristics. It thus seems that in Flemish municipalities leftist majority 
governments without re-election prospects are sensitive to strategic debt behavior, while 
this is not true for its ideological counterparts. Probably the consequences of debt changes 
on its own policy when a government surprisingly returns to office could explain these 
findings.  Third, our analyses show that strategic debt behavior is more to be expected in 
the case of coalition governments. When running separate analyses for single party 
governments and for coalition governments, we find only significant strategic debt 
coefficients for the latter. This may be due to the fact that coalition governments have both 
to win the elections and also to survive the ensuing coalition negotiations. This increases 
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their uncertainty of returning to office and as a consequence their motivation to 
strategically issue debt. To check the robustness of the general results, the strategic use of 
debt analysis was reran using ex post election results and the seats margin (instead of the 
results from the vote function) as a proxy for the probability of electoral defeat. None of 
them allow to confirm the presence of strategic debt behavior. This may suggest that a vote 
function is a more reliable instrument for estimating the probability of electoral defeat than 
the used alternative measures.  
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Chapter 4 : Pre-electoral tax rate 
changes 
 
Applied to tax rates, political budget cycle theory predicts that incumbents will reduce tax rates in the 
build-up to elections to increase their popularity. In chapter 2 the (joint) empirical analysis revealed the 
presence of an electoral cycle for the local income tax rate. In chapter 3 evidence of strategic debt behavior 
in election years was presented. Strategic debt changes may result from pre-electoral tax rate changes. 
Therefore we concentrate in this chapter we on tax rate changes in election years and try to find out 
whether these can be explained using a PBC or a strategic debt approach.  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter deals with the question whether the incumbent government’s expectation of 
the electoral result is linked to their tax policy in the election year. We believe it is and refer 
to two important literatures supporting this view : the budget cycles literature and the 
literature on strategic debt models.  
 
The study of politicians’ behavior at election time is the central focus of electoral cycle 
models (Nordhaus, 1975; Tufte, 1978; Hibbs, 1977 and Rogoff, 1990). The findings of 
these are of particular importance for the analysis conducted in this chapter, for we are 
investigating the effect of electoral expectations on the local tax policy of Flemish 
municipalities. Next to the electoral cycle literature, we rely on insights from strategic debt 
models (Persson & Svensson, 1989 and Alesina & Tabellini, 1990). As shown in the 
previous chapter, the perceived probability of defeat might be a key parameter in explaining 
policy choices preceding elections. In this chapter we test whether the expected vote 
percentage explains local tax rate changes before elections. The calculation of the expected 
vote percentage was already partly worked out in the previous chapter (see section 3.4.1 
starting on p. 91).  
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In this chapter, we focus on tax rate policy, which is the dependent variable in only a 
limited number of electoral cycle studies. Most of the time expenditures, deficits or debt are 
the fiscal instruments under study. Yet scholars generally agree that incumbents prefer to 
manipulate those instruments most visible to their electorates. As tax rate changes are 
highly visible (cf. Mikesell, 1978), the dependent variables in this study represent tax rate 
changes of the local income and local property taxes in the election year.  
 
To test whether vote expectations explain fiscal policy choices, we use panel data covering 
three elections (1988, 1994, 2000) for 294 Flemish local governments. This setting is likely 
to be sensitive to political business cycles and strategic debt policy, both because election 
times are fixed and because incumbents can be indefinitely re-elected (i.e. there are no 
binding term limits), giving them the opportunity to carefully prepare their re-election 
strategy. As such, opportunistic and strategic policies become more tempting.107  
 
In this chapter we build on the vote expectations generated from equation (II.) on p. 94. 
Next, a SUR model is developed to test whether changes in the local income tax rate and 
the local property tax rate in election years depend on the government’s vote expectations. 
Besides the vote expectation variable(s), we introduce variables representing scale, 
budgetary position, government fragmentation, the government’s ideological  
characteristics and demand effects. The results indicate that the expected percentage of 
votes is related to the magnitude of the pre-electoral tax rate changes in the local income 
tax, but not to those in the local property tax. 
 
                                                 
 
107  We are grateful to an anonymous referee who suggested that local incumbents could also reduce tax rates to 
get an advantage on another political scene if they are allowed to compete at the same time for multiple 
positions, whatever their chance of winning the next local election. We think that in our setting such 
motivations are less likely to play a significant role because local elections do not coincide with elections at 
higher government levels. 
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 of this chapter discusses 
the relevant literature. Section 4.3 formulates our research question and hypothesis. Section 
4.4 presents the dataset, the model and the results of the empirical analysis. Finally some 
concluding comments are given in section 4.5. 
 
4.2 The literature 
 
The propositions made in this chapter are related to a number of well-established models in 
the fiscal policy literature. In this section we briefly discuss the contributions of political 
business and budget cycle models and (again) strategic debt models.  
 
4.2.1 Political business/budget cycles 
 
Political business cycle models expect incumbents to engage opportunistically in specific 
policies when facing elections. Originally the models focused on incumbents’ stimulation of 
the economy by manipulating macro-economic policy (political business cycles). By taking 
employment or wealth inducing measures, the government’s popularity, and as a 
consequence the likelihood of its staying in office, was expected to increase. However, 
Drazen (2000) concludes that models based on manipulating the economy through 
monetary policy are unconvincing both theoretically and empirically. Studies focusing on 
fiscal policy (political budget cycles − PBC) are much more robust. Empirical evidence 
supports the idea that lowering taxes, increasing expenditure or raising grants before 
elections raises the government’s chance of re-election. We refer to Franzese (2002) or 
Drazen (2000) for an overview of the theory of PBC. 
 
Numerous empirical contributions have tested the propositions resulting from PBC 
models, but the evidence is mixed. Franzese (2002) observes that support for electoral 
cycles models is less robust in developed countries than in developing democracies. The 
particular context (political, economic, institutional, structural as well as strategic) in which 
incumbents operate also determines their incentives to ‘electioneer’. Finally, evidence on 
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the effects of policy adjustments (i.e. budgets, expenditures, taxes, investments) on the 
voter’s decision-making is relatively well-established. The effects of pre-electoral shifts in 
real outcomes (i.e. gross domestic product, inflation or unemployment) are at best 
ambiguous.108 
 
In this chapter we study pre-electoral tax policy in a local context. The setting of local 
governments excludes monetary policy as an instrument for pre-electoral opportunistic 
behavior because this is the hands of the federal government exclusively, which, through its 
central bank, is represented in the ECB decision-making bodies. At the local level, it is 
changes in fiscal policy that are expected to have a more significant impact on voters’ 
behavior. Drazen (2000), noting that voters have imperfect information about an 
incumbent’s competence, argues that fiscal policy can clearly signal the government’s 
competence to the electorate. More specifically we will focus on the most visible part of the 
local fiscal policy, namely rate changes of important local taxes. One could argue that 
reducing tax rates before elections implies naïve voters. Early models, following Nordhaus 
(1975), did indeed assume naïve voters with adaptive expectations, in which voters did not 
learn from previous election periods and thus could be fooled over and over again. But 
later models developed by Rogoff & Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) positioned voters 
with rational expectations. Rational voters could perceive a pre-electoral tax reduction as an 
attempt to fool them and consequently punish the government by voting against it. These 
later models assume that there is imperfect information about an incumbent’s competence 
and that expansionary policy before election is seen as an indicator of high competence 
(Alesina et al., 1992). In this chapter, we follow Drazen (2000) and introduce tax rate 
changes as the dependent variable.  
 
                                                 
 
108  It is not difficult to see that it is for incumbents much easier to manipulate policy instruments than 
macroeconomic outcomes (e.g. GDP, inflation or unemployment). Governments are able control their own 
policy instruments whereas they can only hope to have some indirect impact on the economy (Blais & Nadeau, 
1992, 390). 
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4.2.2 Strategic debt models 
 
The strategic debt models most referred to are those of Persson & Svensson (1989) and 
Alesina & Tabellini (1990). Both emphasize strategic considerations concerning a 
government’s debt policy but from different points of view. While Persson & Svensson 
(1989) focus on the level of spending, Alesina & Tabellini (1990) concentrate on the 
composition of government spending.  
 
Persson & Svensson (1989) argue that politicians follow their own voters’ preferences 
concerning the size of government. Incumbents are thus acting as Pigouvian agents. 
Accordingly, Conservatives are expected to be reluctant to indulge in ‘bad public finance’. 
This expectation, however, is confounded by the Reagan-governments in the U.S., which 
illustrated that a massive build up of debts is quite conceivable under a Conservative 
government. Following Persson & Svensson (1989), it might have a strategic purpose. 
Increasing deficits and debt levels is seen as a means of restricting the expansionary policies 
of the next government. Consequently, in the case of more liberal governments, the level of 
debt will not increase in election years. This kind of strategic behavior is only to be 
expected if the current government expects to be voted out of office.  
 
According to Alesina & Tabellini (1990) both right-wing and left-wing governments will 
allow higher levels of debt if they suspect they will not be re-elected, as long as the degree 
of political polarization is sufficiently large. In their model, governments differ with respect 
to their preferences concerning the type of government spending. When the government 
knows it will be replaced by a government in favour of policies quite distinct from its own, 
it is expected to increasingly invest in those public goods that matter most to its own 
electorate. As the authors express it: “by leaving the debt to the future, today’s government 
can force its successor to “pay the bills” and spend less on the public good that is worth 
nothing to today’s government” (Alesina & Tabellini, 1990; 409). 
 
For a more detailed discussion on the strategic debt models, see section 3.2 starting on p. 82. 
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4.3 Discussion 
 
In this section we discuss the main contributions of this chapter to the literature.  
 
First, this chapter contributes to the relatively limited empirical evidence concerning 
incumbents’ strategic behavior at the local government level. We are only aware of the 
Pettersson-Lidbom-study (2001), which analyses the strategic debt accumulation of 
Swedish local governments. The same goes for the PBC. We can refer to e.g. Ashworth et 
al. (2005 & 2006), Binet & Pentecôte (2004), Brender (2003), Drazen & Eslava (2005), 
Geys (2007), Solé Ollé (2003) and Veiga & Veiga (2007), still country level data dominate in 
PBC literature, despite the fact that a local-level context offers a number of advantages, as 
pointed out in section 1.4 on p. 31.109 
 
Secondly, contrary to previous research we do not take the viewpoint of individual 
politicians. Rather we focus on the position of the seated majority. We investigate whether 
expectations about the continuation of the current government might be a decisive factor 
in the process. 
 
Thirdly, Persson & Svensson (1989; 325) propose that governments will engage in deficit-
spending or accumulate debt when “the government knows that it will be replaced”. In this 
chapter, we mitigate this assumption, arguing that uncertainty about getting re-elected is already 
sufficient motivation to act strategically.  
 
Fourthly, we measure the probability of staying in office in a different way. In the 
Pettersson-Libom (2001) study, post election outcomes were used as a proxy for the 
probability of electoral defeat. Next, the votes were instrumented by the frequency of 
government changes over the last 7 legislatures. In this chapter we also test post election 
                                                 
 
109  See footnote 36 on p. 44 for more details on these papers.  
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outcome, but in addition we rely on the result of the estimation of the specific vote 
function as developed in the previous chapter.110 We assume that the expected votes are 
dependent on the current popularity of the government, on its fiscal policy and on 
economic conditions.  
 
Finally, this chapter investigates tax rate changes. Tax rate changes as such are rarely the 
dependent variable in PBC research.111 We are only acquainted with the research of 
Mikesell (1978), Nelson (2000) and Binet & Pentecôte (2004).112 The taxes we consider are 
surcharge taxes, the rates of which in Flanders are set by the local municipalities.  
 
4.4 Empirical analysis 
 
In this section we test whether the prospects of electoral outcome are decisive in pre-
electoral tax policy. Section 4.4.1 outlines our dependent variable. Section 4.4.2 presents the 
methodology and the empirical model. Section 4.4.3 discusses the empirical results, while 
some extensions are presented in section 4.4.4. 
 
                                                 
 
110  We refer to equation (II.) in section 3.4.1 on p. 94. 
111  See also footnote 23 on p. 36.  
112  Mikesell (1978) shows that tax rate cuts in American states were concentrated in the latter years of the electoral 
cycle in the period 1960-1977. Tax rate increases, on the other hand, are more likely to occur in the year 
immediately after election years than in election years. Working on a similar but larger dataset (1946-1993), 
Nelson (2000) affirms the occurrence of tax rate increases, while he finds little evidence that U.S. state 
politicians strategically time tax rate cuts to occur around election periods. Binet & Pentecôte (2004) show that 
tax rate reductions are used for election-motivated tax manipulation in French municipalities. 
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4.4.1 Dependent variable 
 
In this chapter we focus on the local tax rate changes (∆TRit). We prefer to study tax rate 
changes to other variables representing the balance or level of indebtedness.113 We agree 
with Wagner (1971) & Mikesell (1978) that tax rate changes get public attention, legislative 
debate and voter attention. Other modifications of the tax laws (such as tax base changes 
and additional exemptions) tend to be less visible and taxpayers sometimes have poor 
understanding of what exactly has changed (Nelson, 2000). According to Tufte (1978), 
especially highly visible actions that generate economic benefits for a large number of 
voters are central to the electioneering process.  
 
We will formulate a model that simultaneously estimates changes in the rates of the local 
income tax (∆LITRit) and the local property tax (∆LPTRit). The tax rate changes in our 
model are measured as the year-to-year change in election years t compared to pre-electoral 
years t-1. Table A14 on p. 210 presents the descriptive statistics of ∆LITRit and ∆LPTRit 
and shows that ∆LITRit has no positive values. None of the Flemish municipalities under 
review increased LITR in election years. ∆LPTRit has some positive values. More detailed 
analyses of ∆LPTRit (not shown) indicate that only four observations have a positive 
∆LPTRit value.114 On average LITR and LPTR are cut by, respectively, 0.08% and 3.86 
centimes in election years. 
 
                                                 
 
113  Blais & Nadeau (1992) show that spending is increased in election years in Canadian provinces. Alesina (1988) 
finds a significant election year increase in net transfer over GNP for the U.S. Shi & Svensson (2003) consider 
a panel data set of 91 countries and find that in an election year the government surplus falls significantly. 
Brender & Drazen (2005) look for budget cycles using expenditures, transfers and the balance in a large cross-
section of countries. Geys’ (2007) analysis of local public debt data for 296 Flemish municipalities provides 
empirical support for opportunistic policy cycles. 
114  Only 1 (Zoersel), 2 (Rotselaar & Maasmechelen) and 1 (Spiere Helkijn) municipalities present positive ∆LPTit 
values in, respectively, 1988, 1994 and 2000. 
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4.4.2 Empirical model  
 
In this section we present the empirical model. We rely on a Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) approach to find out whether or not pre-electoral tax policy depends on 
the government’s prospects of re-election.115  
 
From the PBC-perspective, we expect governments to lower tax rates when they doubt 
their ability to rally the support needed for re-election. Governments fearing an electoral 
outcome just short of a majority position are expected to reduce tax rates in an attempt to 
make up the difference. However, even governments expecting to gain very few votes at all 
might as well do the same; they know this will not convince a great many citizens to vote 
for them, but at least it will strategically trim the next government’s resources. On the other 
hand, local governments who are confident of staying in office probably do not care all that 
much about the impact of votes by changing taxes (Solé Ollé, 2003). They may be expected 
to change taxes when this corresponds to their ideological programme or to their financial 
needs.  
 
We thus expect the government’s decision to change tax rates in election years to be 
dependent on their expectations of getting into office again. Therefore estimation (VI.) 
explains tax rate changes in election years (∆TRit) as a function of the government’s electoral 
prospects (EPit) and additionally a vector of variables affecting fiscal policy (Yit-1). More 
formally, 
 
(VI.) ∆TRit = α1 + α2 EPit + α3 Yit-1 + uit ;  
where i = 1,..., N; t = election years 1988, 1994 and 2000   
 
                                                 
 
115  See the next section 4.4.3 on p. 136 for a motivation on SUR approach. 
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To properly compute the government’s electoral prospects, we should be able to compute 
its actual expectations. But unavailability of such data for a large sample over a long period 
forces us to find a good proxy. This is, in fact, the same issue faced in Chapter 3, when 
estimating the probability of electoral defeat. For the purpose of this chapter we again build 
on the on p. 100 generated forecasted values of the vote percentage (Vfit).116 As explained 
there, for each observation the forecasted value of the vote percentage is calculated by 
applying the coefficients of the vote function as estimated in Table 15 on p. 98 on the one 
year lagged values of the explanatory variables to take into account that tax rates of election 
years t have to be decided before December 31 of the year before elections. These 
forecasted values may be a good proxy for the government’s prospects of the electoral 
result. Therefore we replace EPit in equation (VI.) by Vfit and expect it to have a positive 
coefficient.117  
 
In Chapter 3 we showed that strategic debt behavior differs from the ideological 
characteristics of the government. Therefore an interaction variable was introduced that 
links the vote expectations of the government with the government’s ideological 
characteristics. As we expect strategic behavior to be a possible explanation for tax rate 
changes too, an interaction between the expected votes and an ideological variable IDEOit-1 
is introduced. We fall back on the analysis of Chapter 3 to test the interaction effect in 
three ways. We revert to the dummy variable LEFTMAJit-1 (see p. 101), to the Ideological 
Complexion of local Governments (ICGit-1) as constructed by Kontopoulos & Perotti 
(1999) and to a dummy variable (LEFTGOVit-1) that is gathered from this ICGit-1 value (see 
footnote 92 on p. 102). Including this interaction extends equation (VI.) to : 
 
(VII.) ∆TRit = α1 + α2 V
f
it + α3 V
f
it * IDEOit-1 + α4 IDEOit-1 + Yit -1+ uit ;   
 where : i = 1,..., N; t = election years 
                                                 
 
116  For more details on the calculation of Vfit, we refer to the previous chapter (see section 3.4.1 starting on p. 91). 
117  Analogoulsly to the previous chapter, we also test the impact of vote expectations on pre-electoral tax rate 
changes using the dummy variable variants as introduced in section 3.4.5 on p. 109. Again we also use ex-post 
election results as a robustness check. Results are presented in section 4.4.4 on p. 141. 
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Additionally a vector of variables, represented by Yit-1 in equation (VI.), is introduced to 
control for other variables affecting tax rate changes. Most of these variables explain the 
level or the change of fiscal and financial variables in the year t-1. As in chapter 2, see p. 53, 
this lag is introduced because tax rates are set ex ante; that is, they are fixed in the autumn 
of the previous year. Tax rates cannot be changed during the election year t.118  
 
The decision to reduce tax rates is likely to be dependent on the financial health of the 
government. BALANCEit-1 controls for the surplus (positive) or deficit (negative) of the 
financial account in the year before elections. We expect municipalities facing a surplus in 
the previous year to decide more easily to transfer this to its taxpayers through tax rate 
cuts.119 A negative value is thus expected. Next to the deficit, we introduce DEBTit-1, which 
represents the debt per capita in pre-election years. As governments with low levels of debt 
are more in a position to reduce tax rates, we expect a positive value. Also the level of tax 
rate in year t-1 is introduced (LITRit-1 and LPTRit-1). High tax rates in year t-1 allow for 
more leniency in reducing tax rates in year t, while this is less possible for governments 
with low tax rates. Thus  lagged tax rates might have an effect on changes in tax rates. A 
negative coefficient is anticipated. We add a variable to control for tax base changes 
(∆TBASEit-1) in the pre-electoral year. We run simultaneously two equations (one for each 
tax rate) and therefore we take changes of the specific tax base into consideration. For the 
local income tax, ∆TBASEit-1 measures the change of the revenue per capita of one percent 
local income tax in year t-1 compared to year t-2. For the local property tax, ∆TBASEit-1 
captures the change of the revenue per capita of one percent (this equals 100 opc.) local 
property tax for the same time interval.120 Again negative coefficients are expected, 
indicating that increases in the tax base give governments more opportunities to lower the 
local tax burden. Also changes in the grant revenue may have an effect on tax rate policy. 
Therefore ∆GRANTit is introduced and is defined as the year-to-year change of the 
                                                 
 
118  For more details on the endorsement of the local tax rates, we refer to section 1.2.4 on p. 26. 
119  Contrariwise, a deficit in a previous year could be financed by raising taxes in the year thereafter. 
120  TBASE was already introduced on p. 52 when estimating the tax rates. Some more information on the 
calculation of TBASE is given in footnote 45 on p. 53. 
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unconditional grants per capita. In the presence of grant illusion we expect a positive sign. 
Indeed, higher grants may obscure the real tax price of public goods and it may have a 
positive impact on the demand for public goods and thus on tax rates (to finance this 
increased demand). If grants on the contrary measure the availability of alternative revenue 
sources, a negative sign is expected. A priori the sign thus unknown. Still we already know 
from the results of chapter 2 (see p. 73) that the impact of grants on tax rates is unequal for 
the different tax rates. 
 
As in Chapters 2 and 3 (see respectively p. 52 and p. 104) we control for the impact of 
demographic and socio-economic variables on the tax rate changes. In chapter 2 we 
introduced demographic and socio-economic variables in the tax rate estimations as they 
may reflect the needs for public services. Changes in those variables may lead to changes in 
the demand for public expenditures and have an effect on the tax rates. Therefore we 
introduce the changes in the proportion of young inhabitants (∆YOUNGit-1), changes in 
the proportion of elderly inhabitants (∆OLDit-1), changes in the unemployment rate 
(∆UNEMPLit-1) and changes in the number of inhabitants (∆POPit-1). These variables are 
the year-on-year change of the percentage of inhabitants that are, respectively, below 20, 
over 64 and unemployed and the year-on-year change of the number of inhabitants. We 
expect positive coefficients.  
 
The role of political characteristics in public policy, and fiscal policy in particular, is a 
contentious issue. Besides its impact on strategic behavior taken into account with the 
interaction term (Vfit * IDEOit-1), we may also expect a marginal effect of ideology on tax rate 
changes. Generally, left-wing governments are more in favour of income redistribution and 
an active state than right-wing governments. Left-wing governments thus prefer higher 
public expenditure. As a decrease in tax rates reduces a government’s revenues (and thus its 
ability to spend), we may expect leftist governments to be less in favour of tax rate reductions 
than rightist governments. We thus expect positive coefficients for dummy variables 
representing leftist majorities (LEFTMAJit-1) or leftist governments (LEFTGOVit-1) or a 
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negative coefficient when the position of the government is determined by the Ideological 
Complexion of the Government variable (ICGit-1). Second, we take into account the Weak 
Government Hypothesis (Roubini & Sachs, 1989a, 1989b), which states that weaker –i.e. 
more fragmented– governments tend to follow less restrictive fiscal policies and are thus 
expected to have less freedom to reduce taxes before elections. To do this, we introduce 
FRAGit-1 that –as in previous chapters, see respectively p. 48 and p. 105– is operationalised in 
different ways. First we add the number of parties of the current government (NPARit-1) to 
measure the effect of fragmentation. As in chapter 2, but also in Ashworth et al. (2005 & 
2006), Geys (2007) and Goeminne et al. (2008) a non-linear effect of government 
fragmentation on local government’s fiscal decision-making is stated, we then test a non linear 
specification too, adding a squared term of NPARit-1.121 We also take into account size 
inequalities to pay attention to the importance of the various parties in the decision process 
and therefore introduce alternatively the effective number of government parties 
(ENPARit-1) as employed by Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006) before. Again we also introduce 
its squared term to test possible non-linearities. Another operationalisation to test for non-
linearities is the introduction of dummy variables TWOPARit-1 and LARGEPARit-1 for 
governments consisting of, respectively two and at least three parties –with single party 
governments as the remaining category. 
 
Finally, dummies (Y1994 and Y2000) are included to control for year-specific effects.  
 
                                                 
 
121 See Table 6 on p. 59. 
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Replacing Yit-1 in equation (VI.) with these control variables and ∆TRCit with of ∆LITRit 
and ∆LPTRit, we estimate the following system of equations122:  
 
(VIII.) ∆LITRit =  α1 + α2 V
f
it + α3 V
f
it * IDEOit-1 + α4 IDEOit-1 + α5 BALANCEit-1                  
+ α6 DEBTit-1 + α7 LITRit-1 + α8 ∆TBASEit-1 + α9 ∆GRANTit                       
+ α10  ∆YOUNGit-1 + α11 ∆OLDit-1 + α12 ∆UNEMPLit-1 + α13 ∆POPit-1            
+ α14 FRAGit-1 + α15 Y1994 + α16 Y2000 + uit  
 ∆LIPRit =  β1 + β2 Vfit + β3 Vfit * IDEOit-1 + β4 IDEOit-1 + β5 BALANCEit-1                  
+ β6 DEBTit-1 + β7 LPTRit-1 + β8 ∆TBASEit-1 + β9 ∆GRANTit                       
+ β10 ∆YOUNGit-1 + β11 ∆OLDit-1 + β12 ∆UNEMPLit-1 + β13 ∆POPit-1           
+ β14 FRAGit-1 + β15 Y1994 + β16 Y2000 + vit  
 
where i = 1,..., N; t = election years 1988, 1994 and 2000   
 
4.4.3 Methodology & results 
 
The results presented below are obtained from models estimated by applying Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) −also known as the multivariate regression or Zellner’s 
method. Given that both tax rates are decided at the same time by the same government, it 
is not unlikely that unconsidered factors that influence the error terms of the ∆LITR 
estimation also influence those of the ∆LPTR estimation (and vice versa). The error 
structures may thus be linked to each other. Ignoring this contemporaneous correlation and 
estimating both estimations separately could lead to inefficient coefficient estimates. Under 
these circumstances the use of the SUR technique is recommended (Wooldridge, 2002). In 
a SUR model, both equations are estimated simultaneously with a generalized least squares 
(GLS) estimator, thus accounting for contemporaneous correlation in the errors across 
equations. The data cover 294 of the 308 Flemish municipalities and three election 
periods.123  
                                                 
 
122  Descriptive statistics of all explanatory variables are shown in Table A14 in appendix on p. 210. 
123  Our dataset of the tax rate change estimations builds on the dataset we used to re-estimate Vermeir & 
Heyndels’ (2006) vote-function (see estimation (II.) in section 3.4.1 on p. 94). For remarks on the composition 
of that dataset, also see footnote 75. 
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Pairwise correlations indicate that the interaction terms (Vfit * IDEOit-1) are highly 
correlated with the variables measuring the main effects.124 When including both the 
interaction and the main variables in the model, this may indeed increase multicollinearity 
leading to an increase of the size of the standard errors that makes it less likely that the 
coefficient on the interaction term will be significant. Some scholars suggested that high 
multicollinearity can be solved by centering the main variables when calculating the 
interaction term (see Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003; 28). Other  scholars (see e.g. Brambor et al., 
2006 or Kam & Franzese, 2003) propose that centering alters nothing important statistically 
and nothing at all substantively. When introducing interaction terms, multicollinearity arises 
because there is too little information in the data. The technique of centering does not 
provide more accurate data, it thus not solves problems of multicollinearity.125 Moreover, 
Brambor et al. (2006; 70) suggest that problems associated with multicollinearity are 
exaggerated in the context of multiplicative interaction model and that as long as there is no 
perfect multicollinearity all of the constitutive terms should be included. Here we follow 
Brambor et al. (2006) and keep all interaction and main variables in the model. 
 
In the previous section alternatives are introduced for measuring the government’s 
prospects of the electoral result, for taking into account the ideological characteristics of 
the government and for measuring the effect of government fragmentation. Table 21 
presents the results of the estimations when using Vfit as a proxy for the government’s 
prospects of the electoral result, employing NPARit-1 as fragmentation variable and ICGit-1 
as ideological variable. In Table A16 in appendix on p. 211 the analyse as presented in 
Table 21 is repeated using different fragmentation operationalisations. None of them 
                                                 
 
124  The correlation coefficients are over the suggested threshold of |r|>0.80 (see Gujarati, 2003; 359). See Table 
A15 in appendix on p. 210. 
125  We refer to Brambor et al. (2006) for the algebraic proof. 
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present significant coefficients for the fragmentation variables.126 Therefore, except for 
Table 21 fragmentation effects are removed from the presented results.127 In this section 
we present the results using ICGit-1 as ideological variable. The use of alternative ideological 
variables LEFTMAJit-1 and LEFTGOVit-1 do not result in better results as can be seen from 
Table A17 on p. 213 in appendix. In section 4.4.4 on p. 141 alternatives for Vfit are tested. 
 
In this and next section, tables present in columns (1) and (2) estimations including all 
variables tested, while in columns (3) and (4) insignificant variables are omitted. Remark 
that when an interaction term is significant, the constitutive variables of the interaction 
term remain included regardless of whether they are significant. Insignificant constitutive 
variables are shown in italic. Wald tests are performed and reject the null hypotheses that all 
slope coefficients of our analyses are equal to zero.  
 
                                                 
 
126  Table A16 presents in columns (1) to (8) regressions with all variabels. None of the fragmentation variables is 
significant. The most efficient regressions in columns (9) and (10) count for all tested fragmentation 
operationalisations and correspond to the results presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 21. 
127  Remark that for each analyse the impact of fragmentation is tested. Still we abstain from presenting the results 
including the different operationalisations as significant coefficients fail to appear. 
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Table 21 SUR estimation results of the tax rate change functions using the expected vote percentage 
 
Dependent variable 
(1) 
∆LITRit 
(2) 
∆LPTRit 
(3) 
∆LITRit 
(4) 
∆LPTRit 
Vfit 
0.029 
(2.57) 
** 0.926 
(1.00) 
 0.023 
(2.18) 
** 
- 
 
Vfit * ICGit-1 
-0.005 
(-2.28) 
** -0.171 
(-0.93) 
 -0.004 
(-1.96) 
* 
- 
 
ICGit-1 
0.286 
(2.37) 
** 10.586 
(1.05) 
 0.248 
(2.11) 
** 
- 
 
BALANCEit-1 
-0.001 
(-2.28) 
** -0.011 
(-0.58) 
 -0.001 
(-1.90) 
* 
- 
 
DEBTit-1 
-3.87E-05 
(-1.11) 
 0.001 
(0.38) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
LITRit-1 
-0.018 
(-1.24) 
 
- 
 -0.023 
(-1.69) 
* 
- 
 
LPTRit-1 - 
 -0.008 
(-2.14) 
** 
- 
 -0.009 
(-2.45) 
* 
∆TBASEit-1 
0.045 
(1.76) 
* 2.788 
(1.21) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
∆GRANTit 
-0.002 
(-0.45) 
 -1.200 
(-2.96) 
*** 
- 
 -1.190 
(-3.04) 
*** 
∆YOUNGit-1 
-1.179 
(-0.39) 
 -215.081 
(-0.85) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
∆OLDit-1 
4.525 
(1.40) 
 497.450 
(1.84) 
* 
- 
 510.221 
(2.20) 
** 
∆UNEMPLit-1 
-2.332 
(-1.52) 
 -13.056 
(-0.10) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
∆POPit-1 
8.63E-05 
(1.29) 
 -0.001 
(-0.19) 
 14.00E-05 
(2.26) 
** 
- 
 
NPARit-1 
-0.083 
(-1.18) 
 -2.627 
(-0.46) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
NPAR²it-1 
0.016 
(0.93) 
 0.850 
(0.61) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Y1994 
0.210 
(4.97) 
*** 17.280 
(4.84) 
*** 0.154 
(5.55) 
*** 17.556 
(5.53) 
*** 
Y2000 
0.231 
(6.11) 
*** 17.847 
(5.43) 
*** 0.187 
(7.05) 
*** 17.074 
(2.28) 
*** 
Intercept 
-1.674 
(-2.67) 
*** -65.628 
(-1.28) 
 -1.406 
(-2.35) 
** -7.554 
(-1.77) 
* 
R² 0.124  0.073  0.114  0.065  
Adjusted R² 0.103  0.051  0.103  0.058  
Wald F statistic (p-value) 206.37 (p<0.01) 187.95 (p<0.01) 
Note : N=688; Values in parentheses are t-values (except for Wald-test, where p-values are presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 
1%. Wald statistic has a Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated parameters). 
 
In terms of R², the model performs best when estimating the local income tax rate changes. 
Our model explains about 11% of the variance of the pre-electoral local income tax rate 
changes. For the local property tax rate changes, the R²s vary around 6%.  
 
The results in Table 21 show that the vote expectations (Vfit) have an impact on ∆LITRit 
but not on ∆LPTRit. The finding that pre-electoral changes in LITR can be explained by 
the government’s vote expectations, while this is not true for LPTR, might indicate that 
LIT is more electorally costly than LPT. This is in line with the findings in chapter 3 on p. 
99 where the results of the vote function provide evidence that LIT is electorally costly. 
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The results of the present chapter strengthens the finding that LIT is more electorally 
costly than LPT. In that case, governments may consider LPT a constant revenue source to 
finance local public services, which is not unlikely as the tax base is immobile.  
 
We continue the discussion of the results from the local income tax rate change estimation. 
As mentioned before Vfit significantly affects ∆LITRit and in the expected direction. The 
awaited positive sign is perceived. This suggests that a low percentage of expected votes 
goes together with strong local income tax rate reductions. Still, to interpret the marginal 
effect of (Vfit) on ∆LITRit correctly, we should be aware that in this interaction model, the 
conditioning variable ICGit-1 is a continuous variable that for none of the observations is 
zero. The traditional interpretation of the marginal effect of the constitutive independent 
variable (Vfit) on the dependent variable (∆LITRit) when the conditioning variable (ICGit-1) 
is zero thus is insufficient (Brambor et al., 2006). Indeed, the effect of Vfit on ∆LITRit 
should be calculated as (α2 + α3 ICGit-1). Additional calculations (not shown) indicate that 
the overall impact of Vfit on ∆LITRit is positive, suggesting that lower vote expectations 
lead to stronger tax cuts. The same exercise needs to be done for the interpretation of the 
marginal effect of ICGit-1 on ∆LITRit. Here the effect of ICGit-1 on ∆LITRit is (α4 + α3 Vfit). 
Additional calculations (not shown) indicate that the effect is positive. This is opposite to 
the expectations. Leftist governments seem to be more in favour of local income tax rate 
reductions than rightist governments. Maybe this is because leftist governments, 
traditionally having higher tax rates –see Table 13 on p. 71, have more margin to reduce tax 
rates before elections. The sign of LITRit-1 in the local income tax rate change estimation 
could confirm this suggestion. Indeed, the negative sign LITRit-1 suggests that governments 
with high LITRit-1 cut this rate stronger in election years.  
 
The sign of BALANCEit-1 is also (as expected) negative. Governments with a surplus in the 
year before elections thus seem to offset local income tax rates with this positive balance. 
Governments appear to use short-term financial margins to finance tax rate reductions, 
while the indicator of long-term financial health (DEBTit-1) remains insignificant. Also 
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NPARit-1 and its squared form present a insignificant coefficients. Fragmentation thus 
seems to have no significant impact on pre-electoral tax rate changes. We experimented 
with different fragmentation operationalisations, but none of them resulted in significant 
signs for the fragmentation variables.128 Finally, there are positive significant coefficients 
for ∆POPit-1 and for dummy variables Y1994 and Y2000 indicating respectively that –as 
expected– an increase in the population pushes LITR up and the presence of year specific 
effects in our model.  
 
Opposite to the local income tax rate change estimation where multiple effects were 
identified, only the level of the local property tax rate (LPTRit), a change of the grant 
revenue (∆GRANTit) and a change in the population over 64 (∆OLDit-1) and the year 
dummies significantly determine the level of local property tax rate changes in election 
years. The coefficients have the expected signs. ∆GRANTit presents a negative sign 
suggesting that a change of the grant level does not create illusion effects, but is seen as an 
alternative revenue source and allows to reduce tax rates when the grant revenue increases. 
Vote expectations thus are not affecting pre-electoral local property tax rate changes. 
 
4.4.4 Extension 
 
As in section 3.4.5 of the previous chapter (see p. 109), a number of additional analyses are 
performed.  
 
The novelty of this and previous chapter has been that we do not rely solely on historical 
political stability or on ex-post information to estimate the government’s vote expectations 
(see footnote 105 on p. 117). Nevertheless, we wonder what the results would be if we do 
                                                 
 
128  The results of the tax rate change estimations using different fragmentation variables are presented in Table 
A16 on p. 211. We only present results of the estimations including all variables tested. The results of the most 
efficient estimations including only significant variables correspond to those presented in columns (3) and (4) 
of Table 21 on p. 139  
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rely only on such measurements. Below we re-estimate equation (VIII.) replacing Vfit by the 
ex-post vote share for the incumbents (Vit) as a proxy for the government’s vote 
expectations. Table 22 presents the results when we follow Solé Ollé (2003), Case (2001) 
and Caplan (2001), who use (ex-post) election outcome (Vit) as a proxy for the vote 
variable.  
 
Table 22 SUR estimation results of the tax rate change functions using the ex-post vote results 
 
Dependent variable 
(1) 
∆LITRit 
(2) 
∆LPTRit 
(3) 
∆LITRit 
(4) 
∆LPTRit 
Vit 
0.025 
(2.58) 
** 0.749 
(0.92) 
 0.022 
(2.27) 
** -0.009 
(-2.50) 
** 
Vit * ICGit-1 
-0.005 
(-2.37) 
** -0.135 
(-0.82) 
 -0.004 
(-2.12) 
** 
- 
 
ICGit-1 
0.270 
(2.48) 
** 8.679 
(0.95) 
 0.241 
(2.27) 
** 
- 
 
BALANCEit-1 
-0.001 
(-2.38) 
** -0.012 
(-0.64) 
 -0.001 
(-1.96) 
** 
- 
 
DEBTit-1 
-4.94E-05 
(-1.42) 
 0.001 
(0.30) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
LITRit-1 
-0.031 
(-2.42) 
** 
- 
 -0.033 
(-2.62) 
*** 
- 
 
LPTRit-1 - 
 -0.008 
(-2.21) 
** 
- 
 -0.009 
(-2.50) 
** 
∆TBASEit-1 
0.042 
(1.65) 
* 2.902 
(1.26) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
∆GRANTit 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
 -1.171 
(-2.88) 
*** 
- 
 -1.200 
(-3.06) 
*** 
∆YOUNGit-1 
-1.676 
(-0.55) 
 -224.068 
(-0.89) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
∆OLDit-1 
3.971 
(1.23) 
 490.446 
(1.81) 
* 
- 
 512.319 
(2.21) 
** 
∆UNEMPLit-1 
-2.356 
(-1.53) 
 -15.168 
(-0.12) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
∆POPit-1 
8.45E-05 
(1.27) 
 -0.001 
(-0.14) 
 14.20E-05 
(2.30) 
** 
- 
 
NPARit-1 
-0.066 
(-0.94) 
 -2.720 
(-0.47) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
NPAR²it-1 
0.014 
(0.80) 
 0.898 
(0.64) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Y1994 
0.205 
(4.85) 
*** 17.078 
(4.80) 
*** 0.154 
(5.53) 
*** 17.629 
(5.55) 
*** 
Y2000 
0.230 
(6.07) 
*** 17.863 
(5.44) 
*** 0.187 
(7.07) 
*** 17.151 
(6.31) 
*** 
Intercept 
-1.433 
(-2.56) 
** -55.859 
(-1.21) 
 -1.249 
(-2.34) 
** -7.433 
(-1.74) 
* 
R² 0.122  0.074  0.112  0.065  
Adjusted R² 0.101  0.051  0.102  0.058  
Wald F statistic (p-value) 204.89 (p<0.01) 186.83 (p<0.01) 
Note : N=688; Values in parentheses are t-values (except for Wald-test, where p-values are presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 
1%. Wald statistic has a Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated parameters). 
 
 
The model relying on forecasted vote expectations (Vfit) in Table 21 and that on election 
outcome (Vit) in Table 22 do not much differ. In general, all coefficients are highly 
comparable for the two models. Not only are the same variables significant but their 
coefficients also present highly comparable values. The same can be said for the R²s. For 
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the purpose of this research, we may conclude that vote functions are a good proxy for 
vote expectations. Still, the use of ex-post vote results may not be generalised. Indeed, the 
results of this extension is contrary to what could be concluded from the extension made in 
section 3.4.5 on p. 119, when the proxy for the probability of electoral defeat was not based 
on vote expectations but on ex post electoral outcome. Thus in general we cannot 
recommend the use of ex-post vote results to proxy the government’s vote expectations. 
 
A second extension tries to discriminate between strategic and opportunistic pre-electoral 
tax policy. Though our results provide evidence that vote expectations are a relevant 
variable explaining pre-electoral local income tax rate policy, the analysis does not allow us 
to explain why incumbents react in this manner. Tax rate manipulation could be related to 
PBC motivations, to strategic debt incentives or to both. Theoretically, we would expect to 
find strategic behavior in governments that do not believe they will be re-elected; that is, in 
governments with low vote expectations. Opportunistic behavior in the case of 
governments that have positive beliefs about their chances of re-election seems more a 
matter of convenience. As tax policy manipulation might result in extra votes, they might as 
well invest in it. To test this hypotheses, we fall back on the multiple dummy approach we 
introduced in the extension of the previous chapter (see p. 109). We will rerun the analyse 
of this chapter with a multitude of dummies that cover the governments with vote-
expectations below x-percent.129 This enables us to test whether pre-electoral tax rate 
changes are inspired by opportunistic motivations, strategic debt incentives or by both. 
 
Some remarks on the presentation of the results of this approach in Table 17. First, we 
have not run regressions for governments with vote expectations below 35% as the 
number of observations is too low to run the regression. Second, we only present results 
using ICG as ideological variable and using the actual number of parties as fragmentation 
                                                 
 
129  These dummy variable gets value 1 if the forecasted vote percentage (Vfit) is below 49%, 48%,… etc. (thus 
Vfit<x%) and 0 otherwise 
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variables. Third, we only present estimation results of the most efficient regressions (thus 
leaving out insignificant variables) of the ∆LITRit estimation.130 From the previous results 
there is no indication that the vote expectations affect ∆LPTRit. The results for ∆LPTRit are 
only once presented in the last column of Table 22.  Finally, the vote expectations variables 
(PEDxit) and its interaction term with ICG are only significant for vote expectations between 
40% and 54%. We also tested for expected vote percentages above 54% and below 40%, but 
these results are identical to those when PED54it and PED40it are introduced. For these 
regressions without significant PEDxit variables, we only present the results of these “border 
percentages” as they are identical when using vote expectations above and below these 
percentages. This reduction of presented regression results allows to provide a general view of 
the results of these additional analyses. The results are reported in Table 23. 
                                                 
 
130  When an interaction term is significant, the constitutive variables of the interaction model remains included 
regardless of whether they are significant. Insignificant constitutive variables are shown in italic. 
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Table 23 SUR estimation results of the tax rate change functions using different levels of vote 
expectations (continues) 
 
Dependent 
variable 
∆LITRit 
 PED55it  PED54it  PED53it  PED52it  PED51it  PED50it  PED49it  PED48it  … 
PEDxit - 
 -0.320 
(-1.74) 
* -0.359 
(-1.94) 
* -0.386 
(-2.07) 
** -0.363 
(-1.93) 
* -0.347 
(-1.82) 
* -0.048 
(-1.90) 
* -0.429 
(-2.05) 
** … 
PEDxit*ICGit-1 - 
 0.062 
(1.66) 
* 0.068 
(1.84) 
* 0.072 
(1.92) 
** 0.067 
(1.78) 
* 0.064 
(1.66) 
* -  0.077 
(1.83) 
* … 
ICGit-1 - 
 -0.010 
(-0.37) 
 -0.010 
(-0.40) 
 -0.010 
(-0.39) 
 -0.006 
(-0.24) 
 -0.003 
(-0.12) 
 -  0.002 
(0.08) 
 … 
BALANCEit-1 
-0.001 
(-1.82) 
* -0.001 
(-1.89) 
* -0.001 
(-1.90) 
* -0.001 
(-1.89) 
* -0.001 
(-1.95) 
* -0.001 
(-1.94) 
* -0.001 
(-1.82) 
* -0.001 
(-1.94) 
* … 
DEBTit-1 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  … 
LITRit-1 
-0.035 
(-2.79) 
* -0.031 
(-2.37) 
** -0.030 
(-2.29) 
** -0.028 
(-2.18) 
** -0.028 
(-2.17) 
** -0.029 
(-2.23) 
** -0.029 
(-2.26) 
** -0.028 
(-2.15) 
** … 
LPTRit-1 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  … 
∆TBASEit-1 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  … 
∆GRANTit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  … 
∆YOUNGit-1 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  … 
∆OLDit-1 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  … 
∆UNEMPLit-1 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  … 
∆POPit-1 
15.30E-05 
(2.49) 
** 14.40E-05 
(2.33) 
** 14.20E-05 
(2.30) 
** 14.10E-05 
(2.29) 
** 14.40E-05 
(2.34) 
** 14.40E-05 
(2.34) 
** 15.50E-05 
(2.52) 
** 14.00E-05 
(2.28) 
** … 
NPARit-1 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  … 
NPAR²it-1 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  … 
Y1994 
0.151 
(5.41) 
*** 0.154 
(5.51) 
*** 0.155 
(5.54) 
*** 0.156 
(5.59) 
*** 0.154 
(5.52) 
*** 0.153 
(5.48) 
*** 0.153 
(5.50) 
*** 0.154 
(5.55) 
*** … 
Y2000 
0.187 
(7.07) 
*** 0.186 
(7.00) 
*** 0.187 
(7.04) 
*** 0.187 
(7.05) 
*** 0.187 
(7.04) 
*** 0.187 
(7.05) 
*** 0.189 
(7.16) 
*** 0.185 
(6.99) 
*** … 
Intercept 
0.037 
(0.45) 
 0.067 
(0.43) 
 0.061 
(0.40) 
 0.052 
(0.35) 
 0.032 
(0.22) 
 0.021 
(0.14) 
 -0.018 
(-0.12) 
 -0.008 
(-0.06) 
 … 
R² 0.100  0.107  0.109  0.110  0.110  0.109  0.105  0.112  … 
Adjusted R² 0.093  0.096  0.098  0.100  0.100  0.098  0.097  0.102  … 
Wald F statistic (p-
value) 
176.75 
(p<0.01) 
 182.45 
(p<0.01) 
 183.72 
(p<0.01) 
 185.23 
(p<0.01) 
 184.97 
(p<0.01) 
 183.92 
(p<0.01) 
 181.08 
(p<0.01) 
 186.73 
(p<0.01) 
 … 
Note : N=688; Values in parentheses are t-values (except for Wald-test, where p-values are presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 
1%. Wald statistic has a Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated parameters). 
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Table 23 SUR estimation results of the tax rate change functions using different levels of vote 
expectations (continued) 
 
Dependent variable ∆LITRit 
  PED47it  PED46it  PED45it  PED44it  PED43it  PED42it  PED41it  PED40it  
PEDxit … 
-0.474 
(-2.23) 
** -0.506 
(-2.35) 
** -0.470 
(-1.96) 
** -0.554 
(-2.23) 
** -0.586 
(-2.30) 
** -1.343 
(-4.38) 
*** -1.553 
(-4.45) 
*** -  
PEDxit*ICGit-1 … 
0.086 
(2.01) 
** 0.094 
(2.15) 
** 0.086 
(1.78) 
* 0.101 
(2.01) 
** 0.104 
(2.00) 
** 0.257 
(4.08) 
*** 0.297 
(4.15) 
*** -  
ICGit-1 … 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
 -0.003 
(-0.13) 
 0.004 
(0.17) 
 0.002 
(0.11) 
 0.002 
(0.11) 
 -0.004 
(-0.22) 
 -0.001 
(-0.02) 
 -  
BALANCEit-1 … 
-0.001 
(-1.88) 
* -0.001 
(-1.90) 
* -0.001 
(-1.92) 
* -0.001 
(-1.94) 
* -0.001 
(-1.93) 
* -0.001 
(-1.92) 
* -0.001 
(-1.86) 
* -0.001 
(-1.82) 
* 
DEBTit-1 … -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
LITRit-1 … 
-0.028 
(-2.23) 
** -0.029 
(-2.30) 
** -0.030 
(-2.37) 
** -0.030 
(-2.35) 
** -0.030 
(-2.37) 
** -0.032 
(-2.61) 
*** -0.032 
(-2.59) 
*** -0.035 
(-2.79) 
*** 
LPTRit-1 … -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
∆TBASEit-1 … -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
∆GRANTit … -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
∆YOUNGit-1 … -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
∆OLDit-1 … -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
∆UNEMPLit-1 … -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
∆POPit-1 … 
13.70E-05 
(2.22) 
** 13.40E-05 
(2.17) 
* 13.40E-05 
(2.16) 
* 12.70E-05 
(2.05) 
* 12.50E-05 
(2.01) 
** -  -  15.30E-05 
(2.49) 
** 
NPARit-1 … -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
NPAR²it-1 … -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
Y1994 … 
0.155 
(5.56) 
**
* 
0.155 
(5.55) 
*** 0.154 
(5.52) 
*** 0.153 
(5.52) 
*** 0.154 
(5.55) 
*** 0.166 
(6.15) 
*** 0.166 
(6.16) 
 0.151 
(5.41) 
*** 
Y2000 … 
0.186 
(7.03) 
**
* 
0.186 
(7.03) 
*** 0.187 
(7.04) 
*** 0.188 
(7.09) 
*** 0.188 
(7.12) 
*** 0.196 
(7.46) 
*** 0.191 
(7.27) 
*** 0.187 
(7.07) 
*** 
Intercept … 
0.009 
(0.06) 
 0.022 
(0.16) 
 -0.005 
(-0.04) 
 0.001 
(0.00) 
 0.001 
(0.00) 
 0.050 
(0.39) 
 0.030 
(0.23) 
 0.037 
(0.45) 
 
R² … 0.113  0.112  0.110  0.113  0.116  0.126  0.122  0.100  
Adjusted R² … 0.103  0.102  0.100  0.103  0.105  0.117  0.113  0.093  
Wald F statistic 
(p-value) 
… 
187.39 
(p<0.01) 
 186.97 
(p<0.01) 
 185.17 
(p<0.0) 
 187.14 
(p<0.01) 
 189.23 
(p<0.01) 
 198.55 
(p<0.01) 
 197.96 
(p<0.01) 
 176.75 
(p<0.01) 
 
Note : N=688; Values in parentheses are t-values (except for Wald-test, where p-values are presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 
1%. Wald statistic has a Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated parameters). 
 
 
The results in Table 23 show that local income tax rate changes can be assigned to the 
governments with vote expectations between 40% and 54%. There is an interaction of the 
PEDxit dummy variables with ICG. Given these levels of vote expectations, the local 
income tax rate changes are positively affected the more the government is positioned to 
the right. This is in line with the findings in the previous section. Only for PED49it the 
interaction remains insignificant. Also the control variables present comparable coefficients 
as presented in Table 22. Only in the PED42it and PED41it estimations ∆POPit-1 loses 
significance. In those regressions, the absolute values of the coefficients of PEDxit and its 
interaction terms with ICGit-1 increase strongly, suggesting stronger effects of the vote 
expectations on the tax rate changes when the vote expectations are low.   
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Can we conclude from the results in Table 23 whether the tax rate changes are inspired 
from PBC, strategic or both motivations? 
 
Strategic motivations are expected for governments with the lowest vote expectations. As 
shown in Table A8 on p. 205 in appendix, the minimum expected votes in the dataset is 
34.04%. We do not find a significant effects of the vote expectations on tax rate changes 
when testing PEDxit with x<40%. Those governments, expecting less than 40% of the 
votes, do not let their local income tax rate changes depend on their bad vote expectations. 
As a result, we first were reluctant to conclude that tax rate changes are inspired by strategic 
motivations. Still there is evidence that the group of governments with vote expectations 
below 41% more strongly reduce LITR than governments with higher vote expectations. 
We assume that this level of expected votes is not yet high enough to stimulate 
opportunistic behavior.131 We rather suggest that here evidence is found of strategic 
behavior as the dataset may not be not rich enough to find a significant effect of the vote 
expectations on the local income tax rate changes for governments with expectations below 
40%. Indeed, from Table A13 on p. 209 in appendix, it is clear that there are only 21 
observations with vote expectations below 40%, while this number of observations 
increases by 50% for governments with vote expectations below 41%. When increasing the 
pool of governments by increasing the upper limit of the expected vote percentage to 41%, 
42%,… there is evidence that these governments reduce local income tax rate more in 
election years. Moreover the effect of the vote expectations is strongest in the estimations 
employing PED41it and PED42it. So we may change our first impression and suggest that 
governments with low vote expectations may change tax rates from strategic motivations.  
 
                                                 
 
131  As mentioned on p. 131 we assume that from the PBC-perspective, governments are expected to lower tax 
rates when they fear an electoral outcome just short of a majority position. An expected level of votes below 
41% is not interpreted as “just short of a majority position”. 
CHAPTER 4  
 148 
Can we assign local income tax rate changes to opportunistic motivations? We think we 
can. We see that governments with vote expectations around 50% reduce tax local income 
tax rate in election years. Governments thus may cut LITR to gain the necessary additional 
votes to regain majority or to strengthen the majority if there is only a tight majority 
anticipated. When the dummy PEDxit takes into account also governments that expect to 
get more than 54% of the votes, there is no evidence of tax rate changes caused by the 
governments’ vote expectations. Governments may feel safe about re-election when at least 
54% of the votes are anticipated. 
 
Then do the results allow to find the expected percentage of votes where the governments’ 
behavior turns over from strategic to opportunistic (or the other way around)? The results 
do not allow to find a “tipping point”. The results in Table 23 do not present an indication 
of changing behavior when increasing the expected vote expectations. We only can 
conclude that especially governments with vote expectations below 54% cut local income 
tax rate more strongly in election years. This could not be confirmed when governments 
with vote expectations below 40% are tested individually.  
 
4.5 Concluding comments 
 
There is a lot of empirical evidence that supports the theory of the political budget cycle. 
Unlike the bulk of the literature, which examines expenditures, deficits or debt, this chapter 
looks for the existence of a political tax rate cycle. Tax rate reductions can be expected 
before elections, not only from a PBC point of view, but also relying on the theory of the 
strategic use of debt. A limited number of papers aside, very little is known about the 
determinants of tax rate changes. 
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Our analysis contributes to this research by stressing the role of the government’s 
prospects of getting into office again in pre-electoral tax rate policy. We introduce the 
expected vote percentage at the next elections as an explanatory variable for tax rate 
changes in election years. Our model makes use of predictions derived from a vote 
function as a proxy for electoral outcome expectations. The empirical analysis shows that in 
election years, electoral prospects are decisive for local income tax rate reductions. Our 
results suggest that governments with lower vote expectations are more inclined to lower 
local income tax rates, suggesting the presence of strategic behavior. A more detailed 
analysis tried to distinguish opportunistic from strategic behavior. This extended analysis 
proved evidence of strategic and opportunistic behavior, but does not succeed in finding a 
tipping point. Changes of the local property tax rate, however, appear not to be affected by 
the expected vote percentage. 
 
We are conscious of the fact that our results are exploratory and in particular that the 
forecasted vote percentage estimated from a vote function (Vfit) is only a proxy to measure 
for the government’s prospects. It might be more convenient to collect survey data about 
the incumbent’s perceived likelihood of survival in future election years. Still, it is to be 
noted that the additional analysis using ex post electoral outcome as a proxy for expected 
vote expectations produces very similar results. 
 
Further options for future research are to verify the robustness of our model by using a 
dataset characterized by a longer time horizon. Another challenge could be the enlargement 
of the model to incorporate non-election years in order to look for consistent opportunistic 
or strategic behavior throughout the electoral cycle. Our results (of election years only) only 
suggest the existence of such behavior in the years preceding elections. Such an extension 
would also permit us to control for partisan influences, as fiscal post election reactions 
would become perceptible in the model. 
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Chapter 5 : Projected tax revenues 
 
When comparing projected tax revenues with collected tax revenues, Flemish local governments appear to 
be optimistic about the expected tax revenues. On average, projected tax revenues are about five percent 
higher than actually collected tax revenues. In this chapter we build on the strategic debt models, the 
weak government hypothesis and the ‘war of attrition’ concept to explain why more fragmented 
governments should be more inclined to overestimate tax revenues.132  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Theoretical and empirical research shows that differences in the political and institutional 
characteristics of governments are important determinants of the (fiscal) policies they 
pursue. A central role in this respect is often given to government fragmentation, that is, to 
the extent in which power is dispersed over different parties or politicians. For example, in 
their path-breaking work, Roubini & Sachs (1989a,b) show that weaker (i.e. more 
fragmented) governments tend to face larger budget deficits and debts. This lack of (fiscal) 
austerity in fragmented governments is often explained by pointing to their higher 
spendthrift. Compared to one-party governments, fragmented governments tend to have 
higher spending levels, which leads to their inferior budgetary outcomes (e.g. Volkerink & 
de Haan, 2001 and Perotti & Kontopoulos, 2002).  
 
In the present chapter, we focus on the revenue rather than the expenditure side. 
Moreover, we take the analysis one step back by looking at government behavior at the 
time of drafting the budget (instead of concentrating exclusively on actual spending or 
revenue data). Specifically, we examine whether fragmented governments tend to be 
systematically more optimistic (than one-party governments) about expected revenue levels. 
                                                 
 
132  This chapter has recently been published as “Goeminne, S., Geys, B. & Smolders, C., 2008, Political 
fragmentation and projected tax revenues: evidence from Flemish municipalities, International Tax & Public 
Finance 15(3), 297-315.” 
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Such behavior leads to negative budgetary ‘surprises’ during the fiscal year and ‘unexpected’ 
deficits post hoc, thus providing an alternative explanation for the higher budget deficits of 
fragmented governments.  
 
Three possible reasons can be advanced why government fragmentation would lead to 
more optimistic revenue forecasts. Firstly, when parties fear to lose their position in the 
ruling majority after upcoming elections, the models of the strategic use of debt or deficits 
suggest that they may want to curtail the policy options of their successors by incurring 
fiscal deficits and debts. As parties in a coalition government are likely to be less certain 
about future power than one-party governments, they may have a larger incentive to be 
(over)optimistic with respect to budgeted revenues (thereby creating fiscal deficits post hoc 
and restricting the options of future governments). Secondly, highly fragmented 
governments facing a balanced budget requirement and the impossibility to spend money 
that was not entered into the budget (such as is the case at the Belgian local government 
level) can help accommodate their higher spendthrift by an ‘optimistic bias’. Indeed, “some 
commentators have suggested that budget estimates are inherently sensitive to political 
pressures which, it is presumed, sacrifice accuracy in order to mitigate the need to 
undertake program cuts” (Plesko, 1988; 483). Finally, though related, a rosy estimate may 
facilitate decision-making on the budget. As reaching agreement is more difficult under 
highly fragmented governments, easing the ‘war of attrition’ (cf. Alesina & Drazen, 1991) 
through optimistic assessments of future revenues may be most needed under such 
circumstances.  
 
This analyse is not the first that regards the accuracy of the government’s budget forecasts. 
Still, though some scholars regard European countries (e.g. Bisschoff [2004] on German 
Länder; Lago-Peñas & Lago-Peñas [2004] on Spanish municipalities and Serritzlew [2005] 
on Danish municipalities), most of the literature focuses on the US (e.g. Bretschneider & 
Gorr, 1987; Rubin, 1987; Plesko, 1988; Bretschneider et al., 1989; Cassidy et al., 1989; 
Shkurti & Winefordner, 1989; Miller, 1991; Mocan & Azad, 1995; Auerbach, 1995, 1999; 
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Deschamps, 2004; Voorhees, 2004 and Reddick, 2004).133 Given the characteristics of the 
party system in the US, this precludes a thorough analysis of the effect of government 
fragmentation on (local) government revenue forecast accuracy. The present chapter 
addresses the latter issue –i.e. whether political fragmentation leads to politically-motivated 
manipulation of the budget– using a panel dataset on 242 Flemish municipalities for the 
period 1992-2002. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the literature on 
(revenue) projection errors and presents the theoretical basis for our main research 
hypotheses. Section 5.3 introduces the empirical analysis. The main findings are 
summarized in section 5.4.  
 
5.2 The literature and hypotheses 
 
Under- or overestimation of revenues can be due to inadequate forecasting, inefficient 
revenue collection or both. Hence, to explain revenue forecast errors, we should determine 
the elements that undermine the government’s ability and willingness to make adequate 
assessments of their future revenue streams and/or those that lead to inefficient revenue 
collection. Most authors studying the quality of tax projections mainly point to the 
influence of the technical aspects of the budgeting and tax collection process. Such studies 
assess the effect, for example, of using ‘expert’ judgments rather than more advanced 
econometric techniques to make forecasts (e.g. Bretschneider et al., 1989; Mocan & Azad, 
1995; Reddick, 2004; Voorhees, 2004), of the level of politicians’ risk aversion when faced 
with uncertainty in the forecasting process (e.g. Rubin, 1987; Bretschneider & Gorr, 1989) 
or from the tax administration’s effort to reduce tax non-compliance (and what influences 
this effort level) (e.g. Mayshar, 1991; Hunter & Nelson, 1995; Young et al., 2001; Esteller-
Moré, 2005). 
                                                 
 
133  In addition, several scholars indirectly analyse the gap between budgeted and actual revenues by considering 
the adequacy of tax collecting bodies using a tax technology function (e.g. Mayshar, 1991; Hunter & Nelson, 
1995; Young et al., 2001; Esteller-Moré, 2005). 
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Yet, even in the absence of the distorting factors noted above, tax projections might still 
not be accurate. In fact, we argue that political-institutional characteristics of the 
government may affect (or incite) revenue forecast errors. To date, only few studies take 
such elements into account and thereby mostly focus on electoral and ideological effects 
(e.g. Bretschneider & Gorr, 1987; Cassidy et al., 1989; Ohlsson & Vredin, 1996; Bischoff, 
2004; Serritzlew, 2005; Paleologou, 2005). As mentioned in the introduction, we focus on 
the effect of government fragmentation on forecasting behavior. To the best of our 
knowledge, this has only been briefly taken up by Serritzlew (2005). Still, several scholars 
have previously addressed whether “political party dominance” affects forecasting accuracy 
(e.g. Rubin, 1987; Bretschneider & Gorr, 1987; Bretschneider et al. 1989; Cassidy et al., 
1989; Shkurti & Winefordner, 1989; Mocan & Azad, 1995; Voorhees, 2004; Paleologou, 
2005). However, in a two-party setting such as the US or the UK (where all these studies 
focus on), it is unclear to what extent this “dominance” also captures ideological 
differences between the parties. Moreover, this two-party setting precludes a test of 
whether the number of parties in the government as such affects forecasting accuracy. It is 
exactly the latter relation that is central to the present analysis.  
 
Specifically, we hypothesize that fragmented governments are susceptible to be more 
optimistic about future revenues. We may find arguments to support this contention in the 
literature on strategic use of debt –that is the connection thread of this dissertation. Still 
also the models on “government weakness” and the “war of attrition” should be 
mentioned in this context. 
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5.2.1 Strategic use of debt 
 
First, we refer again to the strategic use of debt models that could explain why politicians 
deliberately overestimate tax revenues.134 These models are (again) an interesting 
framework, in this case to expect a stronger bias towards overestimation in fragmented 
governments. In fact, whether or not the current government engages in such a strategic 
debt game depends on the likelihood of getting into office during the next period. Given 
that parties in a coalition not only have to ‘win’ the elections, but also need to survive the 
ensuing coalition negotiations, they are on average less certain of future power than parties 
that do not share power (Ashworth et al., 2006). Hence, their shorter time horizon may lead 
coalition governments to be more sensitive to the strategic use of debt. Indeed, in Table 18 
on p. 115 we present evidence of strategic debt behavior in fragmented local governments, 
while this was absent in single party governments. We thus may expect fragmented 
governments to more strongly (and consciously) engage in ‘cosmetic accounting’ (by means 
of overestimating revenues) while drafting the budget. 
 
5.2.2 The weak government hypothesis 
 
Second, we draw attention to the “Weak Government Hypothesis” (WGH; Roubini & 
Sachs, 1989a,b). As already introduced in section 2.3.2 on p. 41, this hypothesis states that 
weaker –i.e. more fragmented– governments tend to follow less restrictive fiscal policies 
leading to higher levels of expenditures as well as higher debts and deficits. To finance this 
higher spendthrift, fragmented governments require more revenues and may therefore be 
tempted to increase their financial leeway by being more optimistic in their revenue 
projections (see also Voorhees, 2004). 
 
                                                 
 
134  For a more detailed discussion on the strategic debt models, we refer to chapter 3. 
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This effect is likely to be especially strong in our setting (i.e. the Flemish municipalities) due 
to two restrictions on local budgetary decision-making. Firstly, no expenses are allowed 
unless they are written into the municipality’s budget. That is, to execute an expenditure 
plan in year t, it must be taken up in the budget drafted in year t-1. While this does not 
imply that expenditure shocks cannot occur, such additional spending should first be 
written into the budget through so-called budget amendments (which have to be approved 
by a majority of the local council).135 Secondly, Flemish municipalities are obliged to 
present a balanced budget. As this rule does not imply a statutory obligation to close the 
fiscal year with a balanced account, the balanced budget requirement is rather “weak” (cf. 
Poterba, 1995) and unrealistic revenue estimates can lead to ex-post budget deficits. Both 
these specificities together make that optimism over revenue streams allows fragmented 
governments to implement a higher level of expenditures at time t without needing to 
worry about a need to balance the budget ex post. Moreover, optimistic revenue forecasts 
carry a lower political cost in terms of votes lost at election time (at least in the short term) 
compared to an increase in taxation. As politicians can be expected to act in a way to 
minimize the political costs of their actions (e.g. the HW model)136, over-estimation of 
future revenues is more likely to occur than, say, increases in tax rates.137 
 
It is important to note here that we do not impose an explicit objective by fragmented 
governments to consciously overestimate tax revenues to accommodate their higher 
expenditures (i.e. we do not assume a desire for deficits in fragmented governments). The 
politicians drafting the budget may well believe in achieving the budgeted level of revenues. 
Indeed, the ‘cognitive dissonance’ literature argues that people have preferences over their 
                                                 
 
135  As mentioned in “1.2.4 Budgeting process” on p. 26, the budget as approved (preferably) before 31 December 
need not be the final budget. In the course of the fiscal year, some modifications can or must take place 
because of technical reasons or to balance the budget when exceptional events impose additional expenditures. 
The analysis in this chapter does not consider such modifications due to lack of data.  
136  See section 2.3.1 on p. 38 for more details on the HW model. 
137  Poterba (1994) explicitly points to the use of such ‘cosmetic accounting’ to satisfy balanced-budget rules. For 
an overview of the impact of balanced-budget rules on fiscal policies, see Poterba (1995). 
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states of beliefs and select sources of information to confirm these ‘desired beliefs’ (see e.g. 
Akerlof & Dickens, 1982). In other words, people like to believe what they want to be 
the(ir) truth. Or, in our story, politicians desire a certain level of revenues (which is likely to 
be higher for fragmented governments) and they are convinced to realize (at least) that 
revenue level. This conviction is built on arguments that support the achievement of this 
revenue level while other arguments that reject these beliefs are disregarded. 
 
5.2.3 War of attrition 
 
In their pioneering work, Alesina & Drazen (1991) model fiscal decisions within coalition 
governments as a ‘war of attrition’. For example, in the event of an (exogenous) shock that 
deteriorates the government’s budgetary situation, a stabilization process will be initiated in 
which each group of the coalition attempts to wait the others out. The reason is that 
waiting until the others capitulate allows a party to pass the largest part of the negative 
effects of the stabilization effort to the other parties (and their electorate). The lower the 
degree of political cohesion (or, the more fragmented the government), the later is the 
expected date of stabilization (see also Bulow & Klemperer, 1999 and Martinelli & Escorza, 
2007). 
 
This idea of different parties struggling to reach agreement over (fiscal) policy decisions can 
straightforwardly be applied to the analysis of revenue forecast biases. Indeed, an optimistic 
estimation of government revenues is likely to have a positive impact on the budget debate 
as the common pool of resources seemingly expands. Consequently, more coalition 
members are able to introduce policies into the budget that satisfy their electorate, which 
eases the drafting of the budget. Increasing the common pool of resources by an optimistic 
assessment of future tax revenues could thus prevent difficult budget negotiations. 
Alternatively, and arguably more in line with the original argumentation of Alesina & 
Drazen (1991), it may be more difficult for fragmented governments to agree on necessary 
fiscal adjustments in the budget. Optimism about future revenues then is a means to shift 
the burden of these adjustments to the future and might ease the current budgeting 
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process. Since Alesina & Drazen (1991) state that large coalitions find it particularly hard to 
reach agreements, politically fragmented governments can be expected to be more 
optimistic about their tax revenues than single party governments. As for the Weak 
Government Hypothesis, we do not expect an intention to overestimate tax revenues to be 
present. 
 
Note, however, that it might become more difficult to ease the war of attrition by enlarging 
the common pool through (possibly subconscious) optimistic estimations when the 
number of coalition partners becomes large. The reason is that there clearly is a limit to 
being optimistic. Thus, even though politicians are likely to select their sources of 
information to fit their desired beliefs (cf. “cognitive dissonance” theory, Akerlof & 
Dickens, 1982), this is unlikely to lead to ever-increasing optimism without losing credibility 
about the budget towards the electorate and the opposition. This loss of reputation or 
credibility may be perceived as a cost to over-estimations (or over-optimism) (cf. Lago-
Peñas & Lago-Peñas, 2004) and might lead to a non-linearity in the fragmentation effect. 
 
5.3 Empirical analysis 
 
To empirically assess the relation between government fragmentation and forecast error in 
tax projections, we use a panel dataset from 1992 to 2002 for 242 Flemish municipalities. 
Though there are 308 Flemish municipalities, data availability precludes the use of more 
than these 242 municipalities. In section 5.3.1 we introduce the dependent variable. Section 
5.3.2 provides a detailed account of the model’s specification and the measurement of our 
variables. Section 5.3.3 presents the methodology and empirical results. 
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5.3.1 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable of our analysis will be the degree of foresight of collected taxes 
(DFCTit). This variable equals the ratio of projected to realized local tax revenue of 
municipality i in year t. DFCTit can be interpreted as the percentage of budgeted revenues 
that is actually collected by the local government and is calculated as:  
 
DFCTit = BTit/CTit 
 
where: BTit = budgeted local taxes of municipality i for year t 
 CTit = collected local taxes of municipality i for year t 
 
When DFCTit is higher (lower) than 1, tax revenues are overestimated (underestimated) in 
the municipal budget. As can be seen in 0 in appendix on p. 213 –where we provide 
summary statistics for all the variables in the model– Flemish municipalities have a 
tendency to (slightly) overestimate local tax revenues. On average, budgeted revenues from 
local taxes are about 5 percent higher than collected revenues (given that local taxes are 
approximately 8% of total revenues, this implies an overestimation of total revenues of 
0.4%, ceteris paribus). 0 in appendix on p. 214 –providing more details about the 
distribution of the dependent variable over space and time– shows that both the mean and 
standard deviation increase over the period 1992-2002. Hence, not only is there a tendency 
towards more optimistic revenue projections, the variation in these prediction errors across 
municipalities also slightly increases over time (the same can be observed from the 
information on the interquartile distribution of DFCTit in 0 in appendix on p. 214). 
 
When constructing DFCTit we only take into account purely local taxes. Important for our 
purposes is that the budget builds on forecasts for different revenue sources. These 
forecasts, which are central to our empirical work, should be divided in two parts. Firstly, 
there are various revenue sources (such as intergovernmental grants or revenues from 
surcharges on federal or regional taxes) where local governments obtain an estimate of the 
revenue level from the higher-level government and simply take this up in their budget. 
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Since the projection is then not made by the municipalities themselves, they cannot be held 
accountable for any bias in these projections (and we disregard these revenue streams in 
our analysis). Secondly, there exist a number of revenue sources where local governments 
make revenue projections on their own. This is mainly the case for purely local taxes (for 
which municipalities set the tax base as well as the tax rate independently and fully 
autonomously). Hence, if the local government is susceptible to make biased revenue 
projections, local tax revenue (accounting for 17% of total tax revenues and roughly 8% of 
total revenues) is the most accessible to do so. This is the reason why we focus on local tax 
revenues in the remainder of this chapter. Tax revenue projections used in the empirical 
analysis are taken from the budget as approved by the local council (see footnote 135 on p. 
156). Following the fiscal year, the annual account is drawn up. The collected local tax 
revenues we use in our analysis derive from this annual account. 
 
5.3.2  Model specification 
 
We formulate the following multivariate model (IX.) to test our predictions (subscripts i 
and t referring to municipalities and time respectively): 
 
(IX.) DFCTit = α1 + α2 DFCTit-1 + α3 DFCTit-2 + α4 TAXPit + α5 TAXNit + α6 DEFit-1 + 
α7 POPit + α8 POPGRit + α9 FIRMGRit + α10 TRENDt + α11 FRAGit + eit 
 
As made clear in the previous section, DFCTit is the dependent variable of our model. A 
lagged dependent variable is included in the model to account for possible slow 
adjustments in local government behavior. We expect this variable to carry a positive sign 
indicating that mis-estimations of tax revenues in any given year are not magically resolved 
in the following years. Preliminary work showed that two lagged terms of our dependent 
variable are necessary to remove all autocorrelation from the residuals. We expect both 
these lagged terms to present a positive coefficient. Since last year’s tax forecast error is 
likely to weigh more heavily on this year’s forecast error, we also hypothesize that α2 > α3. 
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Before we discuss the central explanatory variable of the model (i.e. political 
fragmentation), we first briefly go into the various control variables we included based on 
findings in the preceding literature. Firstly, we control for the importance of local tax 
revenues (TAXPit). This is operationalised as local tax revenues divided by total revenues. 
In line with the tax technology function literature (e.g. Mayshar, 1991), we anticipate that 
municipalities deriving a larger share of their revenues from local taxation improve their tax 
administration performance. This increases collected revenues relative to budgeted 
revenues, such that we hypothesize a negative coefficient estimate on this variable.  
 
A second control variable takes into account the number of taxes a municipality levies 
(TAXNit). This is operationalised as a simple count of all the different local taxes from 
which revenues are generated in a given year. It is clear that a larger number of taxes tend 
to make the budgeting process more complex. More tax legislation has to be scrutinized by 
the local tax administration, more tax bases have to be determined and so on. In line with 
findings from the literature on securities analysts’ revenue forecast accuracy (e.g. Duru & 
Reeb, 2002), we expect that this complexity of the local tax system is associated with more 
optimistic budgets, or a positive coefficient is expected. The reason is that diversification 
adds to the unpredictability of income, which may well have an “incremental effect on 
optimism (…) due to additional opportunities for managerial discretion” (Duru & Reeb, 
2002; 418).  
 
Following Esteller-Moré (2005), we also control for the possibility that the tax 
administration’s effort depends on the budgetary situation in the municipality. The more 
precarious this situation is, the higher the effort to collect tax revenues (and the stricter tax 
laws will be enforced). Therefore, we include the fiscal deficit as a share of total revenues 
incurred during the previous fiscal year (DEFit-1). We expect Flemish municipalities (like 
their Spanish counterparts) to become more active in enforcing tax rules when facing a 
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deficit during the previous year. Given that collected revenues then increase relative to 
budgeted revenues, we expect a negative coefficient.138 
 
Next, population size (POPit, in 1000 inhabitants) is introduced to control for the size of 
the municipality. This can have two opposing effects. On the one hand, it is likely to 
indicate more complexity and thus greater forecast difficulty. In line with the above 
argument, this is likely to lead to more optimistic estimations, such that a positive 
coefficient is expected. It should be noted here that the correlation between population size 
and the number of local taxes in the municipality is moderately strong (r=0.43). On the 
other hand, larger municipalities may benefit from economies of scale. They tend to have a 
larger (tax) administration such that tax administration performance is likely to increase. 
This increases collected revenues relative to budgeted revenues, leading to a negative 
coefficient estimate on this variable. Taking both effects together, the sign of α7 is a priori 
uncertain.  
 
We furthermore control for the impact of tax base changes. Since local taxes are levied on 
both inhabitants and firms, the evolution in the number of inhabitants (POPGRit) and 
firms (FIRMGRit) may affect the local tax revenue forecast error. These variables are 
measured as year-on-year growth rates in population size and the number of firms 
respectively.139 A negative coefficient is expected for both these variables. The reason is 
that inhabitants or firms leaving (entering) the territory stop (start) paying local taxes while 
the local government is unaware of the intention of individuals or firms to leave (enter) at 
the time of preparing the budget. Hence, a higher number of inhabitants or firms leaving 
                                                 
 
138  Esteller-Moré (2005) also includes grants as a share of total revenues to account for a possible reduction in tax 
enforcement when a larger part of income is obtained through grants from higher-level governments. We 
exclude this variable in the present analysis as its introduction in a model containing TAXPit (i.e. the share of 
local tax revenues in the municipality’s total revenues) led to significant multicollinearity problems. Inclusion 
of TAXPit gave a better overall fit of the model, hence the choice for this variable in the final model. 
139  Most local taxes are lump sum taxes. Hence, all inhabitants (and firms) must pay the same amount. As such, 
the change in the number of potential taxpayers provides an adequate proxy for the change of the tax base.  
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(entering) decreases (increases) the amount of taxes collected by the municipality. As the 
amount of revenues as recorded in the budget remains fixed at the time of these population 
(or industrial) changes, a lower (higher) amount of collected revenues due to these changes 
leads to higher (lower) values of the dependent variable, such that negative coefficients are 
expected. 
 
The inclusion of a linearly increasing trend variable (TRENDt) accounts for the (slight) 
upward trend in the dependent variable. Experimenting with a dummy variable equal to 
one in the two election years in the sample (1994 and 2000) shows there is no significant 
election effect once controlling for the upward time trend. The same holds when we model 
an election cycle by including a variable measuring the time to the next election (ranging 
from five in the first post-election year to 0 in election years) and its squared values. 
Consequently, and unlike Ohlsson & Vredin (1996), Young et al. (2001), Bischoff (2004), 
Paleologou (2005) and Serritzlew (2005), we do not explicitly account for election effects in 
the final model.140 
 
Finally, we introduce two different operationalisations to test our main hypothesis that 
fragmented governments have more optimistic tax revenue projections. The first –NPARit– 
measures fragmentation as a simple count of the number of parties in the ruling coalition 
(i.e. in the College of Mayor and Aldermen). Given that optimism is unlikely to increase 
linearly in the number of parties (as one can expect this to lead to credibility problems; see 
p. 158), we also test for a possible non-linearity in the effect of fragmentation by including 
a squared term of this variable. The second operationalisation intends to gauge the latter 
effect in a more elementary way by introducing two dummy variables for two party 
                                                 
 
140  Note also that we experimented with using year dummies instead of the time trend. This did not affect our 
results (and the fit of the model was better when using the linear time trend). 
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coalition governments (TWOPARit) and ‘large’ coalitions (i.e. coalitions with three or more 
parties, LARGEPARit) with single party governments as the rest category.141 
 
5.3.3 Methodology and results 
 
It is well known by now that the standard approaches to panel data analysis are 
inappropriate in a dynamic setting . Both fixed and random effects estimators lead to biased 
and inconsistent estimation results in the presence of a lagged dependent variable −as 
DFCTit-1 and DFCTit-2 in estimation (IX.) on p. 160− (Baltagi, 1995). To remove this bias, 
it is necessary to provide a valid set of instruments for this lagged dependent variable. 
Arellano & Bond (1991) offer a solution to this problem by treating the model as a system 
of equations (viz. one for each time period) and developing a Generalized Method of 
Moments estimator that exploits the moment conditions for the equations in first 
differences. Specifically, the estimator is based on taking first differences of the model (to 
remove municipality-specific effects) and then instrumenting the lagged dependent variable 
in first differences with suitable lags of its own levels. In particular, values of the dependent 
variable lagged two periods or more can be used as instruments. The estimator developed 
by Arellano & Bond (1991) is generally called difference GMM (or GMM-DIF). It is ideal 
for short time series (such as ours).  
 
However, an important obstruction to using GMM-DIF is that the lagged values of the 
dependent variable may be only weak instruments in the differenced regression. This could 
lead to severe finite-sample bias, especially when the series is very persistent (see Blundell & 
Bond, 1998). Given this, we employ system GMM estimation (GMM-SYS; Arellano & 
Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). This method combines the moment conditions for 
                                                 
 
141  The simple count of the number of parties outperformed the ‘effective’ number of parties (in which each party 
is weighed by its number of seats in the council, thus accounting for the relative size of the parties). Also, 
preliminary analyses indicated that the ideology of the ruling government (ICGit measured as a weighed 
average ideological position of the coalition parties on a Left-Right scale) was not significantly related to 
forecast accuracy. Hence, this variable was not retained in the final estimations. 
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the equations in first differences exploited in the GMM-DIF estimator with additional 
moment conditions for the equations in levels. The introduction of these additional 
moments increases the efficiency of the estimation. Note also that we use the one-step 
rather than the two-step variant of GMMSYS. Although the latter is asymptotically more 
efficient, two-step GMM estimation is found to lead to significant downward bias in the 
estimated standard errors (Arellano & Bond 1991; Blundell & Bond 1998). 
 
Table 24 provides the estimation results. Six sets of results are given, which differ only in 
their measurement of the (core) government fragmentation effect. Columns (1) and (2) 
provide the most general results and look for a linear effect of political fragmentation via 
NPARit. In columns (3) and (4), we test for possible non-linearity in the fragmentation 
effect by adding the squared term of NPARit. Finally, in columns (5) and (6), the effect of 
fragmentation is estimated in a more elementary way by including two dummy variables: 
TWOPARit (which is 1 for two-party coalitions) and LARGEPARit (which is 1 when the 
coalition consists of three or more parties). The even columns maintain only the statistically 
significant variables and as such provide a more efficient estimation –while taking care not 
to compromise the diagnostic tests reported at the bottom of Table 24. 
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Table 24 Estimation results using one-step system GMM (1992-2002) 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 
0.431 
(2.67) 
*** 0.545 
(4.60) 
*** -0.145 
(-0.38) 
 -0.116 
(-0.32) 
 0.392 
(2.12) 
** 0.425 
(2.78) 
*** 
DFCTit-1 
0.292 
(5.98) 
*** 0.267 
(6.58) 
*** 0.270 
(4.56) 
*** 0.256 
(4.79) 
*** 0.258 
(5.01) 
*** 0.253 
(5.38) 
*** 
DFCTit-2 
0.143 
(3.16) 
*** 0.137 
(3.42) 
*** 0.143 
(2.68) 
*** 0.142 
(2.69) 
*** 0.147 
(3.24) 
*** 0.148 
(3.17) 
*** 
TAXPit 
-0.042 
(-2.41) 
** -0.039 
(-2.90) 
*** -0.050 
(-2.37) 
** -0.051 
(-2.75) 
*** -0.050 
(-2.81) 
*** -0.054 
(-3.21) 
*** 
TAXNit 
0.035 
(2.65) 
*** 0.029 
(3.47) 
*** 0.030 
(1.91) 
* 0.029 
(2.69) 
*** 0.026 
(1.89) 
* 0.027 
(2.90) 
*** 
DEFit-1 
-0.001 
(-0.40) 
 -  -4.0E-5 
(-0.02) 
 -  -4.0E-5 
(-0.30) 
 -  
POPit 
-0.003 
(-0.73) 
 -  -0.001 
(-0.12) 
 -  -3.0E-4 
(0.07) 
 -  
POPGRit 
0.113 
(1.28) 
 -  0.086 
(0.82) 
 -  0.046 
(0.48) 
 -  
FIRMGRit 
0.031 
(2.36) 
** 0.028 
(2.63) 
*** 0.035 
(2.25) 
** 0.033 
(2.33) 
** 0.032 
(2.46) 
** 0.033 
(2.61) 
*** 
TRENDt 
0.031 
(3.60) 
*** 0.024 
(4.06) 
*** 0.031 
(3.00) 
*** 0.026 
(3.38) 
*** 0.027 
(3.05) 
*** 0.025 
(3.74) 
*** 
NPARit 
-0.149 
(-2.00) 
** -0.132 
(-1.99) 
** 0.670 
(1.41) 
 0.745 
(1.69) 
* -  -  
NPAR²it 
-  -  -0.211 
(-1.75) 
* -0.228 
(-2.03) 
** -  -  
TWOPARit 
-  -  -  -  0.045 
(0.36) 
 0.064 
(0.55) 
 
LARGEPARit 
-  -  -  -  -0.325 
(-2.17) 
** -0.319 
(-2.78) 
** 
Sargan 
37.33 
(42) 
 49.27 
(45) 
 23.64 
(43) 
 24.48 
(44) 
 34.07 
(41) 
 32.48 
(44) 
 
AR(1) -8.00 *** -10.74 *** -6.41 *** -7.18 *** -8.16 *** -8.43 *** 
AR(2) -0.75  -0.83  -0.36  -0.30  -0.66  -0.54  
Note: N = 2178; t-values between brackets; * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Sargan is the test for over-identifying 
restrictions.142 AR(1) and AR(2) are the required tests for first- and second-order autocorrelation. None of these diagnostic 
tests indicates misspecification of the model. 
 
Let us first look at the results for our central variable, viz. government fragmentation. Even 
though all three arguments quoted in section 5.2 suggest that government fragmentation is 
likely to lead to more optimistic tax revenue projections, our findings do not support this 
theoretical prediction. The overall effect is negative which indicates that the number of 
parties in the College of Mayor and Alderman reduces the share total budgeted revenues in 
collected revenues. When we take into account the possible non-linearity advanced in 
section 5.2, we find that the negative effect is mainly driven by the larger coalitions. 
                                                 
 
142  We refer to footnote 84 on p. 97 for some more details on the Sargan test. 
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Coalitions with more than two parties are (much) more careful in their tax projections and –
for a given level of collected revenues ex post– expect to receive less revenues.143 Overall, it is 
clear that our findings do not support the central theoretical prediction from section 5.2.  
 
What might explain these deviant findings? Several possibilities can be thought of. The first 
is already introduced in Chapter 2 on p. 60 and suggest that broad-based coalitions might 
be more likely to follow fiscal policies representative of a larger part of the population (see 
e.g. Lijphart & Crepaz, 1991). They might thus be less prone to threats of minor interest 
groups, limiting increases in expenditures and thereby the need to present optimistic 
budgets. Note, moreover, that “an increase in the number of powerful groups [leads to] a 
dilution of power concentration” (Tornell & Lane, 1999, 32). Hence, increases in the 
number of coalition partners reduce the power of each of these in the fiscal appropriation 
process. This leads to lower levels of overspending when the number of coalition parties 
increases −thereby limiting the need to present optimistic budgets.  
 
Secondly, the struggle between parties in a larger coalition increases the power of the 
(normally non-partisan) head of the finance department over the actual budget. That is, if 
there is only one party in the local government, it might be able to sway the budget in its 
desired direction, while this becomes more difficult when the number of coalition partners 
increases (who might have opposing wishes), thereby increasing the power of the finance 
department. Since (s)he generally has no political motives to drive the budget in one or 
other direction (but might rather have an incentive to produce prudent forecasts, see e.g. 
Bretschneider & Gorr, 1989), over-optimism might well decrease with the number of 
parties in the coalition.  
                                                 
 
143  The results from the two-step GMM variant are broadly comparable to those presented although –as would be 
expected– significance levels are strongly inflated. To compensate this problem, we calculated a finite-sample 
correction to the two-step covariance matrix (derived by Windmeijer, 2005). Results using this correction are 
somewhat weaker than those presented, though coalitions with more than two parties remain significantly 
more careful than less fragmented governments. 
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Finally, a higher number of coalition members might increase the probability that at least 
one of these returns in the next government as there remain few alternative ways of 
forming a majority government (cf. Allers & Elhorst, 2005). In such a situation, the 
strategic use of fiscal policy loses its ‘attraction’ since one might be reducing ones own 
policy options (if one should return in the following government). Indeed, it would be hard 
to believe that current coalition members unanimously agree to reduce the policy options 
of the following government when at least one of them is likely to be seated in this 
government. Consequently, overestimation of tax revenues may be reduced rather than 
increased in such a setting.  
 
It is of interest to mention at this point that Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006) and Geys (2007) 
have previously also found a non-linear effect of government fragmentation on local 
government’s (fiscal) decision-making. Especially interesting is the finding by Ashworth et 
al. (2005) that long-term local public indebtedness in Flemish municipalities reaches a 
maximum for coalitions of two parties and that more fragmented governments outperform 
such two-party governments. The pattern observed in our findings is similar (i.e. highly 
fragmented coalition governments outperform less fragmented coalition governments), but 
it is also slightly stronger (viz. highly fragmented governments outperform one-party 
majorities). Overall, the parallel between our findings and those provided for local public 
debt development in Ashworth et al. (2005) provides some support for the view –expressed 
in the introduction to this chapter– that the differential forecasting behavior of various 
types of government may provide an alternative explanation for their differences in budget 
deficits or debts. Indeed, taking both analyses together suggests that the specific pattern in 
local public debts (as analysed in Ashworth et al., 2005) can be related to the more 
cautionary revenue forecasting behavior of more fragmented governments (as analysed 
here). Whether such a systematic relation between government fragmentation, revenue 
forecasting and (local) public debts caries over into different settings is clearly worth 
exploring in future research.  
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Importantly, the observed non-linearity does not seem to be particular to the Flemish 
setting. In fact, employing data on Danish municipalities, Serritzlew (2005) finds that 
expenditure overruns in the budgets for roads and care for the elderly are significantly 
lower when the city council is more fragmented (which, in our terminology, points to more 
careful budget estimations), while the need for a coalition government increases budget 
overruns in these two areas. This alludes to a non-linearity similar to the one we observe in 
our results. To the extent that there is indeed a systematic relation between revenue 
forecasting behavior and public debts (or deficits), this should translate into a better 
financial performance of highly fragmented governments in the Danish setting (much like 
the one observed here for Flanders). As such results are not provided in Serritzlew (2005), 
it is left to future research in the field to assess the extent to which our results –and the 
ensuing alternative explanation for government debts and deficits– generalize over different 
settings, or what drives possible deviations. 
 
Turning to the control variables, it can be seen that, with the exception of the variables that 
consider tax base changes, the estimated coefficients all have the expected sign. Firstly, 
both lagged dependent variables DFCTt-1 and DFCTt-2 are statistically significant in all 
equations. As expected, they have a positive coefficient indicating that local government 
behavior is interdependent over time. Municipalities with high (low) ratios of budgeted to 
collected revenues are more likely to have high (low) values in following years. Also, last 
year’s forecast error clearly weighs more heavily on this year’s forecast error compared to 
that from two years before. 
 
The effect of the share of local taxes in total revenues (TAXPit) is statistically significant 
and in the expected direction. Indeed, municipalities deriving a larger share of their 
revenues from local taxation appear to increase their tax administration performance, which 
is in line with the tax technology literature (e.g. Mayshar, 1991). In addition, we find 
support for the hypothesis that increases in the complexity of the tax system –measured by 
the number of taxes in the municipality (TAXNit)– lead to higher projected revenues 
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compared to actually collected revenues (cf. Duru & Reeb, 2002). Yet, and in contrast to 
findings by Esteller-Moré (2005), we do not find that the tax administration’s effort 
depends on the budgetary situation in the municipality. Specifically, the coefficient for the 
fiscal deficit as a share of total revenues (DEFit-1) has the expected negative sign, but is fails 
to reach statistical significance.  
 
Like Rubin (1987), we find no effect from population size (POPit). Finally, while we 
expected that the growth of population (POPGRit) and firms (FIRMGRit) would negatively 
affect our dependent variable, both variables have positive coefficients. The growth in the 
number of firms is even statistically significant in all equations. A possible explanation is 
that local governments overestimate expected firm movements. That is, the more firms 
move (ex post), the further the local government ‘overshoots’ the size of these movements 
in its (ex ante) expectations. As such, a positive coefficient estimate occurs. This tentative 
explanation calls, however, for further empirical analysis. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The present chapter has its relevance for two research fields. On the one hand, it contained 
one of the first empirical analyses upon the relation between political fragmentation and 
fiscal policy that explicitly focuses on earlier stages in the fiscal process, i.c. the drafting of 
the budget. This extends previous research on the Weak Government Hypothesis that 
exclusively concentrated on actual revenue and/or spending levels. On the other hand, 
analyses of the government’s forecast accuracy have strongly concentrated on technical 
aspects of the collection and budgeting process, but paid little attention to political-
economic factors (such as government fragmentation) as potential explanations. 
 
Using data of 242 Flemish municipalities over the period 1992-2002, our results indicated 
that the level of political fragmentation affects local government’s revenue forecasting 
behavior. Nonetheless, the findings did not support our theoretical predictions. In fact, our 
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analysis disclosed that two party coalitions are slightly more optimistic than single party 
governments (though this effect was not statistically significant), while coalitions with at 
least three parties are less optimistic. This deviant finding may have multiple explanations. 
For example, it could be argued that broad-based coalitions are less prone to threats of 
minor interest groups, thereby reducing the need to present (over)optimistic budgets (cf. 
Lijphart & Crepaz, 1991). Power struggles among the coalition partners may increase the 
power of the municipality’s finance department (which is unlikely to be prone to over-
optimism). Finally, larger coalitions may imply that at least one of its members participates 
in future governments, limiting the attraction of the strategic use of fiscal policy. 
 
Interestingly, and importantly, our results are consistent with the evidence in Ashworth et 
al. (2005) that, compared to single- and multi-party governments, two-party governments 
are associated with the highest levels of long-term local public indebtedness in Flemish 
municipalities. As such, our analysis suggests that the lower level of indebtedness of very 
fragmented Flemish local governments established in that paper can be related to their 
more cautionary revenue forecasting behavior. Additionally, Serritzlew (2005) also indicates 
that highly fragmented local councils in Denmark are also prone to lower budget overruns 
(at least on parts of the budget). Clearly, future research will need to confirm these findings 
in different settings and/or at various levels of government, and indicate whether this 
systematic relation between government fragmentation, revenue forecasting and fiscal 
deficits is a general phenomenon.  
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General conclusion 
 
Politics go hand in hand with policy. The introduction to the Hettich & Winer model 
already made clear that attention should be paid to the political process when analysing 
fiscal policy. In general, policymakers’ fiscal policy is guided by their re-election interests. 
The literature presents different models of fiscal policy making, each with a focus on a 
specific political theme. As an introduction to local fiscal policy, we tested the presence of 
some of these widely used models when estimating the determinants of the rates of the 
most important Flemish local taxes, namely those on income and property. We investigated 
the role of partisan effects, of fragmentation, of interaction dynamics, of electoral cycles 
and of fiscal illusion effects on both tax rates. We found (individual) evidence of partisan, 
of non linear fragmentation effects, of interaction effects and of electoral cycles for the 
local income and property tax rates. The evidence on fiscal illusion was mixed. We could 
confirm the grant illusion and the renter illusion hypotheses for the local property tax, 
while the tax complexity and the tax elasticity hypotheses are confirmed for the local 
income tax rate. This evidence only tells us that a specific effect exists, but does not control 
for the impact of other effects. The real contribution of chapter 2 to the existing literature 
is that it brings together the mostly widely cited political and economic tax rate 
determinants in one model. We suggest that a simultaneous model is to be preferred as this 
way of estimating the tax rates is more in line with reality. The results produced by the joint 
and individual models differ for the local property tax for the tests on partisan 
characteristics, on the government strength and on tax complexity. Additional analyses 
were conducted and indicate that it is especially the interaction terms and the fiscal illusion 
variables that are dominant in the setting of the local property tax rate.  
 
Even though policymakers’ fiscal policy choices are assumed to bring about their re-
election, policymakers may fail to achieve this aim. Aware of this failure, policymakers may 
change their policy from “opportunistic” to “strategic”. Indeed, policymakers expecting to 
lose power may pursue their fiscal policymaking to restrain their successors’ scope of 
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policymaking. Suchlike strategic behavior, the focal point of this dissertation, is introduced 
in the third chapter by clarifying and testing the different models of the strategic use of 
debt on Flemish municipalities. These models then are applied in chapters 4 and 5 to 
construct theoretical expectations on local fiscal policy.  
 
In general, the literature on the strategic use of debt investigates whether a government 
changes its fiscal policy when it knows that it will be replaced after the next elections. 
Governments expecting to be defeated could run deficits to reduce the scope for 
policymaking of the next government. The literature discerns two strategic debt models. In 
the Alesina & Tabellini (1990) model, governments expecting to be voted out of office are 
expected to increase debt. This allows the current government to spend more on services 
which it prefers and at the same time it reduces the next government’s ability to spend on 
services which the outgoing government does not value. While in the Alesina & Tabellini 
(1990) model it is the composition of government spending which is central, the Persson & 
Svensson (1989) model focuses on the level of government spending. In this model, only 
right-wing governments are expected to increase debt. Traditionally, left-wing governments 
are expected to increase public expenditures. But right-wing governments expecting to be 
replaced by a left-wing government can restrict additional public expenditures of the latter 
by increasing debt; interest and amortization payments will limit their (left-wing) 
successor’s scope for doing so. We tested both hypotheses for the Flemish municipalities 
and find evidence in line with the Persson & Svensson (1989) model. Still the results owe 
some comments. Fist of all the strategic debt behavior is only stated for leftist majorities. 
Probably the consequences of debt changes on its own policy when a government 
surprisingly returns to office may explain why only leftist majorities change debt 
strategically. Second, our analyses show that strategic debt behavior is more to be expected 
in the case of  coalition governments. This may be due to the fact that coalition 
governments have both to win the elections and also to survive the ensuing coalition 
negotiations. This increases their uncertainty of returning to office and as a consequence 
their motivation to strategically issue debt. Third, our results show that strategic behavior is 
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performed by governments with vote expectations below 49%. This chapter adds to the 
existing literature an alternative measure of the probability of electoral defeat. While in 
traditional strategic debt models, ex-post election results dominate as proxy for the 
probability of electoral defeat, we introduced a vote function that estimates the 
government’s vote expectations.  
 
We thus find evidence that debt changes in election years can be explained by the 
government’s vote expectations. One way to change debt is –ceteris paribus– changing  tax 
rates. Therefore in chapter 4 we go more deeply into election-year tax rate changes. We 
went back to the previous chapter and introduced the government’s vote expectation to 
explain tax rate changes in election years. Indeed, we find a significant impact of the vote 
expectations on these changes. The lower the vote expectations, the stronger the local 
income tax rate cuts. This is in line with expectations from strategic use of debt models. 
Still, also from the political budget cycle theory tax rate reductions can be expected. From 
this (opportunistic) point of view, governments reduce tax rates to increase their popularity 
–and by consequence their chance of re-election. A more detailed analysis that allows us to 
distinguish between different levels of vote expectations presents evidence that 
governments with vote expectations below 54% reduce tax rates. A significant effect of 
vote expectations on the local income tax rate changes disappears when the behavior of 
governments with vote expectations below 55% is studied. Governments thus seem to be 
sure of re-election –that is they do not reduce local income tax– when they expect at least 
54% of the votes. The results of chapter 4 suggest that analyzing the political budget cycle 
without taking into account the government’s vote expectations may lead to premature 
conclusions. As our results suggest, strategic behavior could be another motivation to 
reduce tax rates before elections. 
 
Finally, in chapter 5, we investigated whether fragmented governments are more optimistic 
about tax revenues. Overestimating tax revenues allows governments to spend more than 
the actual revenues allow for. Firstly, this expectation can be inspired by the strategic use of 
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debt, the relevance of which for Flemish municipalities was supported by the analyses in 
chapters 3 and 4. Overestimating tax revenues can be a strategic instrument for increasing 
debt when a government expects not to get into office again after the upcoming elections. 
The empirical analysis in chapter 3 shows that fragmented governments are more tempted 
to adopt strategic debt behavior than single party governments. We thus expect fragmented 
governments to be more optimistic about tax revenues than single party governments. A 
second argument that may endorse this expectation is the “weak government hypothesis”. 
This hypothesis states that more fragmented governments tend to follow less restrictive 
fiscal policies, leading to higher levels of expenditures and/or deficits and debt. To finance 
this higher spending, fragmented governments require more revenues. This may tempt 
them to increase their financial leeway by being more optimistic in their revenue 
projections. Thirdly, the “war of attrition” may explain higher optimism in coalition 
governments. Reaching an agreement becomes more difficult the higher the number of 
coalition parties. In this situation a more optimistic view on tax revenues may facilitate the 
reaching of agreements as additional (budgeted) revenues allow the various government 
parties to spend more on policies that satisfy their respective electorates. Our results 
indicated that the level of political fragmentation does indeed affect the local government’s 
revenue forecasting behavior. Nonetheless, we find that coalitions with at least three parties 
are less optimistic. This suggest that in governments with large coalitions, the strategic use 
of debt becomes less attractive, as the higher the number of coalition partners, the higher 
the probability that at least one of its members will participate in the future government 
and the less likely that there will be agreement on strategic debt policy.  
 
Besides the enumeration of the individual chapters’ findings a comment that surpasses the 
individual chapters. In chapters 2 and 5 we ran analyses for all years within a time period of 
at least 10 years. The results of these analyses may be generalised and allow to draw 
conclusions that count on the long-term. Conversely Chapters 3 and 4 focused on 
(strategic) policy changes in election years only. This difference in time perspective can 
explain differences in the conclusions. We e.g. refer to the impact of the level of grant 
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(changes) on local property tax (changes). In the long run there is evidence of grant illusion, 
while in election years increases of grants are used to cut local property tax rates.  Also the 
impact of fragmentation differs. The long-term analyses of chapter 2 and 5 provide 
evidence of a non-linear impact of fragmentation on the dependent variables, while in the 
short-term analyses of the chapters in between, initially no impact of fragmentation can be 
observed. These deviant findings suggest that governments have different objectives on the 
short- than on the long-run. Indeed, governments act different when facing elections. Then 
short-term myopic policy crops up from strategic or opportunistic motives, while the long-
term tax rate policy should lead to an optimal tax rate that reflects the needs and 
characteristics of the municipality. Second, not only the time perspective is different for 
chapters 2 and 5 compared to the chapters 3 and 4, when investigating fiscal policy in the 
latter chapters,  we go one step back in the decision process and look for a specific fiscal 
policy determinant that has received no attention yet in fiscal policy research in Flemish 
municipalities. We introduce the role of the vote expectations in the setting of local fiscal 
policy.  
 
What can we finally conclude from the research presented in this dissertation? Can we 
confirm that in Flemish local governments fiscal policy is influenced by strategic 
considerations? Yes, we can. We find that leftist majorities change debt strategically before 
elections. We also show that tax changes before elections are inspired by the expectation of 
electoral defeat. Still, if the question is whether this behavior is omnipresent, then the 
answer is “no”. First, with respect to debt changes before elections, there is only evidence 
for leftist majorities. Second, when pre-electoral tax rate changes are discussed, the results 
do not allow to verify until what level of expected vote percentage the strategic behavior 
can be observed. Finally, the expectation that strategic debt policy forces fragmented 
governments to overestimate tax revenues could not be confirmed. Still, the exercise of 
testing strategic behavior is interesting and add insights to the domain of local fiscal policy 
studies. We therefore recommend to take into account vote expectations when examing 
local fiscal policy in the future. 
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Appendices 
 
Table A1 Descriptive statistics of the variables of the tax rate functions and data sources (1990-2002) 
 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Source 
Local income tax rate (LITR t) 6.68 7.00 10.00 0.00 1.14 VVSG144 
Local property tax rate (LPTR t) 1044.91 1000.00 2300.00 170.00 298.57 VVSG 
Ideological Complexion of the Government (ICGt-1) 4.85 5.10 6.10 2.70 0.52 MICE, VUB145 
Actual number of government parties (NPARt-1) 1.72 2.00 5.00 1.00 0.75 MICE, VUB 
Effective number of government parties (ENPAR²t-1) 1.56 1.47 4.50 1.00 0.60 MICE, VUB 
Two party government (TWOPARt-1) 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 MICE, VUB 
Large party government (LARGEPARt-1) 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.34 MICE, VUB 
Average LITR of neighbouring municipalities 
(LITRNt) 
6.81 6.80 8.67 4.93 0.50 
VVSG, matrix of 
MICE, VUB 
Average LPTR of neighbouring municipalities 
(LPTRNt) 
1050.89 1034.50 1979.17 450.00 224.79 
VVSG, matrix of 
MICE, VUB 
Time before elections (TBEt) 2.62 3.00 5.00 0.00 1.69 - 
Grants (p/c) (GRANTt )  95.04 86.78 820.91 56.38 52.58 MICE, VUB 
Tax elasticity (TELt) 0.54 0.56 0.85 0.01 0.11 MICE, VUB 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHIt) 0.37 0.37 1.13 0.09 0.06 Own calcul. on AHA146 
Percentage of non-owner occupied residences (RENTt) 25.13 23.67 54.50 7.80 7.50 AHAEconomy 
Number of inhabitants (POPt-1) 18999.71 13054.50 473082.00 84.00 31085.73 FPS Economy147 
Proportion of young (YOUNGt-1) 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.18 0.02 FPS Economy 
Proportion of elderly (OLDt-1) 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.06 0.03 FPS Economy 
Unemployment rate (UNEMPLt-1) 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.01 CORE, UCL148 
LIT tax base (TBASELITt-1) 21.49 20.66 53.76 1.23 6.55 AHA 
LPT tax base (TBASELPTt-1) 12.77 11.21 47.38 3.53 5.62 AHA 
Tax dependence LIT (TDEPLITt-1) 0.23 0.23 0.58 0.00 0.07 AHA 
Tax dependence LPT (TDEPLPTt-1) 0.19 0.19 0.55 0.04 0.06 AHA 
Debt (p/c in 1000€) (DEBTt-1) 1.81 0.75 122.50 0.00 7.00 MICE, VUB 
 
 
                                                 
 
144  “Vereniging Vlaamse Steden en Gemeenten”, the Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities. 
145  MICE (Micro-Economics for Profit and Non Profit Sector) research team of the Faculty of Economic, Social 
and Political Sciences, and Solvay Business School, Vrije Universiteit Brussel. 
146  Agency for Home Affairs of the Flemish Government . 
147  Belgian Federal Public Service Economy, SME, Independent Professions and Energy. 
148  CORE (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics), Université catholique de Louvain. 
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Table A2 Research on local inhabitant tax rate determinants 
 
Authors (year of publication), dataset, 
period, method 
Dep. Variable Variable Hypothesis Results149 
Hypothesis 1 on ideology     
Allers & Elhorst (2005), 496 Dutch 
municipalities, 2002, ML (spatial lag 
and error) 
Average local property tax 
rate150 
Dummy for a majority of right-wing parties in 
the Council 
Municipalities with a higher share of right-wing parties in the council experience 
lower tax rates 
1 
Solé Ollé (2003), 105 Spanish 
municipalities in the surrounding of 
Barcelona, 1991-1999, OLS & IV 
a. Local property tax rate 
b. Local vehicle tax rate 
c. Local business tax rate 
Dummy for leftist governments Leftist governments impose higher tax rates a. 1 
b. 1 
c. 1 
Hypothesis 2 on fragmentation     
Solé Ollé (2003), 105 Spanish 
municipalities in the surrounding of 
Barcelona, 1991-1999, OLS & IV 
a. Local property tax rate 
b. Local vehicle tax rate 
c. Local business tax rate 
Dummy for coalition governments Coalition governments levy higher tax rates a. 2 
b. 3 
c. 2 
Hypothesis 3 on strength     
Solé Ollé (2003), 105 Spanish 
municipalities in the surrounding of 
Barcelona, 1991-1999, OLS & IV 
a. Local property tax rate 
b. Local vehicle tax rate 
c. Local business tax rate 
Difference in absolute value between vote-
share of the government at previous elections 
and 50% 
Governments with a higher vote margin impose higher tax rates a. 1 
b. 3 
c. 1 
Allers & Elhorst (2005), 496 Dutch 
municipalities, 2002, ML (spatial lag 
and error) 
Average local property tax 
rate 
Dummy if the number of coalition partners 
divided by the total number of parties 
represented in the municipal council exceeds 
0.5 
Coalitions backed by a large majority mimic neighbouring tax rates less 1 
                                                 
 
149  Results : 1 = Hypothesis confirmed; 2 = Significant coefficient with opposite sign; 3 = Insignificant coefficient; sig+ = Significant positive coefficient. 
150  In Dutch municipalities, local governments can set different tax rates for residential and for non-residential property. Allers & Elhorst (2005) take the weighted average tax rate in each 
municipality as dependent variable. The vanlues of residential and non-residential property are used as weights. 
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Hypothesis 4 on interaction     
Allers & Elhorst (2005), 496 Dutch 
municipalities, 2002, ML (spatial lag 
and error) 
Average local property tax 
rate 
Weighted average tax rate of the neighbouring 
municipalities 
Tax rates respond positively to changes in neighbouring tax rates 1 
Brueckner & Saavedra (2001), 70 cities 
in the Boston metropolitan area, 1980 
& 1990, ML (spatial lag) 
a. Local property tax rate 
(1980) 
b. Local property tax rate 
(1990)151 
4 different weighted average tax rates of the 
neighbouring municipalities 
The municipality’s response to an increase in the tax rates of competing 
municipalities is to increase its tax own rate. 
a. 1 
 
b. 3 
Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), 589 
Belgian municipalities, 1991, 3SLS 
Local income tax rate & 
local property tax rate 
a. Unweighted average tax rates of first-order 
neighbours 
b. Unweighted average tax rates of second-
order neighbours 
Tax rates are copied among neighbouring municipalities a. 1 
 
b. 1 
Richard et al. (2005), 598 Belgian 
municipalities, 1984-1997, ECM 
Local income tax rate & 
local property tax rate 
Different types of distance variables Tax rate changes must be seen as a movement towards a preferred tax rate 1 
Solé Ollé (2003), 105 Spanish 
municipalities in the surrounding of 
Barcelona, 1991-1999, OLS & IV 
a. Local property tax rate 
b. Local vehicle tax rate 
c. Local business tax rate 
Tax rates of municipalities located within a 
distance of 20 km, with different weighting 
schemes (population, economic and political 
similarities)152 
Tax rates respond positively to changes in neighbouring tax rates a. 1 
b. 1 
c. 3 
Van Parys & Verbeke (2007), 589 
Belgian Municipalities, 1991-2004, 
2SLS 
Local income tax rate & 
local property tax rate 
Several weight matrices of neighbouring tax 
rates 
Municipalities react to a tax change of a neighbour by changing the tax rate of the 
same tax instrument or by changing the tax rate of another tax instrument 
1 
Hypothesis 5 on electoral cycles     
Solé Ollé (2003), 105 Spanish 
municipalities in the surrounding of 
Barcelona, 1991-1999, OLS & IV 
a. Local property tax rate 
b. Local vehicle tax rate 
c. Local business tax rate 
Year dummies Tax increases tend to occur in post-election years a. 1 
b. 1 
c. 1 
                                                 
 
151  Brueckner & Saavedra (2001) investigate tax competition before and after imposition of Proposition 21/2. This proposition is a tax limitation measure, designed to limit the property tax 
burden. Proposition 21/2 state that total property tax revenu in each city should not exceed 2.5% of the total market value of property. If a local government did not reached this limit, it 
was required to reduce its levy by 15% per year until the restriction was met. Brueckner & Saavedra (2001; 220) state that “if all cities were constrained by Proposition2'/2, each tax rate 
would simply equal the levy limit divided by total property value. With taxes thus constrained, the choice problem which presumes interior solutions, would no longer be relevant. As a 
result, we might expect that evidence of strategic behavior, present in 1980, would have disappeared by 1990. Given that most of Massachusetts’ municipalities were taxing at their levy 
limits in 1990, it would appear that little scope for strategic behavior existed in that year.” 
152  Solé Ollé (2003) tested different weighting schemes. In footnote 25, Solé Ollé (2003) indicates that the qualitative results, that are available upon request by the author, are more or less 
the same. 
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Hypothesis 6 on fiscal illusion     
Allers & Elhorst (2005), 496 Dutch 
municipalities, 2002, ML (spatial lag 
and error) 
Average local property tax 
rate 
Unconditional grants per capita No hypothesis, the variable is introduced as a control variable Sig+ 
Bastiaens et al. (2001), 308 Flemish 
municipalities, 1994, SUR 
a. Local income tax rate 
b. Local property tax rate 
Complexity of the tax structure: Hischman-
Herfindahl index 
a. Higher complexity reduces the political cost of raising local income taxes 
b. Higher complexity reduces the political cost of raising local property taxes 
a. 1 
b. 3 
Brueckner & Saavedra (2001), 70 cities 
in the Boston metropolitan area, 1980 
& 1990, ML (spatial lag) 
Local property tax rate Per capita state aid No hypothesis, the variable is introduced as a control variable Sig+ 
Van Parys & Verbeke (2007), 589 
Belgian Municipalities, 1991-2004, 
2SLS 
a. Local income tax rate 
b. Local property tax rate 
Several weight matrices of neighbouring tax 
rates 
No hypothesis, the variable is introduced as a control variable a. 3 
b. Sig+ 
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Table A3 Research on fiscal policy in Flemish or Belgian municipalities  
 
Authors, (year of publication), 
Flemish (F) or Belgian (B) 
dataset, period 
Dep. Variable Variable Hypothesis Results153 
Hypothesis 1 on ideology     
Ashworth & Heyndels (1997) 
F, 1994 
Politicians’ opinions of local 
income/property tax rates 
Position on left-right axis The attitude of incumbents towards a given tax rate is negatively related to their 
ideological position 
3 
Ashworth & Heyndels (2000a) 
F, 1994 
Tax choices of local income and 
local property tax rate changes 
Position on left-right axis To increase tax revenue, right-wing (left-wing) politicians raise income (property) 
taxes rather than property (income) taxes 
1 
Ashworth & Heyndels (2000b) 
F, 1994 
Politicians’ opinions of local tax 
burden 
Position on left-right axis Left-wing politicians are more likely to classify a given tax burden as low than  
right-wing politicians 
1 
Ashworth et al. (2003) 
F, 1998 
Non-0 ending digits in income 
tax rates 
Position on left-right axis The use of non-0 ending digits in income tax rates is positively related to the 
ideological position of the electorate along a left-right axis 
3 
Ashworth et al. (2005) 
F, 1977-2000 
Long-term debt Position on left-right axis Parties of a left-wing political persuasion have a willingness to furnish higher 
levels of debt 
3 
Ashworth et al. (2006) 
F, 1991-1999 
Adoption of a green tax ICG = Weighted average position for the 
coalition partners on a scale from 0 (extreme 
left) to 10 (extreme right) 
Adoption of a new tax is more likely under left-wing governments 1 
Geys (2007) 
F, 1977-2000 
Year-on-year growth rate of real 
long-term municipal debts 
ICG = Weighted average position for the 
coalition partners on a scale from 0 (extreme 
left) to 10 (extreme right) 
No hypothesis formulated, the variable is introduced as a control variable Sig+  
& 3 
Hypothesis 2 on fragmentation     
Ashworth et al. (2003) 
F, 1998 
Non-0 ending digits in income 
tax rates 
Number of parties that have at least 2% of the 
vote 
The use of non-0 ending digits in income tax rate is positively related to the 
number of political parties 
3 
 
Ashworth & Heyndels (2005) 
F, 1989-1996 
Change of per capita 
expenditures 
a. Number of parties in the coalition 
b. Number of spending ministers 
c. Effective number of parties 
Government fragmentation leads to an upward bias in expenditures 
 
a. 1 
b. 1 
c. NSR154 
Ashworth et al. (2005) 
F, 1977-2000 
Long-term debt a. Dummy for coalition governments 
b. Dummies for 1, 2 and large party govs. 
c. Number of parties(²) 
d. Effective number of parties(²) 
Fragmented governments face larger debts 
 
a. 3 
b. 1 
c. 1 
d. 1 
                                                 
 
153  Results : 1 = Hypothesis confirmed; 2 = Significant coefficient with opposite sign; 3 = Insignificant coefficient; Sig+ = Significant positive coefficient, NSR = no specific reporting on 
the results of this variant. 
154  There is only mentioned that actual number of parties performed better. 
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Ashworth et al. (2006) 
F, 1991-1999 
Adoption of a green tax a. Number of parties in the coalition(²) 
b. Dummies for single party and coalition 
governments 
c. Effective number of parties in the coalition(²) 
Adoption of a new tax is less likely under fragmented governments a. 2 
b. 2 
 
c. 2 
Goeminne et al. (2008) 
F, 1992-2002 
Ratio of projected to realised 
local tax revenue 
a. Number of parties in the coalition(2) 
b. Dummies for 1, 2 and large party 
governments 
c. Effective number of parties in the coalition(²) 
Fragmented governments are susceptible to be more optimistic about future tax 
revenues 
a. 2 
b. 2 
 
c. NSR155 
Geys (2007) 
F, 1977-2000 
Year-on-year growth rate of real 
long-term municipal debts 
Dummies for 1, 2 and large party governments Fragmentation plays an intermediary role in incumbents ‘electioneering’  1 
Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) 
F, 1982-2000 
The percentage of votes Number of government parties The number of government parties has a positive impact on the percentage of 
votes 
1 
Hypothesis 3 on strength     
Ashworth et al. (2005) 
F, 1977-2000 
Long-term debt The number of seats in excess of majority Governments with larger electoral margins have a lower incentive to strategically 
use debt (and therefore have lower debts) 
3 
Ashworth et al. (2006) 
F, 1991-1999 
Adoption of a green tax The number of seats in excess of majority Adoption of a new tax is more likely the larger the electoral margin of the 
government 
3 
Hypothesis 4 on interaction     
Ashworth & Heyndels (1997) 
F, 1994 
Politicians’ opinions of local 
income and local property tax 
rates 
a. Average local income tax rate in 
neighbouring municipalities 
b. Average local property tax rate in 
neighbouring municipalities 
Political opposition is negatively related to the level of tax rates in neighbouring 
jurisdictions 
a. 3 
 
b. 1 
Ashworth & Heyndels (2000a) 
F, 1994 
Tax choices of local income and 
local property tax rate changes 
Neighbouring tax rates (no indication of 
calculation) 
Higher tax rates in neighbouring municipalities affect political opposition 
negatively 
1 
Ashworth & Heyndels (2000b) 
F, 1994 
Politicians’ opinions of local tax 
burden 
Average per capita tax burden in neighbouring 
municipalities 
Politicians consider a given tax burden as higher to the extent that it exceeds the 
level in neighbouring municipalities. 
1 
Ashworth et al. (2003) 
F, 1998 
Non-0 ending digits in income 
tax rates 
Absolute difference between a municipality’s 
tax rate and average tax rate of neighbouring 
municipalities 
The use of non-0-ending digits in income tax rates is positive related to the 
absolute difference between the municipality’s tax rate and the tax rate in 
neighbouring municipalities 
3 
 
Ashworth et al. (2006) 
F, 1991-1999 
Adoption of a green tax Percentage of neighbours that had an 
environmental tax in the previous year 
Adoption of a new tax is more likely if neighbouring municipalities have already 
introduced a similar tax 
1 
Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998) 
B, 1991 
Local income tax rate & local 
property tax rate 
Average tax rates of neighbours Tax rates are copied among neighbouring municipalities 1 
Richard et al. (2005) 
B, 1984-1997 
Local income tax rate & local 
property tax rate 
Different types of distance variables Tax rate changes must be seen as a movement towards a preferred tax rate 1 
                                                 
 
155  There is only mentioned that a simple count of the number of parties outperformed the effective number of parties. 
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Van Parys & Verbeke (2007) 
B, 1991-2004 
Local income tax rate & local 
property tax rate 
Several weight matrices of neighbouring tax 
rates 
Municipalities react to a tax change of a neighbour by changing the tax rate of the 
same tax instrument or by changing the tax rate of another tax instrument 
1 
Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) 
F, 1982-2000 
The percentage of votes Average neighbouring local income tax and 
local property tax rates 
The level of tax rates in neighbouring municipalities has a positive impact on the 
election results 
1 
Hypothesis 5 on electoral cycles     
Ashworth et al. (2005) 
F, 1977-2000 
Long-term debt Time before elections(²) Debt increases when elections come near 1 
Ashworth et al. (2006) 
F, 1991-1999 
Adoption of a green tax a. Dummy for election years 
 
b. Time before elections  
a. The presence of elections has a strong negative effect on the likelihood of 
introducing a tax 
b. The further in time from an election, the more likely it is that a green tax will 
be installed 
a. 1 
 
b. 1 
Geys (2007) 
F, 1977-2000 
Year-on-year growth rate of real 
long-term municipal debts 
a. Dummy for election years 
b. Dummy for election and pre-election years 
Growth rates of local public debt increases in election periods a. 1 
b. 1 
Hypothesis 6 on fiscal illusion     
Ashworth & Heyndels (1997) 
F, 1994 
Politicians’ opinions of local 
property tax rates 
a. Renter illusion: Share of renters as 
percentage of the population 
b. Number of changes in the tax rate in the 
recent past (as an indicator of the frequency 
with which taxes became salient) 
a. For any given property tax rate, political opposition is negatively related to the 
share of non-owner voters 
b. Political opposition is positively related to the number of tax rate changes in 
the recent past 
a. 3 
 
b. 3 
Ashworth & Heyndels (2000a) 
F, 1994 
Tax choices of local income and 
local property tax rate changes 
Number of changes in the tax rate in the recent 
past (as an indicator of the frequency with 
which taxes became salient) 
Political opposition to tax rate changes is positive influenced by the number of 
tax rate changes in the recent past 
1 
Ashworth & Heyndels (2000b) 
F, 1994 
Politicians’ opinions of local tax 
burden 
Complexity of the tax structure: Herfindahl 
index 
Politicians consider a given tax burden as lower to the extent that it the tax 
structure is more complex 
3 
Bastiaens et al. (2001) 
F, 1994 
a. Local non debt expenditures 
b. Local income tax rate 
c. Local property tax rate 
Complexity of the tax structure: Hischman-
Herfindahl index 
a. Higher complexity causes an excess demand for public goods 
b. Higher complexity reduces the political cost of raising local income taxes 
c. Higher complexity reduces the political cost of raising local property taxes 
a. 1 
b. 1 
c. 3 
Heyndels & Smolders (1994) 
F, 1990 
Local expenditures a. Flypaper effect: relative importance of grants 
in the median voter’s disposable income 
b. Elasticity of the tax structure: share of the 
income tax in total taxation 
c. Simplicity of the tax structure: Herfindahl 
concentration index 
d. Renter illusion: percentage of residences that 
are non-owner occupied 
a. The share of grants in the median voter’s disposable income is positively 
related to the level of local expenditures 
b. A more elastic tax base induces a higher level of spending 
 
c. More fragmented tax receipts lead to a higher expenditure level 
 
d. A higher percentage of residences occupied by non-owners increases public 
spending 
a. 1 
 
b. 3 
 
c. 1 
 
d. 3 
Heyndels & Smolders (1995) 
F, 1990 
Local expenditures Complexity of the tax structure : 
a. Hirschman Herfindahl index 
b. Hannah & Kay index 
The use of the Hirschman Herfindahl index overestimates the relative importance 
of size inequalities, while underestimating the impact of the number of taxes 
1 
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Table A4 Estimation results of the 3SLS estimation of H2 (on fragmentation) – All variables  
 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  
Dep. Var. LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  
Intercept 
3.908 
(9.79) 
*** 
 
-776.919 
(-9.16) 
*** 
 
3.686 
(9.24) 
*** 
 
-762.640 
(-8.99) 
*** 
 
3.910 
(10.03) 
*** 
 
-767.712 
(-9.36) 
*** 
 
NPARt-1 
-0.062 
(-0.86) 
 
42.824 
(2.65) 
*** 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-  - 
 
NPAR²t-1 
0.027 
(1.60) 
 
-10.213 
(-2.72) 
*** 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-  - 
 
ENPARt-1 - 
 
- 
 0.257 
(2.74) 
*** 
 
36.995 
(1.76) 
* 
 
-  - 
 
ENPAR²t-1 - 
 
- 
 -0.077 
(-3.23) 
*** 
 
-9.339 
(-1.74) 
* 
 
-  - 
 
TWOPARt-1 - 
 
- 
 
-  - 
 0.007 
(0.24) 
 
23.474 
(3.50) 
*** 
 
LARGEPARt-1 - 
 
- 
 
-  - 
 0.118 
(2.75) 
*** 
 
-14.064 
(-1.48) 
 
LITRt -  
33.175 
(10.68) 
*** 
 
-  
32.950 
(10.60) 
*** 
 
-  
33.435 
(10.783) 
*** 
 
LPTRt 
0.001 
(17.60) 
*** 
 
-  
0.001 
(17.62) 
*** 
 
-  
0.001 
(17.60) 
*** 
 
-  
OLDt-1 
-3.680 
(-4.11) 
*** 
 
3174.384 
(16.05) 
*** 
 
-3.859 
(-4.32) 
*** 
 
3167.629 
(16.01) 
*** 
 
-3.711 
(-4.15) 
*** 
 
3169.795 
(16.06) 
*** 
 
YOUNGt-1 
-1.190 
(-1.18) 
 
1260.174 
(5.70) 
*** 
 
-1.084 
(-1.08) 
 
1240.732 
(5.63) 
*** 
 
-1.314 
(-1.29) 
 
1345.184 
(6.07) 
*** 
 
UNEMPLt-1 
9.921 
(6.54) 
*** 
 
5055.487 
(16.71) 
*** 
 
10.060 
(6.62) 
*** 
 
5099.596 
(16.88) 
*** 
 
9.902 
(6.53) 
*** 
 
5025.261 
(16.65) 
*** 
 
POPt-1 
2.19E-05 
(19.92) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(10.22) 
*** 
 
2.24E-05 
(20.29) 
 
0.002 
(10.02) 
*** 
 
2.20E-05 
(19.97) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(10.29) 
*** 
 
TBASEt-1 
-0.113 
(-28.72) 
*** 
 
-27.804 
(-36.00) 
*** 
 
-0.111 
(-28.35) 
*** 
 
-27.878 
(-36.16) 
*** 
 
-0.113 
(-28.667) 
*** 
 
-27.733 
(-35.97) 
*** 
 
TDEPt-1 
11.322 
(50.02) 
*** 
 
3377.134 
(49.26) 
*** 
 
11.331 
(50.09) 
*** 
 
3383.700 
(49.19) 
*** 
 
11.314 
(49.99) 
*** 
 
3379.794 
(49.40) 
*** 
 
DEBTt-1 
-0.067 
(-14.28) 
*** 
 
-4.692 
(-4.43) 
*** 
 
-0.067 
(-14.10) 
*** 
 
-4.299 
(-4.02) 
*** 
 
-0.067 
(-14.31) 
*** 
 
-4.781 
(-4.52) 
*** 
 
TRENDt 
0.118 
(19.17) 
*** 
 
21.431 
(21.68) 
*** 
 
0.117 
(19.02) 
*** 
 
21.413 
(21.72) 
*** 
 
0.118 
(19.11) 
*** 
 
21.409 
(21.70) 
*** 
 
R² 0.498  0.616  0.499  0.616  0.498  0.618  
Adjusted R² 0.497  0.615  0.497  0.615  0.497  0.617  
Wald F-stat (p) 354936.80 (p<0.01) 354680.40 (p<0.01) 354906.50 (p<0.01) 
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Figure 5 Impact of NPAR and ENPAR on LPTR (left axis) and LITR (right axis) 
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Table A5 Joint impact of TBE and TBE² on the evolution of LITR and LPTR in non-election years 
compared to the tax rate in election years 
 
Years before 
elections 
LITR LPTR 
5 0.092575 5.138295 
4 0.207245 11.30209 
3 0.255322 13.82026 
2 0.236807 12.85511 
1 0.151699 8.344125 
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Table A6 Estimation results of the 3SLS estimation of all joint hypotheses – All variables 
 
Hyp. Dep. Var. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  
 
Intercept 
-0.445 
(-0.92) 
 
2260.303 
(6.08) 
*** -0.521 
(-1.10) 
 
2164.484 
(5.49) 
*** 
 
-0.549 
(-1.16) 
 
2250.705 
(6.10) 
*** 
1 ICGt-1 
-0.092 
(-3.41) 
*** 
 
27.871 
(3.55) 
*** -0.096 
(-3.65) 
*** 
 
27.533 
(3.19) 
*** 
 
-0.092 
(-3.40) 
*** 
 
27.342 
(3.51) 
*** 
2 NPARt-1 
-0.162 
(-2.36) 
** 
 
45.399 
(3.40) 
*** 
-  -  -  -  
 NPAR²t-1 
0.036 
(2.29) 
*** 
 
-7.514 
(-2.45) 
** 
-  -  -  -  
 ENPARt-1 -  -  
-0.047 
(-0.52) 
 
90.209 
(4.91) 
*** 
-  - 
 
 ENPAR²t-1 -  -  
-0.007 
(-0.30) 
 
-17.563 
(-3.56) 
*** 
-  - 
 
 TWOPARt-1 -  -  -  - 
 -0.061 
(-2.08) 
** 
 
27.940 
(4.74) 
*** 
 LARGEPARt-1 -  -  -  - 
 -0.017 
(-0.40) 
 
23.440 
(2.72) 
*** 
3 SEATMARt-1 
-0.351 
(-2.71) 
*** 
 
-20.672 
(-0.78) 
 -0.294 
(-2.27) 
*** 
 
-37.065 
(-1.47) 
 -0.348 
(-2.69) 
*** 
 
-21.196 
(-0.80) 
 
4 LITRNt 
0.267 
(5.32) 
*** 
 
-188.067 
(-2.76) 
*** 0.252 
(4.96) 
*** 
 
-173.896 
(-2.32) 
** 0.265 
(5.28) 
*** 
 
-181.520 
(-2.68) 
*** 
 LPTRNt 
-0.001 
(-5.69) 
*** 
 
0.358 
(3.84) 
*** -0.001 
(-5.31) 
*** 
 
0.334 
(3.23) 
*** -0.001 
(-5.66) 
*** 
 
0.348 
(3.76) 
*** 
5 TBEt 
0.068 
(2.58) 
*** 
 
20.578 
(3.82) 
*** 0.072 
(2.71) 
*** 
 
18.457 
(3.47) 
*** 0.069 
(2.59) 
*** 
 
20.260 
(3.79) 
*** 
 TBE²t 
-0.010 
(-1.91) 
* 
 
-2.305 
(-2.30) 
** -0.010 
(-2.06) 
** 
 
-1.894 
(-1.93) 
* -0.010 
(-1.91) 
** 
 
-2.247 
(-2.26) 
** 
6.1 GRANTt 
-0.003 
(-4.49) 
*** 
 
0.450 
(3.11) 
*** 
 
-0.003 
(-4.75) 
*** 
 
0.450 
(3.13) 
*** -0.003 
(-4.47) 
*** 
 
0.430 
(2.97) 
*** 
6.2 TELt 
5.596 
(25.44) 
*** 
 
-1915.588 
(-40.73) 
*** 5.609 
(25.52) 
*** 
 
-1929.636 
(-42.14) 
*** 5.605 
(25.47) 
*** 
 
-1913.930 
(-41.09) 
*** 
6.3 HHIt 
-2.849 
(-12.12) 
*** 
 
213.328 
(2.46) 
** -2.800 
(-11.91) 
*** 
 
193.922 
(2.08) 
** -2.834 
(-12.06) 
*** 
 
204.338 
(2.38) 
** 
6.4 RENTt -  
2.279 
(4.97) 
*** 
-  
2.391 
(5.30) 
*** 
-  
2.300 
(5.06) 
*** 
 
LITRt -  
97.747 
(19.47) 
*** 
-  
97.385 
(18.66) 
*** 
-  
97.362 
(19.59) 
*** 
 
 
LPTRt 
0.002 
(26.13) 
*** 
 
- 
 0.002 
(26.03) 
*** 
 
- 
 0.002 
(26.18) 
*** 
 
- 
 
 
OLDt-1 
5.960 
(6.75) 
*** 
 
164.958 
(0.94) 
 5.857 
(6.62) 
*** 142.527 
(0.84) 
 5.937 
(6.71) 
*** 
 
175.407 
(1.01) 
 
 
YOUNGt-1 
5.614 
(5.79) 
*** 
 
-1674.855 
(-5.62) 
*** 5.671 
(5.88) 
*** 
 
-1605.284 
(-5.22) 
*** 5.533 
(5.66) 
*** 
 
-1608.584 
(-5.37) 
*** 
 
UNEMPLt-1 
1.529 
(0.90) 
 
-569.969 
(-1.09) 
 1.977 
(1.16) 
 
-768.946 
(-1.39) 
 1.555 
(0.92) 
 
-629.348 
(-1.21) 
 
 
POPt-1 
2.28E-05 
(12.85) 
*** 
 
-0.001 
(-1.58) 
 2.37E-05 
(13.27) 
*** 
 
-0.001 
(-1.83) 
* 2.28E-05 
(12.83 
*** 
 
-0.001 
(1.44) 
 
 
TBASEt-1 
-0.082 
(-18.67) 
*** 
 
-35.165 
(-39.39) 
*** -0.081 
(-18.20) 
*** 
 
-35.281 
(-39.38) 
*** -0.082 
(-18.61) 
*** 
 
-35.127 
(-39.62) 
*** 
 
TDEPt-1 
4.571 
(13.06) 
*** 
 
1030.822 
(13.03) 
*** 4.587 
(13.13) 
*** 
 
1040.839 
(13.55) 
*** 4.554 
(13.01) 
*** 
 
1036.918 
(13.22) 
*** 
 
DEBTt-1 
-0.057 
(-11.90) 
*** 
 
1.365 
(1.38) 
 -0.059 
(-12.11) 
*** 
 
2.053 
(2.06) 
** -0.057 
(-11.90) 
*** 
 
1.248 
(1.27) 
 
 
TRENDt 
0.095 
(12.28) 
*** 
 
22.513 
(13.35) 
*** 0.095 
(12.25) 
*** 
 
22.22 
(12.81) 
*** 0.095 
(12.22) 
*** 
 
22.641 
(13.54) 
*** 
 R² 0.644  0.797  0.646  0.806  0.644  0.801  
 Adjusted R² 0.641  0.795  0.643  0.804  0.642  0.799  
 Wald F-stat (p) 711580.10 (p<0.01) 729700.80 (p<0.01) 637581.50 (p<0.01) 
 N 2982 
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Table A7 Descriptive statistics of the variables in the vote function (N=688) and data sources 
 
 Mean Median Max Min Std.dev. Source 
Dep. Var. : Vote share (in %) government parties (Vit ) 54.93 54.05 87.30 24.15 10.18 MICE, VUB 
Vote share (in%) current government parties at t-6 (Vit-6) 56.24 55.08 88.29 37.25 8.32 MICE, VUB 
Local income tax rate (LITRit) 6.53 6.50 9.00 0.00 0.89 VVSG 
Local property tax rate (LPTRit) 959.61 950.00 2000.00 170.00 264.79 VVSG 
Per capita expenditures (in €1000) (EXPit)  0.67 0.62 2.18 0.23 0.25 MICE, VUB 
Average local income tax rate of neighbouring 
municipalities (LITRNit) 
6.58 6.57 8.00 3.00 0.51 
VVSG, matrix of 
MICE, VUB 
Average local property tax rate of neighbouring 
municipalities (LPTRNit) 
975.77 969.08 1650.00 400.00 191.66 
VVSG, matrix of 
MICE, VUB 
Average per capita expenditures of neighbouring 
municipalities (in €1000) (NEXPit) 
0.69 0.67 1.82 0.42 0.17 
VVSG, matrix of 
MICE, VUB 
Per capita net taxable income (in €1000) (NTIit) 5.49 5.45 8.88 3.21 0.96 MICE, VUB 
Unemployment rate (UNEMPLit) 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.01 CORE, UCL 
Numbers of parties in the government (NPARit) 1.63 2.00 5.00 1.00 0.87 MICE, VUB 
 
Table A8 Descriptive statistics and histograms of forecasted votes (left histogram) and ex-post vote 
results (right histogram) (N=688) 
 
 Forecasted votes (Vfit) Ex-post votes (Vit) 
 Mean 55.44 54.93 
 Median 55.08 54.05 
 Maximum 88.46 87.30 
 Minimum 34.04 24.15 
 Std. Dev. 8.71 10.18 
 Correlation 0.62 
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Table A9 IV estimation of the vote share of the government parties in election year t, including ICG 
 
Dependent variable :  
Vote share of the government parties (Vit) 
(1)  (2) 
 
Intercept 
69.973 
(0.39) 
 15.233 
(1.22) 
 
Prior vote (Vit-6) 
0.750 
(14.84) 
*** 0.757 
(17.89) 
*** 
Ideological Complexion of the Government (ICGit) 
-6.919 
(-0.19) 
 -  
Local income tax rate (LITRit) 
35.703 
(0.79) 
 -5.413 
(-3.51) 
*** 
LITRit * ICGit 
-7.049 
(-0.79) 
 -  
Local property tax rate (LPTRit) 
-0.210 
(-1.40) 
 -  
LPTRit * ICGit 
0.041 
(1.37) 
 -  
Per capita expenditures (EXPit) 
-75.50 
(-1.50) 
 -  
EXPit * ICGit 
16.20 
(1.53) 
 -  
Local income tax rate neighbours (LITRNit) 
-5.426 
(-0.86) 
 7.050 
(2.71) 
*** 
Local property tax rate neighbours (LPTRNit) 
0.015 
(1.19) 
 
- 
 
Per capita expenditures neighbours (NEXPit) 
-75.50 
(-1.50) 
 -12.643 
(-3.12) 
*** 
Net taxable income (NTIit) 
-0.10 
(-0.01) 
 -1.666 
(-3.18) 
*** 
Unemployment rate (UNEMPLit) 
35.235 
(0.43) 
 
- 
 
Number of government parties (NPARit) 
16.310 
(1.01) 
 2.157 
(3.60) 
*** 
NPARit * ICGit 
-2.748 
(-0.881) 
 
- 
 
1994 year effect (Y94) 
6.822 
(2.21) 
** 
- 
 
2000 year effect (Y00) 
0.454 
(0.13) 
 
- 
 
Party year effects Yes  Yes  
R² 0.16  0.298  
Adjusted R² 0.12  0.291  
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Table A10 Descriptive statistics of the variables in the strategic debt estimation (N=688) and data 
sources 
 
  Mean  Median Max. Min. Std.dev. Source 
Dep. Var. : Change of debt per capita (∆DEBTit) 61.71 40.03 696.69 -446.52 99.27 MICE, VUB 
Prospects of electoral defeat (PEDit) 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.45 Own calcul. 
Left majority (LEFTMAJit) 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 
Own calcul. on 
MICE, VUB 
PEDit * LEFTMAJit 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.19 - 
Left government (LEFTGOVit) 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.46  MICE, VUB 
PEDit * LEFTGOVit 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.23 - 
Ideological Complexion of the Government (ICGit) 4.90 5.10 6.10 2.70 0.56 MICE, VUB 
PEDit * LEFTMAJit 1.40 0.00 6.10 0.00 2.25 - 
Ex-post electoral defeat (EEDit)  0.34 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.47 Hasselt Univ. 
EEDit * LEFTMAJit 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 - 
Seats margin (SEATMARit) 0.12 0.10 0.50 0.00 0.09 
Own calcul. on 
Hasselt Univ. 
SEATMARit * LEFTMAJit 0.02 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.05 - 
Debt (p/c) (Debtit-1) 766.93 685.89 3829.52 120.57 373.96 MICE, VUB 
Change of net taxable income (p/c) (∆NTIit) 0.07 0.07 0.65 -0.70 0.10 FPS Economy 
Change of proportion of elderly (∆OLDit) 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 FPS Economy 
Change of proportion of young (∆YOUNGit) -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.01 FPS Economy 
Change of unemployment rate (∆UNEMPLit) 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.09 0.01 FPS Economy 
Change of number of inhabitants (∆POPit) -22.06 1.00 18760.00 -16592.00 1822.24 FPS Economy 
Change of real interest rate on long-term (federal) government 
bonds (∆INTERESTit) 
0.47 0.63 0.77 0.02 0.33 MICE, VUB 
Actual number of government parties (NPARit) 1.63 2.00 5.00 1.00 0.68 MICE, VUB 
Effective number of government parties (ENPARit) 1.52 1.47 3.77 1.00 0.55 MICE, VUB 
Two party government (TWOPARit) 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 MICE, VUB 
Large party government (LARGEPARit) 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.28 MICE, VUB 
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Table A11 Estimation results of the debt change function, using OLS with random effects using linear 
vote expectations (Vfit) 
 
Dependent variable : ∆Debtit (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Intercept 
0.109 
(0.00) 
 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 2.702 
(0.08) 
 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** -199.848 
(-0.93) 
 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 
Vfit 
0.073 
(0.15) 
 
- 
 -0.102 
(-0.19) 
 
- 
 3.451 
(0.89) 
 
- 
 
Vfit * LEFTMAJit  
0.127 
(0.10) 
 
- 
 -  
- 
 -  
- 
 
LEFTMAJit 
-14.041 
(-0.20) 
 
- 
 -  
- 
 -  
- 
 
Vfit * LEFTGOVit  
-  
- 
 0.600 
(0.56) 
 
- 
 -  
- 
 
LEFTGOVit 
-  
- 
 -45.331 
(-0.75) 
 
- 
 -  
- 
 
Vfit * ICGit  
-  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 -0.681 
(-0.87) 
 
- 
 
ICGit 
-  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 40.171 
(0.94) 
 
- 
 
DEBTit-1 
0.019 
(1.62) 
 
- 
 0.019 
(1.66) 
* 
- 
 0.019 
(1.66) 
 
- 
 
∆NTIit 
53.371 
(1.40) 
 
- 
 52.827 
(1.38) 
 
- 
 52.718 
(1.38) 
 
- 
 
∆YOUNGit 
2974.685 
(2.06) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 3023.090 
(2.10) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 3022.228 
(2.10) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 
∆OLDit 
5380.352 
(2.10) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 5382.035 
(2.10) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 5393.614 
(2.10) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 
∆UNEMPLit 
34.234 
(0.05) 
 
- 
 -0.947 
(0.00) 
 -  
12.223 
(0.02) 
 -  
∆POPit 
0.003 
(1.38) 
 
- 
 0.003 
(1.33) 
 -  
0.003 
(1.37) 
 -  
∆INTERESTit 
128.365 
(2.44) 
** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 129.988 
(2.48) 
** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 129.790 
(2.48) 
** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 
NPARit 
19.571 
(0.81) 
 
-  
26.954 
(1.07) 
 -  
19.273 
(0.79) 
 -  
NPAR²it 
-5.048 
(-0.85) 
 
-  
-5.966 
(-1.00) 
 -  
-5.046 
(-0.85) 
 -  
Time dummy variable (1994) 
-46.107 
(-1.48) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
* -46.882 
(-1.52) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
* -46.576 
(-1.50) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
* 
R² 0.054  0.043  0.056  0.043  0.055  0.043  
Adjusted R² 0.036  0.038  0.038  0.038  0.037  0.038  
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Table A12 Estimation results of the debt change function, using OLS with random effects using 
alternative left-wing variables156 
 
Dependent variable : 
∆Debtit 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Intercept 
16.446 
(1.10) 
 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 16.560 
(0.33) 
 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 13.369 
(0.87) 
 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 
PEDit 
5.519 
(0.59) 
 
- 
 -36.981 
(-0.52) 
 
- 
 5.544 
(0.57) 
 
- 
 
PEDit * LEFTMAJit  
-10.173 
(-0.42) 
 
- 
 -  
- 
 -  
- 
 
LEFTMAJit 
-2.637 
(-0.19) 
 
- 
 -  
- 
 -  
- 
 
PEDit * ICGit  -  -  
8.311 
(0.59) 
 -  -  -  
ICGit -  -  
0.028 
(0.00) 
 -  -  -  
PEDit * LEFTGOVit -  -  -  -  
-6.857 
(-0.34) 
 -  
LEFTGOVit -  -  -  -  
-8.867 
(-0.79) 
 -  
DEBTit-1 
0.019 
(1.68) 
* 
- 
 0.019 
(1.64) 
 
- 
 0.019 
(1.65) 
* 
- 
 
∆NTIit 
54.450 
(1.43) 
 
- 
 53.229 
(1.39) 
 
- 
 53.469 
(1.40) 
 
- 
 
∆YOUNGit 
3107.399 
(2.17) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 3123.368 
(2.18) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 3146.954 
(2.20) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 
∆OLDit 
5539.047 
(2.17) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 5579.694 
(2.19) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 5572.995 
(2.18) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 
∆UNEMPLit 
-4.467 
(0.00) 
 
- 
 -27.307 
(-0.04) 
 
- 
 -42.800 
(-0.06) 
 
-  
∆POPit 
0.003 
(1.32) 
 
- 
 0.003 
(1.31) 
 
- 
 0.003 
(1.26) 
 
-  
∆INTERESTit 
132.550 
(2.54) 
** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 133.086 
(2.55) 
** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 134.176 
(2.57) 
** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 
NPARit - 
 
-  
0.728 
(0.12) 
 -  
4.190 
(0.59) 
 -  
Time dummy variable 
(1994) 
-48.304 
(-1.57) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
* -48.539 
(-1.57) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
* -49.198 
(-1.59) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
* 
R² 0.054  0.043  0.054  0.043  0.055  0.043  
Adjusted R² 0.037  0.038  0.037  0.038  0.038  0.038  
Hausman (p-value) 10.89 (p=0.54) 8.72 (p=0.73) 9.37 (p=0.67) 
 
Table A13 Number of governments with vote expectations below x percent 
 
Vfit< 35% 36% 37% 38% 39% 40% 41% 42% 43% 44% 45% 46% 47% 48% 49% 50% 
N 1 3 5 7 17 21 32 39 52 62 76 99 118 143 164 195 
 
                                                 
 
156  In columns (1) and (2) results are reproduced from Table 16 on p. 108 using the LEFTMAJit dummy variable 
in line with Pettersson-Lidbom (2001). We do not present all possible fragmentation operationalisations for 
each left-wing variable approach as the results of Table 16 on p. 108 show that none of fragmentation 
variables have an impact on debt changes in election years. 
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Table A14 Descriptive statistics of all variables in the tax rate change estimations (N=688) and data 
sources 
 
 Mean Median Max Min Std.dev. Source 
Dep. Var. : ∆LITRit -0.08 0.00 0.00 -3.00 0.05 VVSG 
Dep. Var. : ∆LPTRit -3.86 0.00 300.00 -200 24.01 VVSG 
Forecasted vote share government parties at t-1 (Vfit) 55.43 55.08 88.46 34.04 8.71 Own calcul. 
Ideological complexion of the government (ICGit-1) 4.90 5.10 6.10 2.70 0.56 MICE, VUB 
Vfit * ICGit-1 271.81 268.95 446.70 105.96 52.59 - 
Vote share (in%) government parties at elections (Vit) 54.93 54.04 87.30 24.15 10.18 Hasselt Univ. 
Vit * ICGit-1 269.24 264.11 465.44 106.75 58.31 - 
Left majority (LEFTMAJit-1) 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 MICE, VUB 
Vfit * LEFTMAJit-1 7.26 0.00 79.22 0.00 19.25 - 
Left government (LEFTGOVit-1) 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.46  MICE, VUB 
Vfit * LEFTGOVit-1 16.57 0.00 73.34 0.00 26.14 - 
Per capita financial balance (BALANCEit-1) 35.35 30.23 329.54 -206.58 53.27 AHA 
Debt (p/c) (DEBTit-1) 766.93 685.89 3829.52 120.57 373.96 MICE, VUB 
Local income tax rate (LITRit-1) 6.61 7.00 9.00 0.00 0.86 VVSG 
Local property tax rate (LPTRit-1) 963.47 950.00 2000.00 170.00 265.32 VVSG 
Change of LIT tax base (∆TBASELITt-1) 1.26 1.23 3.11 -0.40 0.42 AHA 
Change of LPT tax base (∆TBASELPTt-1) 0.42 0.41 3.89 -1.97 0.45 AHA 
Change of grants (p/c) (∆GRANTt) 1.18 1.52 29.85 -10.30 2.98 MICE, VUB 
Change of proportion of elderly (∆OLDit-1) 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 FPS Economy 
Change of proportion of young (∆YOUNGit-1) 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 FPS Economy 
Change of unemployment rate (∆UNEMPLit-1) 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.09 0.01 FPS Economy 
Change of number of inhabitants (∆POPit-1) 58.11 54.00 841.00 -3451.00 174.54 FPS Economy 
Actual number of government parties (NPARit-1) 1.63 2.00 5.00 1.00 0.68 MICE, VUB 
Effective number of government parties (ENPARit-1) 1.52 1.47 3.77 1.00 0.55 MICE, VUB 
Two party government (TWOPARit-1) 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 MICE, VUB 
Large party government (LARGEPARit-1) 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.28 MICE, VUB 
 
Table A15 Correlation coefficients of interaction terms with their constitutive variables when|r|>0.80 
 
Correlation between and r 
Vfit * ICGit-1 Vfit 0.809800 
Vfit * LEFTMAJit-1 LEFTMAJit-1 0.984730 
Vfit * LEFTGOVit-1 LEFTGOVit-1 0.987309 
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Table A16 SUR estimation results of the tax rate change functions employing different fragmentation 
operationalisations (continues) 
 
Dependent variable 
(1) 
∆LITRit 
 (2) 
∆LPTRit 
 (3) 
∆LITRit 
 (4) 
∆LPTRit 
 (5) 
∆LITRit 
 (6) 
∆LPTRit 
 
… 
Vfit 
0.004 
(2.60) 
*** 0.086 
(0.84) 
** 0.003 
(2.30) 
** 0.086 
(0.40) 
 0.003 
(2.27) 
** 0.086 
(0.83) 
 
… 
Vfit * ICGit-1 
-0.005 
(-2.28) 
** -0.171 
(-0.93) 
 -0.005 
(-2.22) 
** -0.167 
(-0.90) 
 -0.005 
(-2.20) 
** -0.167 
(-0.90) 
 
… 
ICGit-1 
0.009 
(0.43) 
 1.195 
(0.68) 
 0.017 
(0.82) 
 1.669 
(0.99) 
 0.017 
(0.83) 
 1.665 
(0.97) 
 
… 
BALANCEit-1 
-0.001 
(-2.27) 
** -0.011 
(-0.58) 
 -0.001 
(-2.16) 
** -0.009 
(-0.46) 
 -0.001 
(-2.14) 
* -0.009 
(-0.46) 
 
… 
DEBTit-1 
-3.87E-05 
(-1.10) 
 0.001 
(0.38) 
 -4.11E-05 
(-1.18) 
 0.001 
(0.35) 
 -4.13E-05 
(-1.18) 
 0.001 
(0.35) 
 
… 
LITRit-1 
-0.018 
(-1.23) 
 -  -0.021 
(-1.50) 
 -  -0.021 
(-1.51) 
 -  
… 
LPTRit-1 - 
 -0.008 
(-2.14) 
** -  -0.008 
(-2.03) 
** -  -0.008 
(-2.03) 
** 
… 
∆TBit-1 
0.045 
(1.76) 
 2.788 
(1.21) 
 0.041 
(1.60) 
 2.872 
(1.25) 
 0.041 
(1.59) 
 2.875 
(1.25) 
 
… 
∆GRANTit 
-0.002 
(-0.45) 
* -1.200 
(-2.96) 
*** -0.002 
(-0.41) 
 -1.198 
(-2.95) 
*** -0.002 
(-0.41) 
 -1.198 
(-2.95) 
*** 
… 
∆YOUNGit-1 
-1.179 
(-0.39) 
 -215.081 
(-0.85) 
 -1.561 
(-0.52) 
 -226.421 
(-0.90) 
 -1.584 
(-0.52) 
 -226.291 
(-0.90) 
 
… 
∆OLDit-1 
4.525 
(1.40) 
 497.450 
(1.83) 
* 4.025 
(1.25) 
 471.464 
(1.75) 
* 4.008 
(1.25) 
 471.481 
(1.75) 
* 
… 
∆UNEMPLit-1 
-2.332 
(-1.51) 
 -13.056 
(-0.10) 
 -2.179 
(-1.42) 
 1.868 
(0.01) 
 -2.181 
(-1.42) 
 1.883 
(0.01) 
 
… 
∆POPit-1 8.63E-05 
 -0.001 
(-0.85) 
 8.60E-05 
(1.28) 
 -0.001 
(-0.13) 
 8.57E-05 
(1.27) 
 -0.001 
(-0.13) 
 
… 
FRAGit-1              
NPARit-1 
-0.083 
(-1.18) 
 -2.627 
(-0.46) 
 -  -  -  -  
… 
NPAR²it-1 
0.016 
(0.93) 
 0.850 
(0.61) 
 -  -  -  -  
… 
ENPARit-1 - 
 -  -0.011 
(-0.54) 
 2.305 
(1.35) 
 0.001 
(0.01) 
 2.211 
(0.29) 
 
… 
ENPAR²it-1 - 
 -  -  -  -0.003 
(-0.14) 
 0.026 
(0.01) 
 
… 
TWOPARit-1 - 
 
 
-  -  -  -  -  
… 
LARGEPARit-1 - 
 
 
-  -  -  -  -  
… 
Y1994 
0.210 
(4.97) 
*** 17.280 
(4.84) 
 0.208 
(4.93) 
*** 16.810 
(4.73) 
*** 0.208 
(4.92) 
*** 16.811 
(4.72) 
*** 
… 
Y2000 
0.231 
(6.11) 
*** 17.847 
(5.43) 
*** 0.227 
(5.99) 
*** 17.199 
(5.24) 
*** 0.227 
(5.97) 
*** 17.204 
(5.22) 
*** 
… 
Intercept 
-0.313 
(-1.63) 
 -19.569 
(-1.54) 
 -0.351 
(-1.83) 
* -26.953 
(-2.95) 
*** -0.360 
(-1.77) 
* -26.861 
(-1.94) 
* 
… 
R² 0.124  0.073  0.122  0.075  0.122  0.075  … 
Adjusted R² 0.103  0.051  0.102  0.054  0.101  0.053  … 
Wald F-test (p) 206.371 (p<0.01) 205.914 (p<0.01) 205.939  (p<0.01) …  
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Table A16 SUR estimation results of the tax rate change functions employing different fragmentation 
operationalisations (continued) 
 
Dependent variable … 
(7) 
∆LITRit 
 (8) 
∆LPTRit 
 (9) 
∆LITRit 
 (10) 
∆LPTRit 
 
Vfit … 
0.004 
(2.54) 
** 0.087 
(0.80) 
 0.003 
(2.09) 
** 
- 
 
Vfitc * ICGit-1c … 
-0.005 
(-2.33) 
** -0.173 
(-0.93) 
 -0.004 
(-1.95) 
* 
- 
 
ICGit-1 … 
0.010 
(0.47) 
 1.243 
(0.71) 
 0.017 
(0.92) 
 
- 
 
BALANCEit-1 … 
-0.001 
(-2.24) 
** -0.011 
(-0.57) 
 -0.001 
(-1.90) 
* 
- 
 
DEBTit-1 … 
-3.91E-05 
(-1.12) 
 0.001 
(0.36) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
LITRit-1 … 
-0.019 
(-1.33) 
 
- 
 -0.023 
(-1.70) 
* 
- 
 
LPTRit-1 … - 
 -0.008 
(-2.15) 
** 
- 
 -0.009 
(-2.45) 
** 
∆TBASEit-1 … 
0.044 
(1.70) 
* 2.814 
(1.22) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
∆GRANTit … 
-0.002 
(-0.44) 
 -1.196 
(-2.95) 
*** 
- 
 -1.190 
(-3.04) 
*** 
∆YOUNGit-1 … 
-1.267 
(-0.42) 
 -215.881 
(-0.85) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
∆OLDit-1 … 
4.231 
(1.31) 
 482.029 
(1.79) 
* 
- 
 510.221 
(2.20) 
** 
∆UNEMPLit-1 … 
-2.278 
(-1.48) 
 -9.813 
(-0.08) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
∆POPit-1 … 
8.80E-05 
(1.31) 
 -0.001 
(-0.19) 
 1.40E-04 
(2.26) 
** 
- 
 
FRAGit-1          
NPARit-1 … - 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
NPAR²it-1 … - 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
ENPARit-1 … - 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
ENPAR²it-1 … - 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
TWOPARit-1 … 
-0.024 
(-0.94) 
 0.197 
(0.09) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
LARGEPARit-1 … 
-0.052 
(-1.25) 
 1.557 
(0.45) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Y1994 … 
0.207 
(4.91) 
*** 17.117 
(4.80) 
*** 0.154 
(5.55) 
*** 17.556 
(5.53) 
 
Y2000 … 
0.229 
(6.06) 
*** 17.744 
(5.40) 
*** 0.187 
(7.05) 
*** 17.074 
(6.28) 
 
Intercept … 
-0.369 
(-1.97) 
** -21.422 
(-1.89) 
* -0.276 
(-1.64) 
 -7.554 
(-1.771) 
 
R² … 0.124  0.073  0.114  0.065  
Adjusted R² … 0.102  0.051  0.103  0.058  
Wald F-test (p) … 205.828 (p<0.01) 187.954 (p<0.01) 
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Table A17 SUR estimation results of the tax rate change functions employing different ideological 
variables 
 
Dependent variable 
(1) 
∆LITRit 
 (2) 
∆LPTRit 
 (3) 
∆LITRit 
 (4) 
∆LPTRit 
 (5) 
∆LITRit 
 (6) 
∆LPTRit 
 (7) 
∆LITRit 
 (8) 
∆LPTRit 
 
Vfit 
0.002 
(1.48) 
 0.061 
(0.53) 
 0.001 
(1.03) 
 -  0.002 
(1.14) 
 0.005 
(0.04) 
 0.001 
(0.84) 
 -  
Vfit * LEFTMAJit-1 
0.007 
(1.97) 
** 0.120 
(0.41) 
 0.007 
(1.97) 
** -  -  -  -  -  
LEFTMAJit-1 
-0.380 
(-1.89) 
* -6.940 
(-0.41) 
 -0.380 
(-1.95) 
* -  -  -  -  -  
Vfit * LEFTGOVit-1 - 
 -  -  -  0.007 
(2.25) 
** 0.301 
(1.22) 
 0.006 
(2.08) 
** -  
LEFTGOVit-1 - 
 -  -  -  -0.381 
(-2.25) 
** -18.666 
(-1.32) 
 -0.351 
(-2.15) 
** -  
BALANCEit-1 
-0.001 
(-2.23) 
** -0.010 
(-0.53) 
 -0.001 
(-1.88) 
** -  -0.001 
(-2.16) 
** -0.010 
(-0.54) 
 -0.001 
(-1.91) 
* -  
DEBTit-1 
-3.95E-05 
(-1.13) 
 0.001 
(0.32) 
 -  -  -3.59E-05 
(-1.03) 
 0.001 
(0.43) 
 -  -  
LITRit-1 
-0.022 
(-1.55) 
 -  -0.025 
(-1.88) 
** -  -0.020 
(-1.45) 
 -  -0.024 
(-1.75) 
* -  
LPTRit-1 - 
 -0.008 
(-2.24) 
** -  -0.009 
(-2.46) 
** -  -0.008 
(-2.15) 
** -  -0.009 
(-2.45) 
** 
∆TBASEit-1 
0.043 
(1.67) 
* 3.038 
(1.33) 
 -  -  0.040 
(1.58) 
 2.839 
(1.23) 
 -  -  
∆GRANTit 
-0.002 
(-0.47) 
 -1.192 
(-2.93) 
*** -  -1.184 
(-3.03) 
*** -0.002 
(-0.44) 
 -1.192 
(-2.94) 
*** -  -1.192 
(-3.04) 
*** 
∆YOUNGit-1 
-1.310 
(-0.43) 
 -229.043 
(-0.90) 
 -  -  -1.367 
(-0.45) 
 -222.958 
(-0.88) 
 -  -  
∆OLDit-1 
4.173 
(1.30) 
 472.308 
(1.75) 
* -  508.193 
(2.19) 
** 4.034 
(1.26) 
 476.434 
(1.77) 
* -  511.28
9 
(2.21) 
*** 
∆UNEMPLit-1 
-2.182 
(-1.42) 
 -3.202 
(-0.025) 
 -  -  -2.312 
(-1.50) 
 -11.856 
(-0.09) 
 -  -  
∆POPit-1 
9.25E-05 
(1.37) 
 -0.001 
(-0.090) 
 14.00E-05 
(2.25) 
** -  9.61E-05 
(1.44) 
 -0.001 
(-0.14) 
 14.50E-05 
(2.34) 
** -  
NPARit-1 
-0.021 
(1.24) 
 0.447 
(0.31) 
 -  -  -0.019 
(-0.95) 
 1.042 
(0.62) 
 -  -  
Y1994 
0.206 
(4.83) 
*** 16.907 
(4.76) 
*** 0.152 
(5.47) 
 17.515 
(5.52) 
*** 0.206 
(4.88) 
*** 17.041 
(4.80) 
*** 0.154 
(5.53) 
*** 17.567 
(6.28) 
*** 
Y2000 
0.228 
(6.11) 
*** 17.982 
(5.58) 
*** 0.188 
(7.15) 
*** 17.046 
(6.27) 
*** 0.228 
(6.12) 
*** 17.835 
(5.53) 
*** 0.191 
(7.26) 
*** 17.078 
(6.28) 
*** 
Intercept 
-0.201 
(-1.26) 
 -14.133 
(-1.78) 
* -0.103 
(-0.74) 
 -7.524 
(-1.77) 
* -0.187 
(-1.17) 
 -12.039 
(-1.49) 
 -0.101 
(-0.72) 
 -7.585 
(-1.78) 
* 
R² 0.120  0.071  0.111  0.065  0.122  0.073  0.113  0.065  
Adjusted R² 0.101  0.050  0.100  0.058  0.102  0.053  0.103  0.058  
Wald F test (p-value) 201.72 (p<0.01) 186.05 (p<0.01) 204.36 (p<0.01) 187.54 (p<0.01) 
 
Table A18 Summary statistics and data sources 
 
 Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. Source 
Degree of foresight of collected taxes (DFCTit) 1.05 0.26 2.87 0.21 Dexia, AHA 
Percentage of tax revenues in total revenues (TAXPit) 7.56 0.75 37.64 4.78 Own calcul. on AHA 
Number of taxes (TAXNit) 15.09 2.00 46.00 7.26 AHA 
Fiscal deficit as a share of total revenues (DEFit-1) 6.63 -20.15 41.06 7.78 Own calcul. on AHA 
Number of inhabitants (POPit)  20.53 0.96 465.78 34.45 FPS Economy 
Percental change of the number of inhabitants (POPGRit) 0.44 -3.22 3.53 0.62 FPS Economy 
Percental change of the number of firms (FIRMGRit) 1.18 -71.16 12.61 2.62 FPS Economy 
Number of government parties (NPARit) 1.73 1.00 5.00 0.71 MICE, VUB 
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Table A19 Distribution of DFCT over municipalities and time 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Mean 0.99 0.92 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.09 1.10 1.11 
Std. Dev. 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.26 
Min 0.27 0.26 0.64 0.61 0.74 0.61 0.57 0.53 0.79 0.58 0.67 
Max 1.71 1.43 1.76 2.42 2.09 2.48 2.72 2.23 2.73 2.87 2.78 
25% 0.94 0.85 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 
Median 0.98 0.94 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.03 1.03 
75% 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.07 1.01 1.11 1.07 1.06 1.11 1.12 1.13 
   PRESENTATIONS 
 215
Presentations at (inter)national 
conferences 
 
Goeminne, S., Geys, B. & Smolders, C., Political Fragmentation and Projected Tax 
Revenues: Evidence from Flemish Municipalities, at 
 International Tax & Public Finance Congress, Jeju, South Korea, August 2005 
 VVE-dag, Brussels, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium, September 2005 
 European Public Choice Society Conference, University of Turku, Finland, 
March 2006 
 
Goeminne, S. & Smolders, C., Vote expectations and pre-electoral tariff cuts in Flemish 
municipalities, at 
 World Meeting Of The Public Choice Societies, University of Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands, April 2007 
 International Tax & Public Finance Congress, Warwick University, UK, August 
2007 
 INFER Public Economics Group Workshop on Public Economics and the 
Provision of Global Public Goods, National University of Ireland, Ireland, 
September 2007 
 Labsi International Conference On Political Economy and Public Choice, 
Universita di Siena, Siena, Italy, September 2007 
 (Accepted for presentation on INFER Annual Conference 
Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK, October 2007) 
 XVth Public Economics Meeting, University Of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain, 
February 2008 
 
Goeminne, S. & Smolders, C., Determinants of local tax rates in Flemish municipalities, at 
 WZB Economics and Politics Seminar Series, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung, Berlin, Germany, December 2007 
 
PRESENTATIONS 
 216 
Goeminne, S. & Smolders, C., Strategic debt policy in Flemish municipalities, at  
 (Accepted for presentation on Second Workshop Political Economy, Technische 
Universität Dresden, Dresden, Germany, November 2008) 
 16th Symposium on Public Economics, University of Granada, Granada, Spain, 
February 2009 
 
    
 
 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Faculty of Economics, Social and Political Sciences 
and the Solvay Business School
Prof. dr. B. Heyndels, supervisor
Prof. dr. C. Smolders, co-supervisor
Essays on strategic fi scal policy 
in Flemish municipalities
Dissertation presented to the 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
in partial fulfi lment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor in Applied Economic Sciences by
Stijn Goeminne
essays o
n
 strateg
ic
 fi sc
al po
lic
y in
 fl em
ish
 m
u
n
ic
ipalities  
stijn
 g
o
em
in
n
e
This dissertation is about fi scal policy in Flemish municipalities in general 
and focuses on strategic policy in particular. As an introduction to local 
fi scal policy, we investigated the simultaneous role of partisan e ects, of 
fragmentation, of interaction dynamics, of electoral cycles and of fi scal illusion 
e ects on the Flemish local income tax rate and local property tax rate. 
Even though policymakers’ fi scal policy choices are assumed to bring 
about their re-election, policymakers may fail to achieve this aim. Aware 
of this failure, policymakers may change their policy from ‘opportunistic’ 
to ‘strategic’. Policymakers expecting to lose power may pursue their 
fi scal policymaking to restrain their successors’ scope of policymaking. 
Suchlike strategic behaviour, the focal point of this dissertation, is 
introduced and tested in Chapter 3. We use a vote function to estimate 
the governments’ vote expectations and provide evidence that especially 
leftist and fragmented governments expecting to be defeated change 
debt to reduce the scope for policymaking of the next government. 
Debt changes in election years thus can be explained by the government’s 
vote expectations. One way to change debt is –ceteris paribus– changing  tax 
rates. Indeed, in Chapter 4 we fi nd a signifi cant impact of the vote expectations 
on these changes. The lower the vote expectations, the stronger the local 
income tax rate cut. This is in line with expectations from strategic use of debt 
models. This e ect cannot be retrieved for local property tax rate changes.
Finally, in chapter 5, we investigated whether fragmented governments are more 
optimistic about tax revenues. Overestimating tax revenues allows governments 
to spend more than the actual revenues allow for. This expectation can be 
inspired by the strategic use of debt.  Overestimating tax revenues can be a 
strategic instrument for increasing debt when a government expects not to 
get into o  ce again after the upcoming elections. Also the ‘weak government 
hypothesis’ and the ‘war of attrition’ may explain higher optimism in coalition 
governments. We show that the level of political fragmentation indeed 
a ects the local government’s revenue forecasting behaviour. Nonetheless, 
we fi nd that coalitions with at least three parties are less optimistic.   
Stijn Goeminne is research assistant at the Faculty of Business Administration 
& Public Administration of University College Ghent and is part of the Policy 
Research Centre on Budgetary & Tax Policy. His research focuses on local 
fi scal policy. He teaches fi nancial management in the public sector.
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